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Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Between Autonomy and Authenticity
This thesis reconsiders some of the major works and themes of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the
light of recent debates centering on forms of subjectivity in liberal modernity. Rousseau is not
a liberal thinker in the sense that he invests full political agency in the individual. However,
he shares common ground with the liberal tradition in his promotion of the self to the
exclusion of the social in a number of works. On the other hand, Rousseau's strictly political
framework is communitarian in its recognition of the purely public nature of legitimacy - the
General Will which all individual citizens are expected to express and conform to.
It is argued that the dichotomy identified in Rousseau's work between the positions of subject
and citizen fail to fully realise the potential for a reconstructive view of subjectivity. This
reconstructive view is based on the potential for reconciling individuation and socialisation.
This reconciliation has two branches. In the first place, the subject loses any idealist or
transcendental status, consciousness, cognition, knowledge and other vital parameters of self-
definition are decentered. Secondly, subjectivity is reconstructed along relational lines as
intersubjectivity. In the process truth is demoted from the plane certainty to a more humble
life in the transactional milieu of the social sphere organising and coordinating daily actions,
forms and practices.
Rousseau's works do not expressly recognise the intersubjective reorganisation of
subjectivity. They do however traverse the field of tensions in the process of attempting to
define the subject or social life in terms either of the idealist category of selfhood, or the
practical category of community. The reference points of authenticity and autonomy are
juxtaposed to suggest that those reconstructive theories guiding some current thinking can be
useful in reconsidering Rousseau's notion of subjectivity in a more complete sense. This
greater completeness adds a dimension of inconclusiveness since it is achieved by bringing
Rousseau's narrative and autobiographical works and his systematic and philosophical works
into direct confrontation.
The Confessions is reconsidered as a work in which the attempt to describe authenticity is
immediately frustrated by the position of the real in language. However, the real cannot
appear otherwise than in language. For Rousseau self-identity has the wholeness of substance
and is grasped immediately. This immediacy is what language obscures, but it is not
recoverable through the reconstruction of the self's presence to self. Rather, the subject must
acknowledge its indebtedness to its recognition by the other for its sense of identity. This
indebtedness must further be expressed as a recognition of the other, which recognition is
identifiable at the core of language and inseparable from intentional consciousness, including
self-consciousness
The Dialogues is the product of a crisis of the subject held to ransom and objectified by its
complete entrapment in the webs of a conspiracy. The subject makes a virtue of its unique
status as the sole object of this universal representational system. It is the reality which the
conspiracy regards but can never fully capture. The constructive power of the conspiracy can
nevertheless not dissolve the authentic self which attempts to define itself non-derivatively as
the truth misrepresented by lies. The text promises to deliver the subject as presence - as truth
- but fails. This failure is productive insofar as it advances a model of understanding more
finely tuned both to its own experience of the conspired against subject unable to ultimately
identify either the conspirators or the subject which that discourse has constructed. The
subject's attempts to test the conspiracy and to present themselves as the only fully examined
subject can never be exhausted. What follows is endless examination, revelation and
interpretation, the relocation of truth away from ontology, and the decentering of the subject
from presence to time, or multiple temporal frameworks.
For Rousseau autonomy under the law means the freedom to bind oneself to the norms of the
social formation by participating in the formation of those norms. What is not considered in
this idealism of the freely negotiated contract and the novel social agreement is the sense in
which subjects clash with the given nature of norms, their existence as conditions which one
enters involuntarily. At best, simple reconciliation with those norms represents the acceptance
of the social role as the authentic self. However, this neglects the fact that the cause is not
objective in the sense that it exists prior to discourse but only in the sense in which it assumes
priority in discourse. Clearly, under the law, oedipal narratives structure self-understanding
and the range and nature of lawful positions available to the self. However, autobiography,
insofar as it is a narrative of the representation of guiding imperatives, or a confession of
pathos laden distortions of authenticity offers the opportunity to produce self-interpretations
which actively reinscribe the cause with agency of some type.
Emile broaches but contains the framework for intersubjective selfhood. The ecuation is
driven by a model of autonomy which view relatedness in terms of compromise and sacrifice.
The form of selfhood is modelled on the real as object world, on the assumption that a
scientific understanding of nature is disenchanted and referential rather than semantic and
merely another, competing fable amongst others. However, the education resolves the
tensions it itself produces by disguising the subject's relation to forms of otherness as the
potential crisis against which its own theory guided genesis of the individual guards.
INTRODUCTION
BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND
AUTHENTICITY: A RESPONSE TO MODERNITY
Ethical modernity arose in the context of attempts to secure the norms of culture from
the conditions of culture itself rather than from a transcendental viewpoint.1 The
Enlightenment has frequently been identified, by both proponents and critics, as the
source of this project to oust sacred foundations, examine processes of formation of
subjects and societies and critique standards based on learning processes without
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rational criteria. A prominent example of and tendency within the liberal ethical
viewpoint in this respect is the device of rational goods construction and moral choice
of the social contract.3 In its most recent manifestation in Rawls' Theory ofJustice 4 it
draws on the premise of autonomous individuals making free choices for the sake of
ordering a society founded on principles of justice. Rawls' individuals make decisions
from behind a "veil of ignorance"/ Rawls' 'veil of ignorance' is a device based on
tenets of the rational choice game which is central if not tantamount to justice.
'Ignorance' here refers to the state of the participants in that they are permitted no
preconceptions regarding the type of society that will emerge from their choice nor
their place in it. As the societal type is a reflection and ordering of the goods valued
and competed for within it, ignorance ensures that choice cannot be founded on or
favour those who hold one set of values over another.6
Rawls' work has been criticised as typical of views influenced by the liberal
enlightenment based on choices grounded in and justified by free will.7 Equally, it has
1
been criticised for its misconception of subjectivity as radically individualistic and as
irrational to the extent that it conceives of identity as absolutely torn from the context
of the transactional milieu in which all consciousness is formed and is enacted.8 For
Charles Taylor, liberal universalism posits an unrealisable and incoherent
'unencumbered self' reflecting abstractly on choices without concrete premises.9
Individuals, he argues, inhabit particular cultures and occupy distinct and complex
positions within them. Taylor argues that agency cannot be separated from context,
that "moral frameworks"10 are fundamental and that any attempt to step outside them
and achieve the 'view from nowhere'11 is irrational and invites a loss of identity. The
meaning and value of the goods constituting identity are socially constructed and
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change historically. Therefore, the neutral language of liberal choice or autonomy is
not even a recognisable human language. Natural languages are, argues Taylor, a
1 ^
composite of "qualitative contrasts" which relate intention and consequence, not in a
principled (rational) but a fundamentally indeterminate manner. Qualitative contrasts
express the essential indeterminacy of historical agency to the extent that individuals
do not simply express themselves but are constituted in the process of having their
actions interpreted and reflected back to them.14
Recent critiques of modernity have focussed on the contradictions inherent in the
liberal construction of the subject and the relationship between the individual and
society.1:1 Alasdair Maclntyre, for example, argues that under the conditions of the
liberal Enlightenment the dense and concrete moral vocabulary of historical
communities was jettisoned in favour of standards of judgment based on the
autonomous will of the individual.16 For Maclntyre, objectivity cannot be the result of
a complete transcendence of tradition. Moral reflection is impossible outside
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historical understanding. The individual as a free consciousness able to reflect on the
social context is a dangerous fiction which endorses an arbitrary assertion disguised as
rational choice. It is, first of all, a fiction to the extent that it assumes that an
individual without a role in society can effect self-criticism and reflection. For
Maclntyre, membership in a community is a precondition of moral choice.17 The
relationship between fact and value, which is a precondition of choice, can only be
established historically. It is the product of social practices which have force within a
coherent community alone. Secondly, the atomised individual poses a danger to the
extent that it seeks to displace forms that have evolved within the history of a
particular society with others which, from the point of view of the moral self-
understanding of the community, can only appear arbitrary.
Recently, attempts have also been made to realise the emancipatory potential of
modernity. The most prominent effort in this respect has been Jiirgen Habermas'
linguistic reconstruction of the subject in discourse. Flabermas dismisses the
components (but not the objective) of subject-centered reason - which he identifies as
part of the broader project of the philosophy of the subject. The philosophy of the
subject conceived of the relation between individuality and universality in terms of
18self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, under this rubric, identifies with reason and
identifies knowledge as that which is. Rationality, therefore, is institutionalised
rationality which endorses extant forms and the conditions of formation as they stand.
As these conditions do not allow for reflection on formative processes, modernity and
enlightenment are largely repressive.19 Habermas hopes to retain the emancipatory
potential of autonomy by defining it as the self-reflective recovery of conditions of
subject formation without the transcendental trappings. In other words, he considers it
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possible to resolve the issues of self-consciousness through the exercise of a
reconceived (and therapeutic) form of self-consciousness. Self-reflexivity, for
Habermas, must be reconstructed intersubjectively.
Communitarian critics dismiss the possibility of assuming a transcendent, critical
20 ... . .
perspective as Utopian." The quest for critique is dangerous because it disengages the
subject from the traditions and practices of the community in which it is a member,
and disengages that subject from the forms, traditions and contexts which alone are
responsible for providing the subject with ethical substance. Universalists argue, in
response to communitarians, that a critical theory is required to assess which
traditions are appropriate to follow, and which are destructive, discriminatory and
21
perverse. If one relies on the standards of the culture in which one is immersed, one
will lack standards forjudging that society when it is corrupted. Critics of
universalism point out that the observer perspective is always already a product of the
subject's enculturation by and involvement in formative processes, and that to rise
above them is to risk replacing functional values with arbitrary standards derived from
the newly freed will of the individual. Habermas agrees with communitarian
concerns to the extent that the radical atomization of the individual under the
conditions of liberal modernity must be countered by the development of
. 99
intersubjective strategies of reason and intersubjective formations of identity. ' It is
not the consciousness of the individual investigator that judges norms but the process
of debate and argument in intersubjective communication. Taylor too allows for the
reflective, judging agent of conscience but only in the intersubjective context which
brings to light the discrepancy between what is (facticity) and what ought to be
(validity).24 Self-awareness is the product of partial and overlapping resolutions of
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multiple frames of reference. The world cannot simply be reclaimed by consciousness
through the raising of validity claims, but discourse between interlocutors can resolve
the frustrations of the agent's confrontation with incommensurable values.
Communitarians argue that self-interpretation and therefore reflective subjectivity can
only be derived from meanings available in culture. Critics of the communitarian
position respond that autonomy must be understood in terms of a relative
transcendence of cultural determinism. The subject, then, must be an historicised
subject capable of dialogical self-consciousness. For Mead, reflexivity involves the
internalisation of meaning produced when subjective behaviour is recognised and
acknowledged by others. However, for Habermas, Mead's formulation is
incomplete. Mead's account describes conventional role formation but not the
formation of an independent ego. The condition of independence is not simple,
mechanical reciprocation but consensual communication.26 Mead could well be
describing roles assumed without question or under duress. Autonomy, however,
77
requires communication to include the testing of norms such that the subject acts on
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the basis of convictions that can withstand rational critique. In other words, the
dominant normative perspective must be open to question by the subject assuming
their place in society.29
In Emile, nature is the transcendent term. The process of education, however, reveals
subjectivity to be less a recovery of the objective conditions of nature than the need to
negotiate an internalised boundary between the I and the Me. The basis for autonomy,
then, is less a metaphysics of identity as a language of evaluative contrasts. It is not
the ipseity of 'is' which Emile must master, but the anxiety generated by the metaphor
'as' which he needs to overcome. The observer does not obtain a truthful or
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scientifically valid position with respect to the object of study (whether nature, society
or concrete and particular others) but is revealed as actively involved with them and
equally constituted by them.
Normative testing makes the subject in Habermas' view the subject of a truth
discourse - that is, a subject who acts and engages with others on the basis of the truth
in
and Tightness of applicable standards. However, whether the subject can ever
appropriate this idealised ground is open to question. The activity of speaking is shot
through with ambiguities, displacements, and deferrals which make it impossible to
exhaustively comprehend the other's discourse, or to produce an explicit one oneself.
If validity could be produced by or for the subject, subjectivity would return to
monadism. Testing only arises in the intersubjective context wherein self-
identification is appropriated from the point of view of a participant. '1
In the Dialogues there is no presence to self. Rousseau attempts to recover the truth of
the event of the subject's appearance but is left postponing it indefinitely. The subject
is not self-identical but always already historicised, or interpreted. The logic of
interpretation structuring the text is that of the primal scene which defines the subject
as essentially relational - as an effect of the allocation and reallocation of significance
between scenes and between texts. This interpretation is not equivalent to the
presentation available in the autobiographical text itself - that is, it is not a self-
relation - but is achieved in a context infused with external opinions, forms and
unassimilable constructions of which the conspiracy is the ultimate sign. Rousseau is
unable to uncover the truth in the terms provided either by the text itself or the
significant intertexts (Plato's Apology or Rousseau's own Morceau allegorique).
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The primal scene which structures the Dialogues is traumatising because it conveys
messages which are inherently enigmatic, but which nonetheless remain and are
recognisable as messages. Therefore, the message it conveys is the message of
exclusion from the inception. The Dialogues' analytical mechanism for approaching
the origin as one which simultaneously deflects the interpreter from the origin is
apparent in other contexts, whether truth is figured as 'self' (as in the Confessions)
'nature' (Emile), or law. As Laplanche comments, it is significant that Freud never
refers to a single particular occasion as the primal scene but to "various" occasions
32and the desires they give rise to : "different circumstances ... have been able to
convey one scenic message and it has been possible for this to be repeated in different
ways."33 With respect to the law, the same event - castration - sets in train the
possibility of its being, as Laplanche comments, repeated in different ways. The
question then is whether the repetition entrenches the same event across a wider range
of phenomena, or whether the repetition represents the dispersal without logocentrism
of the foundational event - namely, the possibility for (the reality of) difference. What
the event entails, then, is a problematic core of interpretation. What the law becomes,
in this context, is an objective enigma demanding a labour of elaboration and re-
interpretation from the subjects it forms.
The liberal will is informed by cultural developments which have promoted
authenticity and autonomy above membership and political involvement. The works
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau have featured frequently in this debate, and have given its
central terms much of their substance. Charvet identifies Rousseau's natural man as
the exemplar of autonomy, and of its tensions. Charvet is implicilty informed by
Sartre.34 The natural man is defined by the subjective rather than the objective
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viewpoint. That is, the natural man is interested only in his own opinions and
judgments rather than being dependent on others. Natural man does not reside within
a space of reasons, justifications, challenges and responses - that is, a shared
intersubjective context. Charvet considers natural man as the product of a rigid
demarcation of an objective viewpoint (being for others) from a subjective viewpoint
(being for self).36 The natural man's solution to subjective challenge is to make others
conform to the subject's own viewpoint (to objectify others rather than objectify
himself). This preserves natural unity, and turns others into instruments of his own
subjective self-fulfilment.
The dichotomy is not solved by the social pact which transforms men into citizens.
The contractual solution is intended to center on the fact that the community
recognises the value of its members. This displaces the recognition of each subject as
valuable. Because there should be no competing interest, but only harmony of justice
and self-interest Rousseau may preserve the subjectivity of the citizen only at the risk
of subjective disunity. Love of self separates men from each other and is incompatible
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with the general will which unites them.' In this, argues Ferrara, Rousseau
demonstrates the tensions inherent in a modernity defined in terms of advancing
individualism. Under these conditions an ethics of authenticity clashes
irreconcilably with an ethics of autonomy.
For Ferrara, then, Rousseau's writings demonstrate the working through of the
problems of the impossibility of securely choosing either self or society. The either/or
is genuine and complete because determinate criteria do not intervene between the
subject and their society or themselves to orient them towards the good, the true or the
right. Ferrara argues that Rousseau does no more than indicate the limitations of each
8
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of the ethics that characterised the Enlightenment/ In Emile, Rousseau advances
arguments for the benefits of autonomy, its component characteristics and the means
of achieving that state but cannot claim that it is good without exception. The
Nouvelle Heloise similarly problematises the conditions of modernity by
demonstrating authenticity as failing to achieve the resolution between subjective and
objective conditions. In both cases, Rousseau advances analyses based on an
understanding of the problem ofmoral choice confronting the subject and suggests
either that the either/or remain unresolved, possibly transcended by quasi-Sartrean
'radical choice'40 or repressed by the subject's complete identification with the order
contextualising the choice.
Recently, theoretical frameworks have been developed which restate the problem of
the subject-context nexus. Extreme versions of this interrelation have been posited.
On the one hand, the determinativeness of the structure - variously referred to as the
Symbolic41, the text42, Reason43, Spirit44, the General Will4;i - is said to be absolute.
This development - usually dependent on theories of language or discursive function
- have countered the subjective idealisations of the philosophy of consciousness.46
They have, however, done so at the expense of agency and the means of undertaking
effective interventions in a history reconceived as absolute and subject-indifferent.47
On the other hand, some qualified transcendence of that structure is proposed by
means of repositioning the subject in the intersubjective context.48
A split dominates Rousseau criticism. Bernstein recognises this as Rousseau's
reflexive understanding of the modern dichotomy between forms of identity and
forms of social action resulting in the need for idealised motivations (the categorical
imperative) because of the complete withdrawal of the individual from social life -
9
Rousseau's "double men".49 However, even Bernstein fails to consider that Rousseau
reclaims the subject through and in the subject's formation in the breach. Instead of
the suspension (rather than the foundation) of the subject in the gap between the place
of the subject and the objectivity of the formal system, even sympathetic critics
implicitly or explicitly rationalise Rousseau's conclusions. Ferrara, as stated, artfully
and artificially separates autonomy from authenticity. Others, such as Dent,
psychologise the subject in order to compartmentalise its defining structures.50
Dent recognises, in response to Charvet's critique of Rousseau, that "the self in
isolation" plays a significant role in Rousseau's thinking5' and that Emile is raised to
embrace needs and values that make "no essential reference to the existence of
co
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others". " He goes on to consider how these values are foundational for social values:
in other words, how a sense of personal entitlement gives rise to a sense of
53
responsibility. In the process Dent finds a distinction in Rousseau between
"primordial amour de soi"54 and "reflexive amour de soi".5:) Dent, however, cannot
explain how primordial unity can develop into reflexive relatedness. Indeed, his
description of a starting point in structures that do not involve the responses of others
elides the explanation for identity that takes individuality to be inherently
responsive.5'' If there is such a thing as primordial amour de soi, it is apparent in
Emile that its primordiality is the product of internalised fantasy structures which
make the role of the imagination central to the sense of fundamental unity. Those
fantasies are raised on the ground of elided alterity. Dent's formulation of primordial
57
amour de soi - "to live in good company with ourselves" — is in fact revealing of the
intersubjective requirements of subjectivity.
The point, then, is to recognise in Rousseau a certain discovery, and an attempt to
disguise it. That discovery is the breach which itself issues in a call to autonomy, and
makes autonomy a paradox. In other words, Rousseau makes the paradox
foundational. The law permits autonomy, but only by means of what Zizek refers to as
the process of the wound being healed by the sword that dealt it in the first place.58
The Confessions continually reaffirms the subject through its self-distancing, Figures
of flight and escape - transcendent conscience, sublime eloquence - serve the subject
and permit its self-recognition - but do not permit its foundation in self-recognition.
The self always leans on the other (as the young Jean-Jacques, in the foundational
discovery of self, leans on Marion) in a way that can never be disclosed, but depends
on the support language finds in the absent 'thing' it represents. In the Dialogues,
Rousseau abandons the truth in the process of seeking the truth of a structure - the
pan-European conspiracy which he believed was leveled against him - that only
promotes a false image of him. Emile proposes to construct a fortified protective
integument between the world and the autonomous subject. However, the subject is
defined by internalising a boundary between self and world, including others, which
cannot be admitted to consciousness. This results, contrary to the pedagogical
program, in the irretrievable foundations of the subject in the unconscious, and the
displacement of knowledge from scientific conditions of reference ('is') to metaphoric
parameters of signification ('as').
Rousseau does not (fails to) solve the problem of the subject in breach. In this sense,
readers who find in him two contradictory subjects (man and citizen) are right.59
However, the place of the contradiction in Rousseau is equally significant, since the
contradiction is not simply symptomatic, in the negative sense, of a programmatic
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failure. Rather, the contradiction forms the basis of a reconceptualisation. Rousseau
makes the materials for the recovery of the subject available by not providing
consistent accounts of formation and by developing conflicting lines of interpretation.
Ferrara suggests that the coherence of Rousseau's thought should be examined across
both his philosophical and his autobiographical and fictional works.611 Rousseau
indicates that his works would take up his fundamental concern to know "what
experiments would be needed in order to come to know natural man; and by what
means ... these experiments (can) be performed within society?"61 and outline a
project worthy of "the greatest of Philosophers".62 The Neuchatel manuscript of the
Confessions maintains that it "will always be a book precious for philosophers"63 and
so relates Rousseau's autobiographical works directly to his systematic writings. For
Rousseau, the explicit object of research, "to know natural man" can only be
undertaken by a process of 'disentanglement', separating "what is original from what
is artificial in man's present nature".64 There is no reference to whether this project
can ever be completed. Indeed, the name Rousseau gives to the process suggests
otherwise since it posits a duplicity without a standard against which to measure and
compare the separated deposits. Disentanglement therefore argues for an
epistemological process characterised by the articulation of tensions.
Rousseau considers the tensions that characterise the internal self-relation of the
monad. His works also consider the contradictions informing the requirement of
justice and community and the potential discursive dissolution of the subject within
those contexts. The extremes characterising Rousseau's position can be clarified by
setting the approaches of two important recent theorists of subjectivity - Jiirgen
Habermas and Cornelius Castoriadis - in opposition. Habermas is concerned with the
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construction of rational criteria as frameworks of subjective interrelations.65 For
Castoriadis, on the other hand, critique is radical and should result in unprecedented
forms of expression and conceptualisation.66 Authenticity requires maintaining
independence without complete detachment from the real. Flabermas argues that the
subject and the objective conditions of social and physical life will be unbroachable
without common ground - which he posits in language. Castoriadis proposes the
relative independence of the fantasising imaginary as the only source of novel
meanings.67 However, he confronts the problem of a real heterogeneous from
consciousness which can make no impact upon it and can have no reference to it.
Castoriadis proposes a form of original representation which is essentially
hallucinatory, cannot be traced in any way to the real, and a prototype of all future
wish fulfillment. The subject operates under the imperative of complete unification
since, if the constituting fantasy replaces the 'lost' initial object it must do so under
the organising assumption of plenitude, that nothing is missing68. For Castoriadis, this
monadism exerts pressure over the rest of subjective life, resists the assertion of
difference in order to carry the other back to the core state, and if it fails to do so,
substitutes fantasy satisfactions in its place.
Habermas on the other hand proposes overcoming the problem of autonomous self-
regard and social other-regard by linking individuation and socialisation.69 If society
were simply imposed on a psyche in no way inclined towards it, social relations
would not only be contradictory, or violent, they would be impossible. However, all
that follows from the psyche's inability to produce social forms is the need for
facilitation. Habermas explains the subject as intersubjectively constituted in the
context of speech acts. He takes as his basic assumption that the 'natural telos' of
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language is to communicate, to raise valid claims directed towards others and to
which they are invited to respond.70 This conception is as extreme as Castoriadis' but
in the opposite sense. In communicative reason, language subsumes everything into it,
including the pre-linguistic elements of desire, the drives, and the whole theatre of the
unconscious. Thus, everything would be embedded in the public language of the
culture from the start, no matter how elementary.
It is simply not clear, however, that language has the capacity to represent those
hallucinatory formations in the form of intentional communications. In fact, framing
these primordial constructions within arguments based on propositions testable with
respect to their validity is in danger of rendering symbolic significations naturalistic
objects. This would give rise to an expectation that the discourse of the other could be
neutralised by being assessed as false, or inaccurate. The realist premise conceives an
end to interpretation. Meaning, however, includes the nocturnal - the point between
obscurity and objectivity, the opacity that makes all attempts at perfect
communication deficient.
So, where Castoriadis cannot conceive a figure of mediation, Habermas dissolves
everything in the medium. If Castoriadis' individuals do not enter into intersubjective
relations, they at least do not disappear as producers of discourses. However,
Castoriadis is incorrect to assume that the self and society stand in metaphysical
opposition to each other. The idealistic construction of Habermas' relation between
language and the world, on the other hand, is too facile. There can be no simple
convergence of language and alterity. Language does not transform the world into
discourse without remainder, nor does it set out the conditions of fit between
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phenomena and propositions which allow explicit representation without obscure
implication.
In the Confessions, for example, authenticity is already structured by the other in the
form of conscience or sympathy. Rousseau understands, in his writing devoted to the
state of nature that language has a transcendent moment (silence itself), but also that it
mediates.71 Authenticity, in attempting to recover the former can only ever do so
through and as the latter. Authenticity, therefore, is itself a subject of language even if
it dwells in autistic silence. More importantly, it is equivocal to the extent that its
stillness in time and space is itself an indication of a unity supported by an active
synthesis.
The residuum that is left behind after the symbolisation of reality is central to Lacan's
understanding of language and the formation of subjectivity in language.72 It is central
to present concerns about the conflicting ethical requirements structuring subjectivity
insofar as authenticity emerged as a significant cultural and personal reference point
because ethics could not be idealistically conceived as the point of convergence of
principle and action. For Lacan, in fact, the subject defines itself through this very
point of non-coincidence as lacking. It must indeed find itself as lacking from the
order of actions and reasons which define morality. The subject can never coincide
with the system because it is not the possessor or master, it belongs to the system -
the phallus (the control of signification) does not belong to him.73 In Lacanian terms,
if the child simply accepted castration it would accept the impossibility of never
finding itself in the symbolic. So, it defines itself as lacking as a way of sacrificing its
lack of coherence with the symbolic. Against absorbance into the system the self
defines itself through language as that which it is not yet. In terms of social identity,
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authenticity calls into question received and habitual opinion. Every speech act,
however, must be supported by a self-conception of the subject (authenticity) as
opposed to the role bound speech of sincerity.74 But this conception is merely an
expectation which will be revealed retroactively by what the subject can be said to
have meant: "a retroversion of effect by which the subject becomes at each stage what
he was before and announces himself - he will have been - only in the future perfect
tense."7;> Every act of enunciation reenacts the founding of the ego - from its
emergence in insufficiency, to its completion in anticipation: "the subject is the
emergence (surgissement) which, just before, as subject, was nothing, but which,
scarcely having appeared, congeals into a signifier."76
Autonomy, therefore, can only be completed under conditions of authentic self-
relation which, in turn, compromise — if not undermine - autonomous action. For
Rousseau, man and citizen are contradictory positions. The contradiction itself strains
the concept of the subject. Rousseau's refusal to bridge subject and society by means
of a medium invites extreme conclusions. On the one hand, truth sides with the
subject and accepts the loss of society. On the other hand, a third term is raised
between and amongst subjects resulting in the totalisation of society and the loss of
subjectivity. There are, however, discernable tensions within his formulations which
give rise to detectable displacements of either the monad or the transubjective
subject.77
Rousseau validates the law by means of an autonomy which requires the subject to
reclaim the cause or origin of the law. This origin - castration - must therefore be
interpreted and form part of the self-interpretation of the subject. This self-
interpretation is realised in autobiographical narrative - wherein the conditions and
16
effects of autonomy are reconstructed from existential data rather than from the
schema required by the institutional doctrine of the citizen under the General Will.
The narrative, however, never overcomes the foundation of subjectivity in an external
event incapable of being fully subjectivised, reclaimed or disavowed. Ultimately, it
must be acknowledged that what limits the autonomy of the subject is equally the
source of the subject.7lS The Freudian-Lacanian basis of this interpretation must guard
against what Freud identified as the tendency to say that the person is "retrogressively
fantasised instead of progressively determined".79 In fact, no separation of these
temporalities is permissible. This becomes clear in and through the Confessions where
time is discovered to be the time of the other, and the question of origins is transferred
from a source in the subject to a source in the other. Closure, in other words, is not a
linear movement (a telos), but a place in a system, essentially a linguistic system,
founded on positions and juxtapositions which allows for reinterpretation by allowing
its elements to be put into play.
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In the Confessions1 Rousseau conceives of an idealist category of subjectivity which
. . . . 9
posits an imaginary coherence: authenticity as substance." The self is enclosed both
upon itself and against others and alterity. The, Confessions registers a tension
between consciousness and language. The self understood in terms of a language is
experienced as decentered in language. The language of substance is a language with
a dual aspect: the thing that is relinquished in language returns as an absence around
which language is formed. The enclosure is, in fact, a fold in which inside and outside
.3
are contained within the single figure in the form of an indeterminate demarcation."
Rousseau posits the lost dyad of thing-symbol in the first practices of signification -
authentic language. This loss (the substance) is revealed in desire - the fantasy of the
object (a) or the remainder of the real in language which allows the subject to posit its
wholeness against existential dichotomy. The reclaimed wholeness of the subject is
figured in the Confessions in conscience and eloquence. However, these can only
reveal loss despite the conviction of the subject. Levinas is considered as the critic of
an ontology or egology in occidental constructions of subjectivity which figure the
self as desire, and desire as possession of the other as grounds of identity.
Rousseau's authentic language is appropriative, and reveals, in its move to complete
the subject, a relation and separation from alterity. It parades as a complete discourse,
or metalanguage. If authenticity sees not through language, but language itself, it
posits a demystification. However, even after the demystification of the conditions of
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discourse, language still conceals - authentic language hides the fact of concealment.
To comprehend the relation within the framework of identary logic produces a
paradox. For Levinas, on the other hand, the other is prior to discourse, and does not
appear in discourse. Exercising vigilance against the confidence in a completely
explicit discourse gives rise to an awareness of alterity, that is the otherness of the
other. The other is the source of responsibility as immanent in consciousness. What
ensues, then, is a sublime ethics. Responsibility precedes the subject, producing a
sense of dislocation, of incomplete representation in self-consciousness.
AUTHENTICITY
With the development of a modernity which increasingly cut individuals adrift of
sources of identity and legitimacy in tradition, the potential developed for
incommensurables to structure experience and subjectivity.4 If authenticity demands
that the individual make life choices and embrace values based on truth to self rather
than the place those goods occupied in an established order, the scope for the
individual to find themselves increasingly and irreconcilably at odds with society
expanded. To some extent an outlook based on the pathos of accepting that the
individual's acknowledgment of social life or celebration of uniqueness in their moral
choices characterised the emerging modern self.5
Ferrara identifies an ethic of authenticity in Rousseau's Nouvelle Heloise.1' There, the
character's existential immersion in the compelling contexts of family life confronted
a growing recognition of conflicting desire - inner nature and objective circumstances
failed to mesh, moral choices proved immune to the Hegelian shaping of desire by
reason (Bildung).7 To the extent that, in the Confessions, Rousseau intended to present
22
himself as a natural man whilst bracketing off the distorting effects of social
involvement, the subject of the autobiography is not authentic. Taylor argues that
Rousseau's rediscovery of nature as it relates to the self constructs a position siding
with the rational enlightenment against an earlier and still contemporaneous religious
skepticism. That skepticism was represented by Pascal for whom 'man' mediated
between two absolutes - that of the divine, and that of the person - both of which
were essential, and whose incompatibility explained human fallibility.9 For Rousseau,
the reform of human conduct through the rediscovery of intention in natural feeling
rather than social motivation drew the species closer to the divine. Conscience was the
voice of the divinity - the pure mediation of self-relation. However, it was also a
language and therefore admitted mediation.
For Rousseau, authentic identity is a "strong, simple, uniform whole."10 Rousseau
takes the monad as a starting point wherein all that is ever encountered is the flow of
internal representations failing to engage with the social world. Seen in these terms,
the authentic self is satisfied only by a fulfillment of desire that can be achieved
wishfully, and is opposed to opening onto the external world. Enveloped in this
narcissistic disavowal of reality, socialisation can only be provoked by a shock to the
homeostatic system from which it does not essentially recover. The natural self is "too
simple to be capable of description ... true happiness is quite indescribable; it can
only be felt ... because it is not the result of a collection of facts but a permanent
state." Under these highly specified conditions a disruption to the heavily bounded
identity is inconceivable. Utter simplicity precludes the appeal of external reasons, the
alteration of facts are irrelevant to the preservation of the permanent state, and true
happiness appears beyond the appeal of motives emerging from without. Natural
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scarcity seems incapable of explaining how socialisation can intervene to reform the
identity of a creature satisfied by the internal conditions of imaginary self-satisfaction.
Authenticity's immediacy amounts, in fact, to an appropriation of reality to itself.
Natural man defines itself through the immediacy of being able to take and use
12 •whatever 'comes to hand'. Explaining why natural man had no need to enter
relations under the conditions that pertained in the first state of nature, Rousseau says:
"Fruit does not shrink from our hands. One can take nourishment without speaking.
1 ^
One stalks in silence." Natural man is self-formed to the extent of this capacity for
appropriation. For Rousseau, language is only a part of post-appropriation subjectivity
because it is disappropriative, or dispossessive. What it dispossesses man of is the real
- fruit disappears in language. However, the "silence" natural man dwells in is not the
state of the world in the absence of language, but language in its absence: the silence
of language which realises the unspeakable presence of the object.14 Objects
themselves are said to bear a "mute eloquence"15 and an ideal language says
everything before one "actually speaks".16
In the act of appropriation, the I itself recedes. In Meadean terms, the authentic self is
the Me which the I reflects on and appropriates.17 That is, it is the condition of its own
appearance and disappearance in language. From Rousseau's consideration of
authentic existence in the state of nature it is necessary to conclude that language is
itself this act of signification trapped between revealing and concealing. Derrida
proceeds from the discovery of the impossibility of a science of the origin of presence
to a subject that is no more than the effects of the movement of the signifier.18 These
alternatives are based on the assumption that the subject must be either an absolutely
centered and transcendent point or nothing at all. It is a false inference to conclude
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from this absolutist premise that there can be no possibility of a subject that is not
self-centered. As Adorno argues, from materialist premises, the subject without an
object "would be literally nothing".19 Subjects are inseparable from the world they
inhabit and the relation between subject and object is one of mediation. The subject
experiences the world as something both given, and distanced - that is, as an interplay
ofmediation in language and material immediacy. Rousseau must be read as
proceeding (if not assuming) as if authentic representation is not a metalanguage but
the discovery of language itself as that which mediates all things yet which is itself
immediate. Authenticity, or self, names the most originary experience but only to the
extent that the authentic self is lost at the level of (mute) immediate experience in
order to return as an object in language. The subject therefore is, like the object (the
first fruit) reflected on in language, that which has no possibility of appearing there.
The Confessions is the discourse of truth to the extent that being is presented there as
the index of itself.20 Truth requires a language without lack. However, language is the
embodiment of a lack, and it is only the localisation of that lack that stops the
dissemination of meaning. Authenticity, or nature, in other words, is the index of its
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own impossibility. Language indicates that there is a fundamental loss in its very
presence, which the self embodies in authenticity, where loss attains positivity.
Language is a positivity in that it cannot be negated because it is the embodiment of a
lack. The thing or real makes language possible without being in language. The other
is a void around which language circles. It is recorded in the passage of language, but
never appears in discourse.
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Authenticity, cradling a lack, cannot encompass the immediate self-relation, or self-
consciousness. The Confessions transcends the contradictions of authenticity through
conscience, which itself transcends the self, and is at the same time immanent in the
self:
Conscience! Conscience! Divine instinct, immonai vuice irorn heaven; sure
guide for creatures ignorant and finite indeed, yet intelligent and free;
infallible judge of good and evil, making man like to God! In thee consists the
excellence ofman's nature and the morality of his actions; apart from thee I
find nothing but the sad privilege of wandering from one error to another, by
the help of an unbridled understanding and reason which knows no principle.22
Thus conscience represents the retrieval of authenticity, the human capacity to
overcome tensions between the necessity of grounding moral action and the
arbitrariness of those grounds. At the same time, conscience is the demand for self-
discovery, and self-recovery of the grounds of subjective ethics - that is, an ethics
which cannot be given by the other. Paradoxically, it must be capable of recalling
what is prior to choice and reason, that is, prior to the subject.
Conscience tests but is not derived from extant social conditions. It must therefore
form the basis for normative interaction in the first instance - and therefore what it
means to be inseparable from the world of others.24 Rousseau contrasts the basis of
his own morality ("the vigorous and repeated flights which any sensitive heart must
take outside itself'25) with that of Frederic-Melchior Grimm's ("the sole duty of a
man is to follow all the inclinations of his heart"26). Here, the association of
transcendence with decentered identity rather than egoistic self-absorption is
27constitutive of self-consciousness. Grimm's ersatz morality is no more than a
strategic self-determination grounded in the objectification of concrete others -
summoning his valet "with a 'Heh!', as if the great man had so many servants that he
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did not know who was on duty ... In fact he completely forgot that the valet was a
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man."" In forgetting the other, Grimm forgets himself (as his elaborate toilette which
shows him donning a cosmetic mask indicates). In the Confessions Rousseau contends
that it is possible to concentrate on the monadic core of identity without obliterating
the other, or the moral sentiments. The external flight is not a passage through
intersubjectivity. The Confessions concentrates on the relation of difference between
self and society, presenting contrasting possibilities of a private life threatening social
order (Grimm), and an authentic interiority available to morality despite the
constructedness of social relations.
In the metaphysical tradition, conscience is an ontology (or anamnesis) because what
is (onto) could be represented before a perceiving subject who could experience the
representation in the mode of recollection. The good and recollection are intrinsically
connected For Plato, recollection - the return of the Form/Idea by way of an imprint,
9Q
is an eidos of beauty and the good, or supreme truth, coming from beyond."
Metaphysics is concerned with the appropriation of presence into self-presence - with
that which brings to presence in the first place. The self, however, does not occupy the
first place. The initial impetus towards ('love' of) the good is independent of reason
TO
or the subject.
If there was any man so wretched as never to have done anything, all his life
long which he could remember with pleasure, and which would make him
glad to have lived, that man would be incapable of self-knowledge, and for
want of knowledge of goodness, of which his nature is capable, he would be
.31constrained to remain in his wickedness and would forever be miserable.
This love of the good, or 'conscience' is a transcendent (natural or divine) voice
which has already ordered the good that self-knowledge comes upon subsequently.
Identity is therefore determined by a relation to the good which cannot be grasped,
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negated or transcended. The involuntary nature of memory, its independence from
intentionality suggests that deep within the self there is another self, and that therein
lies the basis for the notion of the soul. Nietzsche describes the metaphysical primal
scene of memory in this way:
One must revise one's ideas about memory: here lies the chief temptation to
assume a 'soul', which, outside time, reproduces, recognizes etc. But that
which is experienced lives on 'in the memory'; I cannot help it if it 'comes
back', the will is inactive in this case, as in the coming of any thought.
Something happens of which I become conscious: now something similar
comes - who called it? Roused it?32
Only narcissism, appropriated to what Nietzsche calls the 'fiction of the subject'33,
bars the presupposition that there is a subjectivity within the self - an other.
Levinas reads the history of ontology critically and ethically.34 For Levinas, the aporia
that structures conscience requires it to be rephrased as a call from the other rather
than an inner voice. It is a command to act responsibly with respect to the self and the
other; and a sign that the other's claim on the self is unqualified. Moral responsibility
is not in addition to some ontology or knowledge of the world. Obligation is prior to
agreement or contract. Conceptualising contract as some common framework of
understanding on which morality is added fails to grasp the ethical relation with the
other:
The consciousness is affected, then, before forming an image of what is
coming to it, affected in spite of itself. In these traits we recognise a
persecution; being called into question prior to questioning, responsibility over
and beyond the logos of response.35
The bond is also infinite in the sense that responsibility has nothing to do with guilt,
or the relative position of self and other. The contract, which relates self and other, is
unable to embody or structure ethics. The infiniteness of responsibility articulated in
the uncontainable prior existence of the other calls into question the subject's right to
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identify themselves as an I, a self-consciousness. The self is unique, self-identical, not
in its relation to self, but in its relation to the other Responsibility for the other
constitutes my uniqueness - since I am responsible for the other to the extent that no-
one can take my place.
MEMORY
Memory is displaced as the basis of identity both because it is subject to empirical
failure36 and because the effort to perfect memory is an accusation of the spontaneous
ground of being. The remembering subject is divided between the heterogeneity of the
remembered objects and their representation to the subject. Les Charmetes is
associated with Rousseau's rare experience of happiness, but memories of it constitute
only a "fugitive reality". Access to the original qua original is only possible when
the objects of representation are not objects but sentiments. Self-consciousness is not,
then, a species of 'consciousness of'; rather, consciousness establishes the form of the
memory itself.
What shall I do to prolong this touching and simple tale as I should like to;
endlessly to repeat the same words, and no more to weary my readers by their
repetition than I should weary myself by beginning them forever afresh?
Indeed, if all consisted of facts, deeds and words, I could describe it and in a
sense convey its meaning. But how can I tell what was neither said, nor done,
nor even thought, but only relished and felt, when I cannot adduce any other
cause for my happiness but just this feeling? I rose with the sun and I was
happy; happiness followed me everywhere; it lay in no definable object; it was
• 39
entirely within me; it would not leave me for a single moment.
Where self-consciousness establishes the truth of the narrative by embedding it in the
immediacy of feeling or a "chain of sentiments,"40 conscience idealises a prior ground
as the immemorial. Narrative time is contained outside consciousness in the narrative
chain to avoid the paradox of the past which leaves something unassimilable - the
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immemorial. Making the past opaque to consciousness brings it forward and
denatures its essential irreversibility. The past can never be possessed as an object of
knowledge or be controlled by an act of will.
This opacity is revealed in an episode wherein Rousseau unexpectedly re-encounters
Mile de Vulson. Rowing on a lake with his father, he notices some ladies nearby and
asks who they are. His father responds:
'Why doesn't your heart tell you? Its your old love, Mme Cristin - Mile de
Vulson she was.' I started at the almost forgotten name; but I told the boatman
to change course. It was not worthwhile breaking my vow, and renewing a
twenty-year old quarrel with a woman of forty, though then I was in very good
position to take my revenge.41
Because consciousness implies memory - opposing discontinuity ("I started ...") with
synthesis ("my vow") - it challenges alterity.42 'Presence' - the instant which
interrupts the chaos of history and, according to both Levinas and Lyotard, simply
calls out that 'there is' (ily a) - is there even before that which is has any signification
("'Why, doesn't your heart tell you? ... "').43 Being has a total personality in revealing
itself instantaneously. For Heidegger, Being announces itself imperatively44 and is not
defined in terms of an end.4:> It completes an ontological task in completing a
chronological task (being is time). Lyotard contends that letting occurrence be (ily a)
must be accomplished every time (and never finalised). Being is only potential in that
it announces the openness of the subject to renewal and reform by the other. Renewal
cannot be consciously avoided: even before Rousseau can 'decide' to change course
he has been caught in the past of the other. Time cannot be mastered by memory,
rather the subject emerges in memory's production in time.
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Time cannot be mastered by memory because time is not exhausted by the past, but is
equally of the future. Rousseau's encounter with Mile de Vulson is not only an
encounter with his own past, but an encounter with an other having its own future.
Indeed, Rousseau is dispossessed of his "old love" precisely because becoming Mme
Cristin, and a woman of forty, was the other's future alone. The future is not subject
to the self's will, choice or assertion - it belongs ultimately to the other. The other
dwells in possibilities forever closed to the self, and has a relationship with time
unrelated to the self.
This moment reveals for Rousseau that subjectivity occurs in time rather than the
other way around. For Deleuze, there can be no self-identical, singular subject
because time is the interiority which the subject is interior to.46 For the Rousseau
punting on the lake, the flashback prompted by his father gives rise to a
pronouncement that restores time to linearity rather than expropriating and defining
the subject through exteriority and disruption. However, the characterisation of time
as ineluctable confronts time as immemorial to the extent that the subject foregoes its
possession, and thereby the ontology of time. Time, as such, originates in the other,
since it is only in the presence of the other that the present of the subject can be
disrupted. So, for Rousseau to construct the subject in relation to the other would only
underline the fact that the subject at this point stands revealed as indeterminate.
The real time of the subject is, as Deleuze maintains, 'indiscernible'47 because the
subject interpenetrated by the recognition by, or time of, the other questions the self-
sameness of that subject.
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SUBLIME DISBELIEF
The Levinasian critique of Heidegger is relevant to the constitutive role of otherness
implied in Rousseau's attempts to isolate an authentic self from the conflicting data of
social relations. Rousseau shares a phenomenological concern recognised by
Heidegger in his discussion of angst. Rousseau's sentiment of existence - which
cannot be thought (conceptualised) but can be felt is echoed in Heidegger's
understanding of the disclosure of totality through moods such as boredom, joy and
A O
angst. The whole may be incomprehensible, but it can be experienced. The
fundamental mood (angst) consists in being brought face to face with the real within
the symbolic, which is the disclosure of nothingness.49
Nothing brings consciousness into immediate contact with being.50 The effect of this
is to repel the subject - to throw the subject into acts of symbolisation. The subject is
transcendent to the extent that it overcomes determination by what is (nothing) in this
way. The subject's freedom is radical; freedom individualises the subject to the extent
that the subject slips out from under the effect of determination by the other.51 This
freedom, or individuality, however, is only available in solitude. As Heidegger says, it
is (at last) revealed by death because one dies alone. ~ Death, however, is an act of
dispossessive realisation - a destructive cause. Rousseau's 'strong, simple, uniform
whole' is an impersonal state of being inherently related, and the precursor, to the
facticity of death. Death is the 'brute fact' of life which, in its placement and
simplicity, deprives the subject of consciousness of itself.
Levinas contends that there is a fear of Being as primal as the fear of death. In other
words, the absolutely other is not the impersonal alterity of death - which, in bringing
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to a head one's finitude is a non-relation (a non-relation with nothing). The meaning
of subjective being is founded in the other. The subject (even if it is, as Heidegger
says, horror) is produced by something. This horror implies an experience - or the
possibility of an experience since the horror is produced by something. Angst, on the
other hand, is the non-relation with nothing - the absence symbolised in language.
Subjectivity is the product of something, not nothing. Consciousness is produced in
the subjective comprehension of something, not nothingness.
The shock Rousseau experiences at the sight of Zulietta's malformed nipple measures
the extent to which the symbolic never completely transforms the real - there is
always a residuum, a remainder. His amazed stare articulates a traumatic fixation. " In
fixation the real cannot be adequately transformed into symbols which can be
substituted and displaced. The real is everything that is yet to be symbolised - it is the
material, the object.
However, the real object signifies nothing.^4 The real 'returns' as a centre of gravity
around which the symbolic circles. The symbolic can never absorb or translate this
real - it skirts it. Indeed, one cannot represent nothing (or the thing) because it is
uncontainable.^5 It can, however, be grasped as allusion, or in evocation. That is, as a
'negative representation'. Essentially, representation articulates the paradox that it
represents nothing.
In Heidegger, this nothing gives rise to anxiety (angst).56 The yet to be symbolised
appears as the negativity of waiting. For Heidegger, the response of 'astonishment'
indicates that revelation has occurred.57 "We step back, as it were, from being, from
the fact that it is as it is and not otherwise."' In other words, consciousness is the
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process of being thrown away from 'there is' - from authenticity, into language -
because 'there is' has no subject.39 For Levinas, this waiting is charged with positive
value: it is pleasure since it is the means of welcoming the stranger, the unknown. It is
at least a tension in waiting suspended between pleasure and pain. The welcoming is
the very means of sensing the occurrence - making the subject ask, 'is it happening?'
in reference, obviously, to the real.
The autobiography strikes the ambivalent contour of the absent centre at the time of
revelation presaging greatest pleasure. The subject is caught between taking a step
towards pleasure, subjectivation, and meaning and excluding the unrecognisable
materiality making such a deep impact on it. If all the subject sees is an absence, then
meaning must occur, as Freud says, as the refinding of an assumed but lost object:
"the finding of an object is the refinding of it".60 Freud explains that object choice
after the latency period repeats the child's first object choice - the breast. For Lacan,
however, the object was always already lost - in never was, but was only
retrospectively constituted as 'lost'.61 The subject, then, is essentially phantasmatic
and does not correspond to a remembered experience of satisfaction.
Lacan's reconstruction of Freud benefits from a reading mutually reliant on both
Heidegger and Levinas. Subjectivity is raised on the ground of what establishes and
threatens - what compels and repels us at the same time. Consciousness begins as a
retreat from that towards which we draw near, an averting of attention from the object
of epistemic desire. As the breast, or object, is constituted in those moments of
deprivation when the mother is absent or refuses the child, the child experiences the
anxiety of losing control of the means of satisfaction, and the imaginary pleasure of
bringing it under his control in fantasy. However, control in fantasy is equivalent to
lack of control in fact. What follows is appropriation - mastery through the concept,
or ontology.62 Once symbolised, the child can never again refind the breast as
experienced the first time - as not separate - extending the child's ambivalent
response. Actual objects found thereafter, Zulietta for instance, are simply not it.
They are something else, the reminder that something is missing. They are - as
Zulietta tells Rousseau by advising him that he would be better off as a mathematician
than a lover63 - products of a symbolising mentality.
The symbol has in fact concealed, or masked, the object which is not there. Ontology
makes the partner the object (a), not the woman as such. It is, says Lacan, not her that
attracts him but something he gets from her.64 However, what he gets is only
something already deposited there (and refound). Zulietta has been invested with the
desire reserved for Mme de Warens - whose breast had previously been exposed and
admired for its perfection.63
That threat of being contains the potential for its own overcoming is realised in the
experience of the sublime. Sublimity is a neurotic form of pleasure in that, in it,
delight consists of the removal of the threat of pain.66 The sublime is not an
unalloyed, but a painful, pleasure, wherein we fail to present the absolute and
consequently experience displeasure. Nonetheless, the imagination is prevailed upon
to present it - to present the sensible in an image. However, because the real is infinite
and cannot be represented it must be relativised, contextualised and conditioned - in a
word, misrepresented. The paradox is overcome negatively, through symbolisation of
the presence of the absolute to consciousness, and the recognition of the impossibility
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of representation. This type of negative representation articulates the labour of a
dispossessive language recalling the conditions of authentic language.
Certain objects and sensations announce the possibility that life will soon cease,67 that
there will be no more occurrence for the subject - no more il y a (there is). For
Rousseau, the waterfalls of Chailles and Chambery are such objects. Chailles is
experienced as the possibility of destruction through a fall. Nevertheless, Rousseau is
tempted to scale the falls: "For the amazing thing about my taste for precipitous
places is that they make my head spin; and I am very fond of this giddy feeling so
long as I am in safety."68 Rousseau thus creates the conditions of sublimity but
withdraws from the consequences of negation.69 He does so under conditions where
the self is incapable of taking possession of, and exercising control over, phenomena.
Indeed, he seeks security in the form of "a little river which would appear to have
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spent thousands of centuries excavating its bed."
In these contrasting realities Rousseau admits that he cannot face presence since
presence would disable the mind. Chailles is the pure manifold which the subject
cannot passively be carried along by since that would allow nothing to appear to
consciousness, to take place. Rousseau's safe perch at the top of the falls is the place
from which apprehension, making apparent, can occur. In other words, the subject is a
synthetic and synthesising subject. It is the subject of repetition or it is no subject at
all. The little river reveals a trace inscribed over the landscape,71 a figure of
continuous time but one emphasising the containment (the deeply excavated bed) that
allows continuity to flow, the immobility (place) that makes movement apparent, and
the possibility of representation. Consciousness depends on memory, on the least
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instant of retention, or it would remain unconstituted. There is always already
reproduction if the present is to occur.72
However, the deep river bed is itself a figure of the conditions of experience and self-
consciousness. It internalises the contradiction and necessity of motion within an
apparently enclosed system. Closure is only an artificial synthesis serving to make
T\ • •
movement apparent. ~ As with the river the more firmly entrenched the more swiftly
to flow, what has bitten deeply into matter unravels in time. Self-consciousness is no
more than the translation between these dimensions. At Chambery, misjudgment in
walking behind the falls can result in being "soaked in a moment".74 This 'moment' is
an event beyond conscious control. The possibility of 'something happening'
disappropriates the mind and exposes the non-self-mastery and non-self-presence of
the self. The moment is something poised on the edge of happening: it is about to -
and it is enough that it 'can' occur. This condition of possibility is identical with the
subject's relation to authenticity. The sublime is the feeling that something will
happen (the pregnant pause) - despite everything, despite the threatening void, there
is something there, that will take place and announce that everything is not over, that
ily a has not been obliterated. Sublimity is thwarted finality; the 'not yet'; the
suspended resolution.
DESIRE
The subject is constructed on the ground of desire. It occurs, according to Lacan,
when something ordinary is raised to the level of object of desire, of 'it', by chance.75
Object choice is less important than the entering of an object into the space opened by
desire. In fact, desire has no object properly speaking, but only a cause (the object
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(a)76). Sophie d'Houdetot's comic-romantic arrival at the Hermitage77 is followed by
another which just happens, says Rousseau, to coincide with his feeling "intoxicated
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with love that lacked an object" - and fixes on her as its object. Despite her
unwillingness to be seduced, Rousseau describes how they nonetheless shared a
related satisfaction:
We were both intoxicated with love - her for her lover and mine for her; our
sighs and our delicious tears mingled together. We confided tenderly in one
another, and our feelings were so closely in tune that it was impossible for
them not to have united in something.79
What arouses the subject's desire is the other's desire. It is not necessary for subject
and other to relate as beloved and beloved. The other's desire may be pure
80desirousness completely cathected in something or someone else.1 The causes of
desire, argues Lacan, are difficult to symbolise81. Rousseau can only say that desire
"united in something", however it is essentially related to the movement of signifiers
- the "mingl(ing) together" of tears and sighs, for example - opposing fixation and
demand. These partial and detached objects - sighs and tears - are signs of the lost
object - "something".
The movement of signifiers elevates the subject from consciousness to self-
consciousness:
It was in that wood with her on a grass bank beneath an acacia in full flower, that I
found a language really able to express the emotion ofmy heart. It was the first
and only time in my life, but I was sublime, if such a word can describe all the
sympathy and seductive charm that the most tender and ardent love can breathe
into the heart of a man. What intoxicating tears I shed at her knees! What tears I
82drew from her in spite of herself!
The incentive to speak, for Rousseau - which cannot be confused with the occurrence
of language 'itself' - is found in the common effort to recoup a common loss in the
• * 83transition to society. ' The relation of desire harbours a lack, because desire can never
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be satisfied. Desire is purified of the threat of dissatisfaction it poses by not being
satisfied in the relation itself: "The duty of self-denial had exalted my soul. The light
of every virtue adorned in my eyes the idol ofmy heart; to have soiled that divine
image would have been to destroy it."84 As Lacan explains, jouissance is the pleasure
the body is permitted to enjoy before becoming written over by the interdicts of the
symbolic order. The authentic wholeness of the self shattered by the presence of the
other is partially transferred to language.86 Rousseau's eloquence is the state of
language absorbing some 'illicit' jouissance to itself - refusing to fully sacrifice
desire, and giving in to the drive to put into words what cannot be articulated. At the
same time as maintaining his commitment to self-denial and the protection of the idol,
Rousseau enjoys manipulating Sophie against her will. In other words, he reveals the
full implications of the presence of the other: the coexistence of desire, which cannot
be expressed, and responsibility, which is not represented. Therefore, Rousseau's
eloquence reveals the subject's state of being in excess of itself.86 Rousseau is eager
to absolve himself of any need for shame, or any tincture of guilt because that would
reveal the existence of something that distances the subject from itself, undermines its
authenticity - unconscious desire. Therefore, he tells us: "I sighed and was silent. I
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embraced her. What an embrace! But that was all!" In this Rousseau declares that he
still has a conscience - which is an embrace of the other which is in itself nothing at
all.
Rousseau's embrace continues his technique of subjective appropriation. In it the
88other is taken up as being for the subject. For Levinas, on the other hand, eros is not
figured as grasping, but as a caress. The caress is aimed at what is 'not yet'. Its object
is mysteriously absent: it is not nothing, it simply cannot be possessed.89 In
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demonstrating that erotic love is the failure of possessiveness, Levinas demonstrates
( that the otherness of the other is irreducible and absolute. The other is desired but
cannot be possessed without destroying their freedom and agency. The only basis of
the relationship is one which preserves rather than neutralises the alterity of the other
Eros, therefore, is the relationship of intersubjectivity without fusion wherein the
beloved can appear in their otherness, without having to fit the ontological pre-
understanding (the embrace of conscience) of the subject.40 Overcoming the ontology
of language means allowing the other its extradiscursive reality - that is, allowing for
the other in representation. For Levinas, "the pathos of voluptuousness lies in the fact
of being two. The other is not there as an object that becomes ours or becomes us; to
the contrary, it withdraws into its mystery."91
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Because the subject is defined by alterity, it is a site of exit from itself. The dialectic
of the same inherent in the Rousseauian gaze is opposed by Levinas who announces
93that the self does not become authentic except in the 'eyes of the other'. The face to
face encounter disrupts the egology of ontology by means of an exposure to alterity.
Rousseau's eloquence is such an ontology in that in it desire aims to capture the
consciousness of the other. The task of letting the other appear to the same is based on
a subjectivity incapable of closing itself off, or withdrawing into itself. Mutual
interdependence, on the other hand, makes the other's freedom inseparable from the
subject's.
Levinas' subject is structured by transcendence. In other words, subjectivity is
inseparable from the other which precedes the subject. The form of subjectivity is
therefore an intersubjectivity from which emerges a responsibility that the subject
assumes without assent.94 In Levinas, the traumatic sudden appearance of the other is
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a signal for ethics. For Rousseau, the traumatic revelation of Zulietta motivated
egological withdrawal, and rejection. Levinas would critique Rousseau's irresponsible
reaction as inauthentic. Rousseau was not free to reject the other because subject and
other are bound prior to free commitment, or intention to commit. The subject feels
alienated to the extent that this responsibility "has slipped into me unbeknownst to
me".9'1 The subject is founded on responsibility, and is thus a stranger to itself,
indebted to the other for something that was never done. This marks the subject as
essentially passive, as determined by the other, and free only to be responsible.96
For Levinas, then, authentic being has an essential relation to the other. Fleidegger,
however, defines Being primarily in terms of the letting-be of the other. In other
words, freedom is prior to responsibility, since the relation to the other is disposed of
once and for all after the subject has let the other be. Letting be is primarily a concern
for the preservation of the self's own freedom, without responsibility. For Rousseau,
authenticity is a relation of self to self, not to the other; it is a rediscovery of the real
in language hence a relation to the thing (which is nothing). As this is true for all
selves, the other may orient itself to the thing without entering into relations with the
subject - just as it was not necessary for Sophie d'Houdetot's desire to have any
bearing on Rousseau's. In the Confessions, self is an abstract category (a "strong,
simple, uniform whole") resulting in depersonalised being and ethics. Indeed, to the
extent that authenticity is a relation of the subject to the truth in conscience, the other
is a source of distortion or obstruction except as an object of consciousness allowing
the realisation of self-consciousness. The Confessions specifically denies that self-
consciousness is not more than the awareness of a division, a self-displacement, and
that conscience is triggered by a guilt which one is accountable for, without causing,
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or recalling the subject's relation to it. The Confessions proposes that identity may be
fashioned in a space beyond repression - where standing alone is neither conducted in
suffering nor articulated as pathos.
For Rousseau desire is the motivation towards ontology and knowing. For Levinas, on
the other hand, the relation of desire must be one of non-adequation - the other
disrupts the intentionality of consciousness, and questions freedom (as the
identification of will and reason, where reason is the neutralisation of existents under
the common concept). Rousseau's Social Contract, on the other hand, posits an
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ontology of coexistence requiring a comprehensive knowledge of the other.
Coexistence requires comprehending the other's intentions. The social pact also
marginalises incomprehensible intentions, forcing intentions to display the features of
no
a common intention (the General Will). Rousseau sets out to defend the subjectivity
of interiority, the inner life - but his methodology cannot allow for difference.- it must
neutralise difference using the same conceptual strategy as the general will."
For Levinas, the self's freedom requires taking responsibility for the other "even to
the point of substitution."100 Consequently, subjectivity is inadequate to ethics. For
Rousseau, on the other hand, sympathy is only putting oneself in the same place as the
other, and then "we do not become what they must be, but remain ourselves
modified."101 Sympathy, in Levinas' analysis, still forms part of the ontological
project of comprehension. For Levinas, responsibility is a precognitive disposition
towards the other solicited in the face to face encounter. For Rousseau the self (in
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freedom) constitutes the meaning of the other's existence (letting others be).
Levinas posits subjectivity in precisely the opposite terms - that is subjectivity
constituted in and through alterity. The subjectivity of ethics is therefore called into
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question. Indeed, ethics requires an externalisation (ek-stasis) of the self for the others
sake.103
The problem with the conception of responsibility as the absolute command of the
other is the difficulty of conceiving how the subject can act otherwise. This has both a
prescriptive and a descriptive component. Firstly, it must be asked what it means
under this definition for the subject to act in freedom. If subjects are homogenised by
their formation upon the template of otherness they should not presumably experience
conflicting needs and desires. Secondly, how could a subject choose not to hear the
voice of conscience? Under Levinas' conception of non-derogable responsibility to
the other it is impossible for cognition to be directed anywhere else but to the other. In
his non-dialogic conception of self-other relations, conscience would speak and bear
the same meaning for all. The overwhelming conclusion is that the subject acts self-
contradictorily (by definition, in-humanly) when it chooses and acts contrary to the
other, because one cannot be oriented towards the other and act irresponsibly at the
same time.
By conceiving of an 'erotic' ethics which avoids the danger of possession, Levinas
proposes that the subject stand in passive toleration towards the other. The subject can
never truly embrace the other because the forms under which it does so retain the
residue of the ontology of appropriation. The subject's openness to the other can
never be a form of approach, or intervention but consists of vigilance and awaiting.
Ethics, subjectivity, and otherness posited prior to the social make it impossible for
anything (certainly not these categories) to support and induce socialisation.
Ricoeur is wary of ontology but identifies 'desire' as that "which is at the origin of
language and prior to language."104 Desire is unidentifiable in its generality and
43
priority, it hovers between being unsymbolisable and the uncontainable consumer of
symbols. Desire is that within language that presumes a moment of unavoidable
transcendence.107 It is, in other words, the tension in silence (itself, affirms Rousseau,
a form of 'mute eloquence') which is "turned from the very outset towards
language."106
MARION
The paradigmatic confessional moment for Rousseau centers on a failure of self-
knowledge and destructive action / desire. Rousseau accuses a fellow servant, Marion,
of stealing a ribbon which he himself had stolen intending, he says, to give it to her.107
108 •The incident has attracted significant commentary. These interpretations implicitly
promote an understanding of the subject in self-centered and self-invented terms alone
by basing themselves on the declarations, and an interpretation of the intentions and
the actions, of the subject Jean-Jacques, or the narrator Rousseau. Their approach
therefore continues the effect of marginalising Marion. The other's voice within the
text directs us to Rousseau's concern with unrealised identity. Rousseau describes
Marion's immediate response to his accusation:
The poor girl started to cry, but all she said to me was, 'Oh, Rousseau, I
thought you were a good fellow. You make me very sad, but I should not like
to be in your place.' That is all.109
In this paradigmatic moment, truth is the discourse of, and the imperative issued by,
the other."0 Marion tells Rousseau, and demonstrates through the text, what the
narrator cannot reveal to the reader. Her reference to not wanting to occupy the
deviant's 'place' despite his immunity from punishment identifies the incident as a
scene of the failure of sympathy.1" Unable to make the imaginative identification
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with the other required of him, Marion demonstrates that she both understands the
requirement for, and has, what he lacks. The stranger carries the self's response with
it. However, authenticating conscience conceives of the self-other relation through a
transcendent term - a third term, truth - which the authentic subject appropriates,
making the shared concept of reality asymmetrical in favour of the self. Because the
ethical situation in conscience requires the other to appear to the subject as a
comprehensible representation, there can be no actual address or relation to the
other.112
De Man has argued that Rousseau, in declaring that, in naming Marion, he literally
"excused [himjself on the first thing that offered itself' (Je m'excusai sur lepremier
objet aid s'offrit) includes her as nothing more than a contingent fragment in an
otherwise causal chain explaining his strange behaviour. As a result, her presence in
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the rhetoric of 'excuses' that structures autobiography is only coincidence. De Man
quotes Marcel Raymond approvingly when he says of Rousseau's strange explanation
for his accusation of Marion: "He accuses her as if he leaned on a piece of furniture to
avoid falling."114 That Rousseau would 'lean on' the name Marion as he would any
other object indicates the arbitrariness of their relation, the non-specificity of desire
and "the estrangement between subject and utterance" because, in this case, 'Marion'
is not a name but a mere "sound".115 For de Man, the 'rhetoric of excuses'
deconstructs the relation between the cognitive and the linguistic, and the
correspondence of meaning to language that it implies because Rousseau
demonstrates how his attempts at self-understanding and self-explanation do no more
than introduce "a foreign element that disrupts the meaning, the readability of the
apologetic discourse, and reopens what the excuse seemed to have closed off."116 This
foreign element is the cause of desire.
Rousseau wishes to close off desire - as a relation to the concrete other - in order to
conceive of himself in terms of simple wholeness. De Man therefore identifies the
undermining of Rousseau's synthesis, and the constitution of subjectivity in division.
He considers the confessional act a source of epistemic confusion. Examining
Rousseau's repetition of the confession in the Reveries de Man refers to the lacuna
introduced into the text by the disjunction between 'performative' excuses and
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'cognitive' guilt. Language is disappropriative, but not to the extent of a dichotomy
between cognition and being. Rousseau does not retreat into a subjectivity centered on
a constitutive fantasy not supported by discourse.
In this, de Man resembles Castoriadis who argues for a schemata prior to language
which is released in language and which desire (fantasy) 'returns to'.118 Lacan too
recognises desire as the opportunity to complete the self in fantasy."6 However, he
argues that fantasy is the divided subject's relation to the object (a). The object (a) is a
remainder from the real, a reminder of the subject's former unity. It cannot be
'found', only rediscovered elsewhere because its condition is to be always already
lost. It is lost after the fact, constructed as lost, discovered to be lost: or, rather, it
never was.
In fact, it is not possible to constitute an object under conditions of unity, because that
is an undifferentiated condition, where there is neither subject nor object. However,
the felt absence of that condition constitutes what the original condition must have
been for this condition of experience to be what it is. Under the experience of
absence, the object is symbolised. Symbolisation differentiates, makes the real in its
image, and makes it impossible to return to a prior state. Innocence is lost, and
knowledge is an unending symbolisation and resymbolisation of the real. Indeed,
what de Man refers to as the impossibility of an intentional consciousness depends on
an idealisation of the concept of intention such that its disruption undermines the
possibility of all coherent subjective expression. What Rousseau experiences, on the
other hand, is the impossibility of self-reflection ever rendering the subject explicit to
itself. What is brought to light does not simply complete a project of self-knowledge,
it both confirms and disappoints.
De Man's appraisal of Rousseau's idealist intentions extends to his dismissal of
Marion as a sound rather than a name. She too succumbs to the extreme formulation
that if the subject cannot be recognised fully, there is nothing there. However, the
other's voice confronts this analysis with another - that of the subjective identity as
the entwinement of subjects that goes, in this instance, by the name of sympathy.
Rousseau, in leaning on Marion, reveals the other not to be an object for the self to
substitute for some original lost object. In the same movement the other is designated
as not simply what the self is not, but constitutive: the means by which the self relates
to itself. In identifying Marion as a 'sound' rather than a 'name', de Man accredits
subjectivity to only one side of the relation. However, Rousseau argues that sounds
are the means by which language relates to itself, and this identifies the ultimate
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unappropriability of the other, or object for the subject. Not only are sounds
rendered fit to be heard by translating them into symbols, but so is language. Indeed,
Raymond's reference to 'leaning on' must be seen in the light of the development of
the term in the psychoanalytic literature. Laplanche coined it in preference to
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Strachey's English translation of Freud's Anlehnung as "anaclisis". Laplanche's literal
translation is meant to suggest that the sexual instinct props itself against the
instinctual apparatus prior to detaching itself and becoming autonomous. The
simultaneity of separation and involvement in the term and its imagery suggests the
contingency of the aim of the subject.121
Wade argues that the ribbon Rousseau says he accused Marion of stealing because he
wanted to give it to her functions as the Lacanian object (a) - the cause of desire, an
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object alienated in the real, and therefore inaccessible to the subject. In positing the
object (a), Wade implicitly argues against de Man's deconstruction of confession,
which identifies arbitrariness as Rousseau's mode of decision making and narrative
reconstruction. Wade's identification of Mme de Warens as the truth 'behind' the
ribbon, on the other hand, installs an ontology of desire based on a 'truly' desirable
object, rather than an inextinguishable dialectic of unrepresentable lost object (cause)
and unsatisfying identification and libidinal investment.
The narrative pattern associated with the ribbon is therefore one of repeated
acquisition and loss, satisfaction and disappointment. The ribbon - associated with an
earlier, lost one given to Rousseau by Mme de Warens - signifies unfulfilled desire,
and results in repeated frustration. Frustration enjoins the logic of teleology since it
posits a goal, the real, which the subject's efforts at symbolisation repeatedly fall
short of. Frustration, however, is essential, because the real is not constituted in
fantasy after it is lost, but is already fantasmatic at the origin,123 in that it was never an
object. Frustration signifies the presence of a destructive cause, a threatening origin
through which the subject emerges and is disappropriated. The ribbon does not
correspond to truth, it points to the inadequacies of a correspondence theory of truth
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which aims to anchor subjectivity in memory (representation to event), and masks the
revelation of inadequacy. There can be no recovery of unity, if synthesis refers to a
heterogeneous event, object or other. The subject cannot, as Castoriadis argues, signal
a return to natural quiescence since it would have to do so through the schema of a
constitutive fantasy untraceable to the real, prior to the emergence of difference.124
THE NAME
De Man has not only deprived Marion of her name, he has made both it and her less
than a signifier - a mere sound. For Rousseau, sounds do not signify. They must, he
says, be made to 'speak' in order to be heard, and have no effect unless they are
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understood. If, as de Man says, Marion is no more than a sound, she is subject to
the ontological pre-understanding that structures linguistic regimes. In this sense, the
arbitrariness of the excuse would be correctly identified since both name and sound
are to be brought under the rubric of the same, translated into the consciousness of the
subject.
Kripke argues that a name is an invariable designator of identity, indicating in its
repetition the presence of the same thing.126 If the name is a mere 'sound' designation
ceases, and meaningful language gives way to the free play of propositions. The self
escapes determination by the name of the other that precedes it. In fact, the self is
unitary only to the extent that it avoids determination. However, the name is not a
sound, but already meaningful. Without a meaningful origin meaning would fail to
follow. Marion therefore is a name. Only in remaining at the level of the literal can
originary displacement be perceived. In bearing meaning, what comes to mind
spontaneously, without previous denotation (by the subject's desire), is displaced
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from the origin, and from itself. Marion's voice does not simply swell out of
conscience, nor simply speak the truth. It is propositional and fully symbolic when it
comes to mind. It does not 'offer itself for the purpose of 'excusing,' it 'offers itself'
to interpretation - as a signifier, and therefore a subject; and not as a sound and
unrepresentably or pre-symbolically 'real'.
However, the real and the symbolic are related in that the real structures the symbolic
by its very absence. In this construction the name is a fragment of the real as a
positive condition of the restoration of the symbolic relation, and figures the paradox
that nature is what the symbolic leans on for ordering - averting collapse into
indeterminate difference without meaning. A totally contingent materiality establishes
the symbolic pact. Some fragment of the real therefore disrupts the indifferent stasis
that reigns between subjects (who 'excuse' themselves rather than taking
responsibility). By suddenly erupting in consciousness it structures the imaginary
whole into a symbolic organisation. The shock of the real, like the encounter with
being, is a destructive cause - the paradoxical condition of possibility for both subject
and object.
It is the other, therefore, who specifies what forms and positions the subject can take.
The other also mediates the subject's self-relation, through which the subject observes
the other. As Levinas says:
The consciousness is affected, then, before forming an image of what is
coming to it, affected in spite of itself. In these traits we recognise persecution;
being called into question prior to questioning, responsibility over and beyond
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the logos of response.
Marion's voice invites no response. She states her case against Rousseau and the
narrative isolates the other's voice from the subject's: "all she said to me was ... That
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is all." There is no question and response, no dialogue and communication in ethics.
For Levinas, the affect must be direct because it must question conscience itself - that
is, it must interrogate the inherited structures of ontology and language which mutely
(authentically) dominate the other.128 Goodness is alterity itself, which calls into
question the capacity of subjective freedom to orient itself towards the other, and
displaces rationality from ethics by unveiling the violence of its comprehension of
alterity.
It is revealing that Rousseau excuses himself from entering discourse at all. Levinas
cannot explain how an alterity prior to discourse can raise the issue of validity. The
silent call to responsibility in the face to face encounter can hardly hope to disrupt the
power of self-justification inherent in conscience. Levinas conceives of the relation to
the other in terms which maintain the separation of the same and the other, object and
subject. An ethics which insists on the absolute separation of self and other reinstates
monadism. Levinas moves from the extreme of complete heterogeneity of self and
other, to having to posit an immanent alterity within subjectivity. However, it a false
to infer from the fact that the subject is not a priori social that it is incapable of
socialisation. An immanence less absolute than Levinas' alterity will facilitate
discourse, ethical relations and social forms.
At the same time, Levinas cannot be dismissed entirely because his is a timely
reminder that drives, wishes and other forms of creativity cannot simply be translated
into language. The sound of the name and the name are not one and the same. The
entwining of sound and name suggests that something elementary, nocturnal and
unstructurated eludes meaning, or, rather, is retained as an obscurity within meaning.
Thought continues to lean on the thing which it cannot readily translate into symbols.
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There is no pre-established harmony between language and substance. The Freudian
concept ofAnlehung ('leaning on') is a quasi-ontological category which indicates
that others are not simply available to subjects in object choice, but marks the space of
separation as a condition of relatedness.129 The condition of subjectivity involves
reciprocation between the anticipation of meanings to come, as well as retroactive
designations revealing things to be first only after they have given rise to effects.
The scene of sympathy Rousseau constructs is divided between image and
intersubjective symbol. Marion is both thing and subject; the ribbon is both a symbol
and an object. The presence of both voice and ribbon in the narrative indicate that the
form of explanation is to be dialectical - as signifiers are meaningful not ontologically
but only once they enter relationships. Rousseau cannot be equated with the
Levinasian form. The other helps the subject heal the breach in subjectivity, but not
by closing the other into a loop, embracing it to itself in the search for objective
selfhood. Satisfaction is to be sought in the intersubjectively constituted world, in
mediation. The ribbon, therefore, must be translated into an expression of desire, as
Ricoeur would argue, for a shared code - a decoding of private meanings and their
rearticulation in discourse. The backward movement into the monad, into desire,
becomes the means for establishing the ethical relation - as when a wave of sympathy
engulfs the subject so that suffering propels them across unbridged sites of
130individuation.
At the same time, the subject is always in a position of receptivity, or desire. New
meanings do not arise spontaneously from a private, constitutive fantasy, but are
possible because self and other are not heterogeneous. In discussing the formation of
simple ideas Rousseau states that:
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As a new object strikes us we want to know it, and we look for relations
between it and the objects we do know, that is how we learn to observe what is
before us and how what is foreign to us leads us to examine what touches
131
us.
The subject's desire to know orients perception, structures relations and propels
learning processes. In the first confession, on the other hand, the subject encounters
something prior to itself ("the first thing"), which spontaneously comes to mind to
determine it. In 'offering itself' the other's passivity indicates the subject's
indifference to its obligation to recognise the other.
Marion is both the region of the real on which the subject finds material support
(leans on) to structure subjectivity, and the other of the subject. If neither Rousseau
nor de Man recognise this it is because one had failed to hear Marion, and the other
has continued to silence her discourse. For de Man, the fragmentary "sound" is the
true discourse of the other, but it is uninterpretable for not being symbolised. In the
Confessions, however, Marion is the site of a coherent voice. The problem for
Rousseau is that, in declaring her independence she threatens his integrity, which is
based on a standing negation.
Rousseau does, however, indicate an alternative resolution to the subject's orientation
to the other. When, having fallen asleep at the theatre of San Crisostimo, he
reawakens in the midst of a concert he remarks: "my first thought was that I was in
Paradise."132 Return to consciousness and transcendence of the conditions of
immediate experience concur. The experience depends on a fusion and doubling of
the senses and their relation to self-consciousness: "What an awakening, what ecstasy
1 nn
when I opened my ears and my eyes together!" ~ Here the languages of appropriation
and disappropriation meld. The openness to discourse (ears), and to the absence of the
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real (eyes) represent the state of awareness. The return to the senses is sanctioned by
their capacity to act as means of their own transcendence. The verse Rousseau hears
on waking is equally telling: "My lovely one will save me / For, see, my hearts on
fire".134 Here, the divided subject announces that it is closed over, its split resolved, in
desire; and that desire becomes the means of overcoming subjective division. The
object (a), the contingent fragment of the real which disperses meaning through
discourse by being unlocatable is itself the foundation of discourse.
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The intention of the Dialogues is to contrast true and false images of the subject with
the aim of restoring the former. The false image is critiqued as founded on
unverifiable and demonstrably untrue premises. In other words, the subject's public
image is the product of a heterogeneous cause. The false image is to be replaced by a
truthful account, itself a prelude to the subject's full presence. However, the
Dialogues cannot fully separate fantasy from representational logic. The three
dialogues construct separate but interlocking scenes. Identity is not located in any one
of these scenes rather than another but in the logic of the discourses connecting them
through equivalence and difference. The original subject, as opposed to the
misleading representations, is no longer founded in ontological certainty, but in the
mode in which transference between scenes is accomplished.
The psychoanalytical category for this constructive logic is the 'primal scene'.1 In the
primal scene, a presumed cause is ostensibly retranslated into symbols which are
subsequently interpreted and reinterpreted. Subjectivity arises not because the cause
can be traced, but because symbolisation has enabled causality to be presumed
without localisation. Indeed, the co-existence of proximate (memory) scene,
transference scene and original (event) scene means that subjectivity hovers over the
displacements and arrangements that these scenes enter.2 Establishing particular
(essentially provisional) relations at any one time is establishing identity. In other
words, identity is an act of translation unmastered by intention: analysis does not
mesh with a cause in any 'real' sense, and symbolisation is only the recognition of an
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absence, the acknowledgment of the effects of another scene, an elsewhere and
another time. The subject is therefore dominated by a sense of remove and
remoteness, an unresolved conflict that issues in disavowals and characteristic acts of
aversion, of looking aside from what it cannot resolve. Similarly, the intentional
component of the text is inconceivable without foregoing the search for an objective
identity - a metaphysics of meaning - in favour of an intertextual sense of
signification.
TRUTH AND METHOD
It is necessary to pose the question of the precise nature of Rousseau's constructions,
the process of construction, and the indeterminacy of the finished product. The
Dialogues is a tripartite text in which one speaking subject ('Rousseau') engages with
another ('The Frenchman') about a third who never engages in dialogue ('J.-J.').
Rousseau aims to convince the Frenchman that he has been mistakenly persuaded by
a universal conspiracy to abhor J.-J., and that he should adopt his own, independent
view of him - one similar to Rousseau's own. The Frenchman is to read the works
which have been held up as evidence of J.-J.'s abominable character prior to meeting
him. This final meeting - which is to be the culminating proof of his error, and
revelation of the truth known by Rousseau - never takes place.
The few critics who have examined Rousseau's text have concentrated either on the
historical 'reality' of the conspiracy or the author's state of mind/ Huntington
Williams is typical of the failure of exegesis in this respect. In an otherwise
scrupulous psychoanalytically informed analysis of Rousseau's autobiographical
project he succumbs to the reduction of the Dialogues to documentation of the
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author's mental state.4 More to the point is the relation of reality to fantasy. The
isolation of Rousseau's paranoid inability to tell the difference between reality and
fantasy fails to consider how those fantasies are related to the real. Rousseau calls the
reliability and significance of the thing to which the event draws our attention into
question by means of two complementary approaches. First, by use of the
'counterfactual' method, wherein the Frenchman becomes willing to speculate on
thoughts "which", as Freud says of psychoanalysis, "merely ha(ve) a possibility of
existing".5 Second, by means of the relentless problematisation of the historicity of
the event.
Rousseau's 'Preface' to the Dialogues explains his reason for writing them. Referring
elsewhere to the Confessions as "a book precious for philosophers"6 he criticises its
readers for having dismissed it so lightly. He deliberately makes the Dialogues a
difficult text - a text "for philosophers." The Dialogues is 'philosophical' in at least
one important respect - it refers generally and constantly to the Apology of Socrates
wherein the philosopher answers two principle questions: 'Who is Socrates?' and,
relatedly and inseparably, 'What is Philosophy?'7 Therefore, like the Apology, the
Dialogues relates person to praxis and attempts to establish a common ground for
both.
The question, 'Who is Socrates?' can be traced to the relationship between Socrates
and the Delphic oracle.8 The oracle's mode of imparting wisdom is described by
Heraclitus: "The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither speaks out nor conceals but
gives a sign."9 These signs are not a form of speech to be heard immediately and
grasped as truth, but are to be interpreted. They are signs which have the
characteristics both of disclosing and obstructing. The second question is answered by
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Socrates when he describes his own praxis. Socrates recalls in the Apology how, when
he first set out to examine being (onto) he was careful to avoid the danger of looking
directly into the sun for fear of being blinded: "I thought of that danger, and 1 was
afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my own eyes and tried to
grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to logoi and
examine in them the truth of beings."10
These logoi - interpretations or representation - articulate the same doublet of
revelation and concealment which structures the logic of the primal scene. Like the
sun the primal scene cannot be looked at directly, but is that which makes it possible
for things to be seen. The only way to investigate the sun, says Socrates, is to "look at
its image in water", or study it during an eclipse - that is, when it is 'covered over'.
The object of interest - the light itself - is unavailable to be seen. In a sense it is
necessary to be oblivious to the source in order to acquire knowledge.
Inquiry is always accompanied by the threat of blindness. In fact, the movement of
concealment and revelation is necessarily present because light only emerges from
and beside shadow. Similarly, knowledge requires an awakening to the ignorance
internal to the knower" - a constitutive darkness which distances the subject from
itself and its origin. For Socrates, philosophy is the revelation of the logic and
medium of this internal difference which permits things to become manifest. The aim
of philosophy and his praxis is to explain the conditions of access to knowledge for a
creature for whom ignorance is intrinsic.
Rousseau provides his own foundational epistemic myth. The Morceau allegorique12
describes a veiled statue standing on a smoke and incense shrouded altar at the centre
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of a temple, worshiped by the initiates of a cult who "painted her in their imaginations
in accordance with their own characters and passions".13 Three attempts are made to
shatter the power of the idol. In the first a man restores the sight of some initiates by
shifting the blindfolds they are forced to wear. In the second an old man whom
Starobinski identifies "as Socrates"14 unveils the statue expecting the revelation of its
ugliness to break the spell it has over "the assembly". Although it has the intended
effect on the philosophers present, it only renews the ardour of the ordinary
spectators. The final, successful attempt is made by Christ whose mere presence
awakens those who see him to the truth, but who nonetheless affirms his seizure of
power by breaking the icon "and, calmly climbing onto the pedestal ... seems to be
assuming his rightful place rather than usurping another's."15
Rousseau here appears to critique the Socratic technique as necessary but limited.
Identifying the aporias of human consciousness (constitutive ignorance) not only fails
to enlighten in general, it provokes16 renewed ignorance. In this allegory of naturalist
epistemology17 Rousseau presents himself as the heir of a metaphysical tradition -
one that believes that representation can grasp what is (onto), and that what is could
be represented before a perceiving subject who could experience the representation as
a mode of recollection. The Dialogues, on the other hand, foregoes the possibility of
presence - the making present figured by the actions of Jesus who, in taking up his
position on the pedestal, is a self-presenting presence. Rousseau undermines the
conspiratorial structure directed at J.-J., but fails to bring the Frenchman into the
promised face to face relation with him.
The Dialogues shadows the Platonic-Socratic text both in a general sense and in
specific instances.18 In particular Rousseau reproduces Socrates' distrust of a direct
perception of being - or knowledge of the cause. In the first part of the Apology
Socrates refers to a set of accusers who precede those currently assembled in the
court.19 They are so pervasive as to be elusive20 so that it is not even possible to name
them - except for one who is a writer of comedies and accuses Socrates of being one
9 I
"who makes the weaker logos the stronger". Two interrelated factors are addressed
in this speech: the inaccessibility of 'the first' to reflection, and the dependence of the
current accusations and their interpretation on the first. Socrates connects the "later
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accusations" with the "first false accusations" - the corruption of the youth of the
city. The first false accusations are the basis of the later accusations - they are an
established prejudice which designs the contours of the judge's ethos. Logic contends
that, by removing the first false accusations the latter will collapse for lack of
foundation - to refute all the accusations is to remove all the false images that are
presented as legitimate representations and accusations against Socrates. In the
Dialogues Rousseau follows this same procedure: "To spare the difficulty of so many
proofs, I ask only for one, but I want it authentic, invincible and according to all
• • 23forms. It is proof of the first offence which gave credibility to all the others".
The Frenchman says the Gentlemen did not attend to J.-J.'s crimes but to "his awful
character"24 — which is a petitio principii, a conclusion masquerading as a
fundamental premise, and lacking the status of a 'first'. Rousseau here analyses the
lack of primary foundations of the conspiracy - much as Socrates analyses the
motives of his prosecutors in the Apology. He does not mean to suggest for the apogee
of the Morceau to remain elusive to the protagonists of the Dialogues. However, the
intertextual presence of the Apology and Morceau in the Dialogues is suggestive of a
strategy in which textual relations at least partly provide the basis for the mimetic
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relation between the event (the conspiracy) and the verismilitude of its representation.
The Dialogues suggest a move away from ideal mimeticism - the notion that "the
95 • .
being of something that is, is being imitated". The mimeticism at work here is in the
zone of undecideability - between obscurity and concealment. Like Socrates' logoi,
and Heraclitus' sign, it reveals and conceals the referred to event by situating it
between construction and recollection.26
The presence of an intertextual event displaces 'event' from the ground of ontology.
The conspiracy's relation to the real is thereby thrown into question. However, what
is true of the conspiracy is equally true of the counter-argument. If Rousseau cannot
reveal the basis and workings of the conspiracy he cannot affirm his method.
Similarly, if he cannot displace the influence of the conspiracy by a radical
undermining of its terms and preoccupations, his status as subject cannot be promoted
to a basis in truth. The question of the ontological grounding of the self is not a
question of non-existence per se, or of unjustifiable belief but of the unavoidably
unsolvable question of origins which materialises when evidence points to an origin,
cause, or first but it remains unverifiable. The conspiracy is not an object of
observation - it is the sign of an ontologically undecideable intertextual event situated
in the space between historical memory and imaginative reconstruction — between
archival verification and free play.
As long as the identity of the conspiracy remains unrevealed, an ambiguity in the
relation between self and other - and therefore a fundamental indeterminacy of the
self - prevails. Under the conditions for ontological research prescribed by Socrates
and followed by Rousseau, the dialogic situation is incapable of generating truth,
since truth is subject neither to one interlocutor's authority nor the other's subjective
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recollection. As a result, the aim to provide subject and method with a common
ground akin to the Socratic convergence of praxis and persona is threatened. For
97 • • •
Lacan" the truth is in an 'impossible situation' in dialogue precisely because of the
difficulty of generating a notion of recollection that is neither properly subjective nor
objective. As the patient parts with the notion of recollection as self-presence truth is
displaced from consciousness to discourse. Interpretation is exercised in a zone
between subject and object - where truth is differential - and constituted somewhere
28 • /•between pure construction and historicity. The event remains (in Nietzschean terms)
9Q
'incalculable'. In other words recollection precedes the subject at the level of the
structure of the signifier. It is:
Not Platonic reminiscence - it is not the return of a form, an imprint, an eidos
of beauty and good, a supreme truth, coming to us from the beyond. It is
something that comes to us from the structural necessities, something
humble.30
Rousseau's method is dialogic, but follows the form of Socratic anamnesis in which
'dialogue' means 'inner dialogue'. Presence is self-presence in terms familiarly
Rousseauian from the actions of Jesus in the Morceau allegorique. Socratic
anamnesis places truth within the field of subjective recollection. Rousseau presents a
structuring myth in the attempt to overcome the problem of dispossessive language
which points to the real in the very act of establishing its inaccessibility. The First
Dialogue describes a mythical place where people know what they say before saying
it.
It is a characteristic sign by which initiates recognise one another; and what
gives great value to a sign so little known and even less used is that it cannot
be counterfeit, it can never act except at the level of its source, and when it
does not come from the heart of those who imitate it, it does not reach those
hearts capable of distinguishing it. But as soon as it reaches them, it cannot be
• 31
mistaken; it is true as soon as it is felt."
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Wanting to reproduce this economy of effortless signs requiring no labour of
explication Rousseau informs the Frenchman: "Everything I say to you can be
understood only by those to whom there is no need to say it."32 A place without
(necessary) speech is a place with a voice that is everywhere and nowhere.
Communing through the universally dispersed logos - the medium that is everywhere,
always already spoken - the voice of reason does not have to be made material
through speech. The voice of reason is an echo within the self of an earlier
incarnation. It is the logos through which the origin of the self remains present to the
self. Again, dialogical structure follows the form of inner dialogue; knowledge and
recollection are bound to the subject in its inwardness - its ability to bring the logos to
presence within itself. Thinking, speaking and reasoning are all modes of recollection
in that anything outside the subject is secondary and incidental to what has been
interiorised through recollection. The truth is synonymous with this form of
(voiceless) speech or dialogue - that is, recollection. Truth is founded on inwardness
to the extent that the subject is founded on the forgetting of its externality, its non-
self-presence, its divided (dialogical-dialectical) origin.
Psychoanalysis challenges the subject's origin in recollection through the constructive
discourse of the primal scene. Rousseau's myth of absolute interiority is incompatible
with his theory of language. There is therefore a significant convergence between
Freud's discovery of psychoanalytical method and Rousseau's discovery of the basis
of signification. Freud's primal scene is foreshadowed by Rousseau's analysis of the
33
emergence of language as figurative, not literal, in the first instance. For Freud
psychoanalysis centres on entertaining the possibility that the therapeutic effect of
"recollected ideas" may have nothing to do with their historical reality.34 In the
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process he jettisons his seduction theory of the mid-1890s which had given credence
to the authenticity of the scenes of childhood trauma recounted by his patients. Then,
recollected scenes had been accepted as fitting into an "associative and logical
35
structure". Freud concluded after some revision of this thesis that the work of
unconscious fantasy meant that it was "impossible to say anything about ... the state
which the pathogenic material was in before the analysis".36 He therefore challenges
the capacity of the patient to say anything coherent about the scene they claim to
37recollect. In other words, the resistance constructed by unconscious fantasy is
primordial.
Fantasy and reality, according to Freud, are bound together in an "intricate
10
meshwork'V They are so inseparable that the structure of unconscious fantasy
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provides the only access to the real represented in the scene. Rousseau similarly
rejects those analyses of figuration which sees it as derivative of, and a deviation
from, the literal, as the product of a referential relation between the word and the
object.40 Rousseau concludes that the original condition of language was metaphorical
and that the promotion of referential language to primacy in time and explanatory
power represents a forgetting of the figurative origins of signification. Man, on
encountering another such as himself in the state of nature fears the other and calls
them, first of all, 'giants'. Only eventually, after a number of encounters, does he
learn to see them as like himself and to give them their proper name, 'man'.41 The
word 'giant' is equally divided between a supposed reference to an exterior reality
and the registering of an internal state. Significantly, the choice of the word both is
conditioned if not determined by fear and does not correspond to reality.
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Temporal spacing and difference (figuration, Rousseau would say) have always been
present in the process of recollection. The recollection is not of what is (onto., Socrates
would say) because the subject, necessarily in the midst of it then and now observing
it from a privileged position, cannot repeat the event. As the event has necessarily
been 'worked over' (Uberarbeitung, Freud would say) and revised original
impressions are only significatory as deferred actions.42 Figuration is available to the
speaker, argues Rousseau, when he uses a word with reference to a passion without
believing that it designates anything beyond his subjective condition. Indeed, the
word 'giant' retains only its mythical dimension, as a word without an objective
referent. Because we "substitute the idea that the passion presents to us for the word
that we transpose"43 it remains in our vocabulary as a pure subjective referent, made
up of an "idea" interlaced with fear.
In the Wolf Man case Freud observed that "the dream seemed to point to an
occurrence the reality of which was very strongly emphasised as being in marked
contrast to the unreality of the fairy tales."44 The task of interpretation is to determine
the nature of "occurrence", but this occurrence cannot be placed directly in relation to
reality. It can only be placed in contradiction to unreality. At the origin, fantasy
conceals the origin. Like Rousseau's primal scene of subjectivity founded in
figuration, competing and irreconcilable levels of signification can be identified. At
one level the pretense of having grasped (or having to grasp) the real is alive. At
another it is relinquished so that an artificial, non-subjective memory replaces that
previously attributed to consciousness.
According to Laplanche and Pontalis:
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The original fantasy is first and foremost fantasy: it lies beyond the history of
the subject but nevertheless in history: a kind of language and symbolic
sequence, but loaded with elements of imagination; a structure, but activated
by certain contingent elements. As such it is characterised by certain
contingent traits which make it difficult to assimilate to a purely
transcendental schema, even if it provides the possibility of experience.45
Laplanche and Pontalis argue that Freud wanted to know what kind of event the
dream "seemed to point to."46 Lacan interprets Freud's approach as indicating "that it
is in relation to the real that the level of fantasy functions. The real supports the
fantasy, the fantasy protects the real." 7 Analysis must remember that the relation of
the object of interpretation to the real has been forgotten. The primal scene is what is
'unknown' and 'forgotten'. For Rousseau, the 'opinion' of the public is a dream
which frequently points to a forgotten origin. The conspiracy thereby functions as the
primal scene. However, 'the' primal scene cannot be singularised, reduced to a single
or unitary function or event. Primal scenes are indeterminate, and therefore multiple -
hence the need to raise and interrelate the structuring input of the conspiracy, the
Socrates of the Apology, and Rousseau's own Morceau allegorique. Furthermore, the
event and its symbolisation consist of two temporal frames of reference without a
stable relation between them. The unfolding of the scene, therefore, will consist of
A O
multiple temporalities, or "the originary role of non-originary temporal difference."
Because the explanatory framework is constructed at the intersection of different
times and scenes interpretation produces conviction outside recollection. Dialogue is
the joint work of interlocutors each criticising the historicity of the other's
reconstructions. At the limits of recollection the analysis cannot produce conviction
because what is remembered is the fundamental nature of forgetting - of looking into
the oblivion (non-self-presence) of the origin. The time for understanding is always
'another time'. In the Dialogues, it is the open future of the third part alone which can
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produce conviction as the projective repetition of the origin experienced in the
transference - a past towards which one is constantly moving.49 The Frenchman's
conviction will be produced in time as he comes to believe that the symptoms have a
cause that can be located in time.50 Rousseau's counterfactual method pervades his
reconstruction. Fie claims that because he has located an 'event' without which the
symptoms could not have developed he has identified an explanatory mechanism. The
subject therefore produces in himself the conviction that he has located a cause. At the
same time he does not position it directly in subjective recollection - but he does
position it within interpretive authority. What he demonstrates in the process,
however, is its incalculability.
FALSE ECONOMY
The subject of the First Dialogue appears to be the 'veiled' J.J with an undeserved
public reputation for heinousness. Public opinion here is a distorted will and, as such,
the public is not the subject it presumes it is - just as J.J is not the subject he presumes
he is. The public is no more than "a tally of voices"51 - an empirical collective, rather
than a consensus. The public constructs an opinion on the basis of the representation
of an original to which it does not have access and to which it presumes access is
unnecessary. The public subject's blindness is expressed through an ironic reference
52
to knowledge of J.-J (" ... once he was well known ... " ), whereas all it has and has
had access to is a veiled object. The gap between the subject and its appearance in
public opinion is a measure of the public's acceptance of the interpretation foisted
53
upon it by the "pledge"'' contracted between the conspirators and the experts they
import to guide the public's perception of the subject.54 This gap represents the
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opportunity for a deductive, circumstantially based construction put together in the
interstices between the mental images or symptoms of subjects.
The conspirators who malign J.-J are said to have their "reasons".55 However, the
conspiracy is not a form under rational control, but a machine with a life of its own.56
The figure of the self-moving conspiratorial mechanism is a figure of Rousseau's own
theory and his belief in the mechanism (the theory, and, what is not a completely
different thing, the conspiracy) he has just invented. His desire to discover the origin
of the other's unconscious desire becomes a compulsion. His quest for the origin can
appear as compulsive as the conspirator's drive to obscure their actions. To set the
stage for the self-imploding logical contradictions of the conspiracy, Rousseau is
driven to assume the scenario which reveals his understanding of the fate he is
subjected to. The demands of theory enable Rousseau to articulate the workings of the
mechanism, but only to the extent that the mechanism affirms the validity of
questioning which aims to reveal it. The Dialogues is itself Rousseau's mechanism
for celebrating his ability to raise the question - that is, his ability to articulate the
difference between reality and fantasy, scene and origin without ultimately locating
the necessary opposites of the bipolarity.
The structuring naturalist belief of the Dialogues is articulated in the danger of
appearances assuming an independent reality. The conspirators organise J.-J.'s
57
habitation and physical surroundings to satisfy his desires. The economy is the
symbol of a machine-like force which reproduces the realm of appearances. The
master conspirators enjoin the people to supply him with better quality goods for the
58
price of ordinary stock and make up the difference in price themselves. A
fundamental concealment of value occurs which bears the logic of the primal scene.
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Rousseau refers to the conspiratorial forgery of value in the bourgeois economy
because of the commensurability between the reinscription within the commodity of a
value that is not properly its own and the impossibility of commanding the event or
cause that underpins the interpretation in the primal scene.
In making 'opposites meet'59 the false economy echoes the Apology where Socrates is
accused of convincing ordinary Athenians that the weaker logos is the stronger.60 In
the Dialogues the public cannot "reconcile" just ends and unjust means or "virtue
through fraud".61 The equivalence of antitheticals promoting the realm of appearances
over that of truth means that interpretation is reified because value as such cannot be
located. The event and its significant reworking are interdependent, but the structure
they form is indeterminate. Indeed 'event' and 'symbol' are positions occupied by
elements that can be reversed. The subject emerges as a result of these differences and
indeterminacies such that formulations of subjectivity bear out the emphasis: "while
he is different than he appeared then because the illusion has vanished, he is the same
as he always was".62
Rousseau undertakes to lead the Frenchman from his false beliefs forged under the
influence of the reign of appearances to a founding principle capable of stabilising the
disorderly arrangement of object and false signals. The solution is Platonic in that it
registers a disgust for illusions.63 However, the Frenchman must continue to approach
an image which he finds horrifying (but only and precisely because the image is false)
before it is or can be revealed.64 Rousseau turns the domination of appearances
against itself by adopting a rule of inversion which is central to the conspiracy itself.
To defeat the appeal of the idol Rousseau must break its spell by revealing the
contradictions on which the conspirators depend. Wanting to 'unveil' J.-J the
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conspirators veil both the object and themselves.65 Unveiling J.-J would reveal that
there is 'nothing' there.66 Neither the conspirators nor the public understands the
mechanism of the plot to which they are both subject: the public does not see what it
enacts67 and the condition of the public becomes that of the conspirators because
"they resolved to see what they sought."68
If observation is always already speculative, and everything in analysis is discovered
through the medium of construction, then Rousseau's discovery of the conspiracy
'already at work' in the 'origin' (as Socrates discovers it working prior to his birth), is
rediscovering the dividedness of the origin. The dichotomy of illusion and reference
points to a complete and impossible recovery of the origin such that simply
countering the logic of the conspiracy will entrench the same logic. Instances of this
logic occur where the Dialogues reveals how the conspiracy merely converts J.-J.'s
attributes into attributes of the system itself - his 'strength', for example, becoming
their 'benevolence'.69
The strength of the analysis lies in the capacity to maintain the internal difference of
identity on both sides of the moral divide. Under the conspiracy, critique is
impossible: "that ... benevolence is too bizarre which, making its unfortunate object
carry all the disgrace of derision along with all the burden of hate, strives only to
deprive him of all means of escape whether he is innocent or guilty."70 Because this
hermeneutic produces 'bizarre' results, Rousseau seeks 'natural causes'71: "Let's set
aside all the facts for a moment, let's suppose that the only thing known is the
temperament I described to you; and lets see what would naturally result from that in
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a fictional being about whom we could have no other idea." Rousseau's 'paranoia'
therefore represents a refusal to be barred from learning the secret - a refusal to forget
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ontology. The Morceau articulates the refusal to be barred from the real - the belief
that truth is not buried beneath impenetrable layers but is all over the surface of that
which comes to presence. Jesus' appearance - presence secured in the present - is a
forgetting of the production of meaning by the relation and coextensivity of all scenes
resulting in the simultaneous presence and absence of the subject 'here' and
'elsewhere'.73 The subject is the product of and produces both presence and absence
without being reducible to either. Representational thought exhausts itself trying to
secure presence, and has no reserves for thinking absence. Evidence of this is located
in the indeterminate conclusion of the Dialogues which reveals Rousseau's
'exhaustive' and exhausted analysis of the conspiracy as an attempt to represent it as
(or reduce it to) presence. In the process it forgets concealment. The constant,
nocturnal presence of the conspiracy, however, is precisely the reminder of the
forgetting of concealment; and that concealment bears within itself the only form of
disclosure available to an interpretation barred from the real.
Rousseau will come to realise that no test will be able to establish in principle the
status of a recollection.74 This is simply because at one level the scene was never
perceived by the subject75 but is the result of imaginary working over. What matters is
the role it plays in articulating temporal difference in the narrative work of analysis. It
is immaterial whether the scene (conspiracy) actually happened - what is important is
the way unconscious fantasy structures the scene. It is no longer presupposed that
what is can be represented before a subject. The primal scene shifts the site of
interpretation from the univocal perspective of the subject of the scene to the subject's
displacement in the scene.
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THE WHOLE TRUTH?
The text consistently offers objects for judgment which are grounded in a
correspondence theory of truth, in which poor reproductions wither before the force of
the original. The original must be apprehended before judgment can be passed. If
judgment is the search for truth, then it will fail when offered representations for
which only an aesthetic judgment can be provided. Jones argues that the Dialogues is
rooted in an argument for ontology76, and thereby fails to identify the aesthetic mode
of judgment. The Frenchman is asked to exercise aesthetic judgment, rather than to
assess the truth of the representation. In his being required to have insight into his
own subjective representations Rousseau is making room for two conclusions. The
first is the Cartesian mode of self-representation stressing the method of doubt above
which the cogito rises to self-contained certainty. The second is Socratic - that is, that
the Frenchman is being led to consider the constitutive ignorance of consciousness.
The intertextual logic of the Dialogues points to the constructive dominance of the
latter. Rousseau removes the transcendental grounds of truth from the discourse of the
Dialogues by projecting them onto the idealised conditions of "a better order of
things".77 However, Rousseau does not rest easily satisfied with discovering the
aporias of consciousness, or an hermeneutical solution to the objects of judgment.
Therefore, the Morceau allegorique ranges beyond the aporia to the installation of
presence — Jesus - securing certainty. The logic of the Dialogues follows a similar
pattern, dismantling false images before confronting the object of representation. The
structure of the text, however - wherein one character ('Rousseau') defends the
absent other ('J.-J' or 'Jean-Jacques') to a third ('The Frenchman' - la Francois) -
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according to Foucault ', undermines the humanist project of realising an integrated
identity through its vain attempts to protect the fragmented subject from its
confrontation with the externality of its conditions of formation.
Rousseau finds the hermeneutical approach inadequate, and provides for the
possibility of critique. Rousseau learned, when intending to deposit the manuscript of
the Dialogues on the altar of the cathedral of Notre Dame he found his way barred by
a previously unseen grille, that there can be no inhuman, perfect and wholly other
recipient of the message79, and that the event or cause which would guarantee the
interpretation of the text is in itself inaccessible. Fie subsequently turns his efforts to
composing and publicly distributing a letter "to all Frenchmen who still love justice
Rf)
and truth" but is met with universal rejection and the refusal to be read. Foucault, in
o 1
this respect, refers to "silence" as experience premiere des Dialogues". Denied
access to the site of the confirmation of meaning - God - Rousseau is forced to accept
uncertainty whilst continuing to posit certainty.
Rousseau's traumatic discovery - the barred door at the altar of self-justification —
means that all messages, whether to or from the recipient, remain enigmatic. The
primal scene is an objective enigma at the heart of every trauma to the extent that it is
a message of exclusion from inception. The episode in Notre Dame is itself the
discovery of such an exclusion of the subject, leaving them looking into something
that sends a message that cannot be understood. In the same way, the primal scene,
R9
says Laplanche, retains something of the abandoned seduction theory. ~ That is to say,
insofar as seduction represents a message from the other the primal scene remains a
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sign offered to the child from the adult. The primal scene places a demand on the
83child to interpret the sign. The communication is both an invitation to respond and
an imperative because the offer of the sign is also a display - not just an invitation to
see, but a forcing to see.
Rousseau has already figured this sense of the primal scene in his myth of the other
world where the transactions of language are suspended in perfect silence. The
idealisation of that scene's perfect transparency of gestures could not deny the
initiation of the subject in a communication, a demand to interpret. Silence, as
Laplanche explains, is not a transcendence of the material conditions of language, but
the form of the message anticipating its assumption of a position in complex
figurations of language. Silence refers equally to the monolithic conspiracy which
Rousseau cannot dialecticise - a massive obstruction that bars insight into its own
origins, his relation to it, and his current condition. As a result he is forced to posit a
Utopian future in which "there will be found someone who listens to me" and by
whom "the truth would shine through to the eyes of the public". This 'someone' is
figured in the Jesus of the Morceau allegorique, whose splendour becomes the focus
of worship. Herein lies the promise of meaning recoverable by an intentional
consciousness, the logical basis of which is that it is not absolutely other. Caught
between the silence of inaccessible truth, and the impossible dream of silencing his
critics, Rousseau is forced to acknowledge a relatively but not absolutely decentered
consciousness.
In the preface to his defence Socrates anticipates his defence as a whole. It will be
based on a consideration of his relation to logos, or speech. It will therefore be a
speech about speech, which contrasts with the speech of his accusers. Rousseau, as we
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have seen with reference to the myth, centralises language. The Morceau itself is an
attempt to find a language that brings the subject to presence. The gulf between
Socrates' and his accuser's speech is indicated by the dedication of his logos to truth:
"Now they, as I say, have said little or nothing true; but you shall hear from me the
whole truth." To speak the truth is to reveal - or at least to not allow the things that
he speaks about be hidden. Socrates marries logos to praxis by identifying himself as
the subject of truth, and presenting himself through his representation in the defence.
The whole truth is the answer to the question, 'Who is Socrates?' Like Socrates,
Rousseau is taking a stand against letting things remain hidden: "I have said just about
everything I had to say. It is drowned in chaos and disorder, but it is there."86
Rousseau alludes to the structuring of the discourse on a naturalist belief in the
objectivity of the subject. It is there as 'it' — not as something to be constructed in
procedure, or existing as the compound set of equivalences between propositions
produced by the interpretation. The logic of the primal scene is alluded to powerfully.
However, the belief in demystification falls short of a praxis for truth since obscurity
remains even in revelation.
The Frenchman claims that the counterfactual method cannot give rise to a positive
claim of truth, but merely to a competing claim "made deliberately in opposition to
on
the other". The presence of competing claims can only draw attention to "error or
oo
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lying on one of the two sides". On the other hand Rousseau claims the necessity "to
unravel truth with certainty".89 In the comedy in which Socrates is represented as the
purveyor of the weaker logos in place of the stronger, he is also identified as
undertaking inquiries which assault the gods90, a form of a hubris. He is, like the idol,
the symbol of a false religion, an assault against the gods. The logic is understood and
taken up in Morceau where the only way forward is to destroy the false image, and
replace it with the true. Socrates, on the other hand, as in the Apology, stops short of
replacing the image with a true representation - he only refutes and indicates the
inappropriateness of those images to himself.91 He asks: "Do you think you are
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accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus?" " Socrates proceeds by denying and
distinguishing himself and never answers the question 'Who is Socrates?' by
reference to foundations in an ontological sense.
DEMONSTRATION
93In the Dialogues the myth of the voiceless other place is the paradigmatic primal
scene of the legitimate society (and the antithesis of the conspiracy). The ghostly
nature of the voiceless dialogue masks the presence of the speech of the dead, heard in
the echo of Socrates' accusations against his judges from the Apology. The
Dialogues' discourse of truth - its myth of the other place94 - has concerned itself
with presence, but places what brings to presence under an interdiction: "Visibility -
should not be visible".95 The primal scene is an event outside the grasp of
metaphysics (the science of presence). In fact it is the preexistent trace underlying the
possibility of the distinction between presence and absence, subject and object. The
Dialogues is concerned with the conspiracy to the extent that it both enables seeing
and figures the interdiction against looking into the conditions of seeing. The primal
scene is an attempt to overcome that interdiction against what brings to presence - it
is concerned with what is there in the first place. The conspiracy figures the primal
scene because it is the point where representation (the conspiracy) gives way to
(becomes / figures) concealment.
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Painted on its face were expressions of ecstasy mixed with rage. It trampled on
a figure representing mankind, but its eyes turned tenderly toward heaven ...
This vision made the philosopher tremble, but the spectators, far from being
repelled, saw not a look of cruelty but only heavenly ardour, and felt even
more zealous toward the uncovered statue than they had before its true face
was revealed.96
The gesture of 'unveiling' reveals naturalistic premises. First, that the object is single,
unitary and real. Second, that the origin is an event that occurred in the past as such.
And lastly, that recovering it the way it was will explain the causative ground of the
present independently of interpretations. The gesture therefore presumes ontology as
ground and revelation as method.
The Second Dialogue is dedicated to a rehabilitation of the ontology of vision. It is
dominated by the mode of simple demonstration: the complete relation of origin and
interpretation - or, the revelation of an origin prior to interpretation. To make the
Frenchman "feel all at once, through a simple and immediate impression" the "idea ...
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imprinted in my mind after a long examination of the original" Rousseau must base
his method on naturalistic premises. Demonstration is related to mathematical proof,
and its success entirely independent of whether it is believed or not. The Dialogues, at
this point appears to make too great an investment in the 'scientific' disenchantment
of modernity. It reifies the impossible fusion of object and interpretation, seeking a
method to avoid the pitfalls of those through which "one sees what one believes and
QO
not what one sees". Rousseau complains that "the biased man sees what he believes
... the passionate man sees what he desires".99 The Frenchman, however, argues for
an approach in which the subject "is regarded with less indifference".100
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Visual evidence fails to accord with veracity. The Ramsay portrait is displayed and
reproduced not in order to promote a truthful representation but represents "a secret
that had to be confided to the entire public without ever reaching the one who was its
subject".101 The portrait posits a fold at the heart of identity - the public interpretation
which is the cause the subject is barred from. The fold, in fact, is double since not
only can the subject not see itself in public representation, but the public is not
expressed in public opinion.
The non-identity of the public is figured when J.-J. is burned "in effigy" by attaching
1 02his face to a Swiss man of straw burned annually in the Rue aux Ours. The portrait
converges with the figure of the scapegoat. As Girard explains, the scapegoat is not
the criminal but the sacrifice which acknowledges both that a crime was committed
1OT
and that the cause is unknown. The burning of the effigy, like the stoning of the
scapegoat, represents destruction of the bearer of presence/absence. The scapegoat
which is and is not the cause104 relieves tension temporarily. The sacrifice is intended
to blind the public to the real, which is inaccessible as real, but not so that the real is
forgotten as the real. The indeterminable non-centre is still there as something other
than absence. The effigy therefore brings us to the real only by staging its
concealment and withdrawal. Ultimately, the public - or the conspiracy behind them -
represent a castrating agent. The burnt effigy is apotropaic in the sense that it confers
protection by giving up some part of the real in order to protect the rest.105
In an important sense, the burnt effigy is the most characteristic and appropriate form
of representation in the Dialogues. It is not simply a symptom of the author's fear of
exposure - Rousseau's famous paranoia. Rather, as the figure vanishes in the flames it
achieves the demand for a demonstration of character which includes the temporal
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unfolding of narrative. Rousseau remarks that portraits are essentially lacking in their
representational capacity: since no portrait can capture change, they fail to represent
time.106 A portrait will therefore say something as a way of not saying something else.
As Rousseau tells the Frenchman, every object must conform to a fundamental law -
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the law of "all or nothing" : "the same thing cannot be and not be." These are the
requirements of ontology, not of the primal scene. However, if the subject is as much
the story of the production of the portrait as the object, then the subject is the product
of a relation between propositions - and therefore is neither proven nor disproven.
Consequently, the Second Dialogue moves from a paradigm of sight to one of
construction. Hortative rhetoric guides the subject away from the model of vision:
"How can you not see how removed your Gentlemen themselves are from this scorn
for him they want to inspire in you? How can you not see that the scorn they feign is
not real ... ,"109 The power of the analysis (to cure or represent) inheres in its capacity
to put temporal difference into play - to initiate a connection between the work of
recollection and construction.110 The subject is in flames as the subject of time
hovering between a 'lost' origin (past) and a 'false' present. Thus, on the one hand,
the "summary of the observation ... of his true character ... appear contradictory" but,
on the other, Rousseau's purpose is not to resolve the contradiction but to offer "some
explanations ... in order for you to see it in its full light".111 The Second Dialogue
implicitly accepts displacement, the hovering between past and present - between the
time for understanding and 'another time' whose ontological status would always be
indeterminate. The effigy burnt by the public figures the apprehension of the real as
112
an act of interpretation undertaken in relation to its absence. Time is temporal
difference with a mediating and concealing power of its own. In other words, the time
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of the representation is inseparable from 'another time', another temporal frame of
reference, the time of interpretation.
FACE TO FACE
The procedure which affirms who Socrates is constitutes a refutation of counter
images and an assertion over and against them of a truthful image. This procedure is
also the concrete exhibition of the practice which defines Socrates.113 Rousseau's text
refers to the Apology as a primal image - but in the very act of reflecting the primacy
of the source, it enters the practice of interpretation. The process of dialogue cannot
simply present the original object or source, but is immersed in the practice of
interpretation.
The Frenchman suggests following a procedure which would "combine prudence with
rectitutde".114 However, this would limit the quest for knowledge to the elimination of
falsehood or the avoidance of error - hermeneutic's constant reinterpretation.
However, the aim of both the Third Dialogue and the third stage of the Morceau are
"to establish the truth".115 The condition of possibility of ontology is the face to face
encounter. This argument is circular, for the encounter is itself conditioned by the
ontology which enables it. It takes the divine to speak "the language of truth" yet God
addresses the essential humanity of his listeners, which is only an image of their own
divinity.
"O, my children!" he says, with a tenderness that penetrates the soul, "1 come
to expiate and heal your errors. Love Him who loves you and know Him who
exists." Then, seizing the statue, he effortlessly topples it, and, calmly
climbing onto the pedestal, he seems to be assuming his rightful place rather
than usurping that of another ... To hear him once was enough to admire him
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always. One sensed that the language of truth cost him nothing because he
held its source within himself."116
Jesus combats the crisis of the subject which experiences history as blind force — a
process without a subject. The idol had been (or worshipped) a divinity operating
according to its own laws and principles, oblivious to the course of human history.
Jesus, on the other hand, intersects with the course of human history (through the
incarnation, here his appearance) whilst at the same time not being (or becoming) part
of it. Jesus figures the embodiment of the divine, the becoming human (becoming
comprehensible) of transcendent forces. He appears to be presence itself, acting so as
to convince onlookers of propriety, of originality, whilst obscuring strategies of
displacement. Jesus replaces, but seems only to be assuming his proper place, just as
truth appears to supersede interpretation, and language to coincide with its object. It
must so seem since this illusion is constitutive for subjectivity. The interpretation in
fact occupies the place of the thing.
We are speaking of Christ, but the cue comes from the Socrates of the Apology who
promises to speak the 'whole truth'. Rousseau finds Socrates wanting, but desires to
bridge the gap between revelation and construction without revealing the presence of
the chasm being spanned. The emptiness remaining after the destruction of the idol is
overcome by the fact that Christ's actions are acts of restoration which annul temporal
difference. The idol who tramples on humanity does not share the suffering of his
subjects, but Jesus, the man of sorrows, fully coincides with the suffering of
humanity. His incarnation represents both his temporal coincidence with humanity,
and the guarantee of subjectivity since, through him, temporal divergence is
transcended, and the displaced origin returns to its proper place (is at one with itself).
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The flaw in (in fact, the impossibility of) the procedure is embodied performatively in
the Third Dialogue where direct encounter remains a deferred possibility. Admitting
that J.-J. can never be known in his lifetime, Rousseau projects full recognition
(presence) into an indefinite future117 and so undermines it by means of this projective
transference of the origin into the future. The future, then, is the origin towards which
one is constantly moving. The restorative actions of Jesus extend the past into the
future and reconstruct and reenact the forgetfulness of temporal difference. The
constructions of the Third Dialogue must remain tentative because knowledge of
118when its benefits will be received is incalculable . The Dialogues operate in the
prophetic mode, and in and through them Rousseau presents himself as the
philosopher of the incalculable. The time for understanding is the future, the essence
of subjectivity is a destination that cannot be known beforehand, and the self is
haunted by the possibility that it will never arrive.
Knowledge as revelation requires a condition prior to reason and language — a
condition of timelessness. However, the Dialogues accepts the pathos of tragic
witnessing - the insuperability of the primal scene. Thus, wisdom appreciates the
impossibility of ideal self-evidence - what is remembered is the unavoidability of
forgetting. A faithful interpretation is one that does not distort the text and that is
merely an innocent supplementation to it. It is, however, impossible to say anything
about the state the pathogenic material was in before the analysis (there is no 'before'
in that sense). Socrates has been so affected by his accuser's speeches that he almost
forgot who he was.119 The forgetting of identity is a condition of identity in
accordance with the logic of the primal scene, where identity is thrown into question
because it does not exist prior to interpretation. However, Socrates does not entirely
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forget, and his answer is his assertion of identity. The First Dialogue opens by
echoing the mock bemusement of the Apology referring to the prosecution case which
120
makes the defendant unrecognisable even to himself. The conspiracy undermines
its own principles. Justification and verification are impossible when the subject is the
subject of truth rather than interpretation: so, the failure to provide a final answer
(truth) "cannot shatter the direct persuasion my research has produced in me".121
Rousseau considers J.-J.'s texts transparent and intends the Frenchman to read them
with the same comprehension. The Frenchman had promised to read them at the end
of the First Dialogue, and present his findings after listening to Rousseau throughout
the Second Dialogue, but his interpretations are aligned with the conspiracy's
199
viewpoint. For Rousseau, the Frenchman continues to confuse the veiled and the
unveiled. Flowever, the logic of the primal scene demands that both perspectives be
incorporated into the formation of understanding and subjectivity. He continues to
address the Frenchman in the mode of what he believes is description without
commentary but is unable to overcome the aporia of content and category emerging
simultaneously. The hope of the dialogues - "I do not seek him as I picture him, I
seek him as he is"123 - only highlights the impossibility of seeking a priori conditions
to knowledge. The "frame of mind favourable to truth"124 by means of which
Rousseau proceeds is nevertheless a framework for truth to appear in - the appearance
of which will sanction its work as a frame. The ethical demand in the exhortation is to
abandon old habits for new ones - but interpretation guides and is guided by what one
desires to be. In other words, theory cannot exist outside a domain of normative
assessments.
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The Frenchman's education begins when his confidence in the conspiracy is shaken
forcibly125 and culminates in the painful recognition of his role in the dissemination of
the false image. Full recovery of the conditions of distorted subject formation are
expressed as a form of tragic witnessing - "don't remind me of my wrongs".126 To say
that the past is a memory that can be reconstructed in a new evaluative framework is
to say that it is always only an interpretation. The Frenchman finally assents to
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Rousseau's way of seeing the author's works. This exchange between the like-
minded, however, can never find full affirmation in the face to face encounter. The
distortion of formative processes is corrected, but it cannot establish the cause or truth
of the subject beyond its current interpretation. Consensus merely stamps order on
disorder - that is, it stabilises impressions within a sanctioned framework.
Truth never supersedes this convergence of horizons because the sought after object is
never present. Interpretation continues without termination. The Dialogues remains
open, and instantiates a model structured by unfinished inferential conditions in the
place of the conspiracy's closure to investigation. Socrates' service to the city is to
understand the oracle as imposing on him the task of exposing the ignorance of those
("whether citizen or foreigner") who presume they are wise - "and show that he is not
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wise." Rousseau exposes the Frenchman's lack of wisdom in the same vein as
Socrates exposes Meletus's lack of wisdom - by revealing the disparity between his
claim to wisdom and his actual condition, involving him in self-contradiction.
Essentially, Meletus is involved in the self-contradiction of being ignorant of himself,
in that he is ignorant of his own ignorance. That is, false wisdom is the belief in the
triumph of demystification. To be ignorant of the continuing obscurity of the source,
origin or subject is to invite self-contradiction, and to refuse enlightenment.
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Socrates destroys men's claim to wisdom by exposing their ignorance.129 These same
men are encouraged to grasp the insight that only by being made aware of their
ignorance can they acquire wisdom. To some extent Rousseau is skeptical of
Socrates' practice. Whilst he does not share Socrates' accusers' opinion that it is
merely destructive, he questions its adequacy. Socrates' incessant questioning is
devoted to awakening Athenians to their own ignorance, and to understanding the
1 TO
place of ignorance in human wisdom. ~ The force of his questioning is accusatory,
but only appears arrogant - even criminal - to the extent that it undermines the
Athenian's blithe belief in a perfectly explicit wisdom. Rousseau's pronounced
skepticism in the Morceau does not survive its re-reading in the light of the
Dialogues. The open text of the latter, the deferred encounter, brings to light the fact
that the supposedly naturalistic relation of object to consciousness in the allegory is an
illusion cast by the powerful retroactive effects of a displaced origin asserting itself
and sanctioning its return in the mode of simple presence. The subject of truth, or as
truth - that is to say, the subject in its presence - consequently gives way to a more
complex, more elusive, and more provisional identity incapable of making
authoritative self-assertions or authenticating statements. Dialogue reveals an opacity
within the subjective self-relation and that this essential opacity cannot be articulated
outside the structure of a dialogue in which those elocutions can be challenged,
qualified, or undermined.
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THE LAW OF EXILE
INTRODUCTION
Modernity is inaugurated in the era of the state's being purified of sacred origins and
transcendent claims to validity.1 Beliefs relating the individual to the state therefore
arise, not at the altar, but in the public sphere: the zone of reasoning, argumentation
and will formation.2 Given these de-transcendentalised conditions, and the rapidly
expanding field of claims occupied by individualised subjects, the law's validity was
defined by two interrelated conditions. Firstly, it depended on its being embraced
autonomously by the subjects who came under it. Second, this required the self to
authentically embrace only those norms which it had given itself. The demand made
of autonomy by authenticity is based on the dependence of the rationality of beliefs on
subject's being able to give an account of how and under what conditions their
identities are formed and their relation to those beliefs. Because these accounts are
both given and provided in a space of reason and evaluation, these norms will be
subject to validity claims. Norms must therefore be acquired through mechanisms
which agents explicitly and implicitly recognise. Habermas argues that these
mechanisms must permit the identification of deformatory mechanisms which
undermine rationality.' To hold justifiable beliefs (to be self-understanding) subjects
must have access to the grounds and conditions of subject formation.
The account of subjectively valid beliefs reduces to circularity when it is impossible
to distinguish between the norms held by the subject and the normatively legitimated
means of validity testing and subject formation. Under these conditions, extant norms
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are determinative of subjectivity - at least of the subject in its public role. The system,
as cause, precedes the subject and subjectification occurs when the subject recognises
its place within the system.4 Deviant positions held by the subject are constructed
from the normative viewpoint as a discrepancy between the ideal and real self.
The authenticity and autonomy of the subject of law requires it to construct a self-
understanding of the motivations and the coherences for which it is aiming. This self-
understanding is intended to represent and produce an insight into the subject's
essential, as opposed to its contingent, constitution. However, this problematic
intention is related to complex motivations, largely unconscious, which an
authentically oriented subjectivity seeks to understand and accept rather than suppress
or control instrumentally.
For Alasdair Maclntyre acts of self-identification are carried out by the tradition and
the culture and confirmed when the self occupies the role designated for it within the
personal and cultural narrative.3 Maclntyre posits a perfect cure in terms of a fit
between self and society expressed as identification with the social role. However, his
sense of the overcoming of social crisis reveals a condition of incoherence that is
structural, not incidental. The germ of alterity has been buried in the values of the
tradition which promote reintegration. For Lacan, however, the subject's reaching
back into the conditions of belief and self-formation can only occur to the extent that
the wound of castration is the condition of its own healing. The split between
conscious (other) and unconscious (other's discourse or language) is permanent and
defines the subject.6 The split reveals the subject to be in excess of the structure and
not simply a reflection of or in conformity with it. Here, then, lies the source of
autonomous legal subjectivity, because the structure is revealed as not merely
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determinative of the subject. The split is therefore a condition of possibility of the
existence of the subject.
For Rousseau law can only be established in a community of autonomous subjects.
The autonomous subject is self-legislating, and therefore chooses the law that is in
fact given. In the Social Contract Rousseau explains that the central problem of
politics is "to find a form of association ... (such that) while uniting himself to all (the
citizen) may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before."7 In other words,
the problem of the valid organisation of society centers on the possibility of the
convergence of freedom and the law. Freedom is the "essence"8 of the social contract
in that "a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty".9 Rousseau therefore posits
the question of law and its legitimacy in terms of the subject's voluntary allegiance to
an objective order. The law only has criticisable normative validity when subjects
contribute to its construction and ongoing operations and elaborations.
The Social Contract therefore contemplates autonomy in terms of the possible re¬
assignment of the cause of the law to the subject itself. In an extreme formulation -
but one with which autonomy is inextricably intertwined — the subject must 'become
the cause'10 of the norms to which it accedes; and, to the extent that it is a normative
being, the cause of its own subjectivity. The Lacanian subject is only possible if the
more conventional readings of his theories as forwarding an autopoietically
constituted and regulated system - the Symbolic - is reinterpreted to introduce the
possibility of self-reflection into the system of meaning in such a way that the subject
is allowed some freedom to rescript symbolic codes. However, the Symbolic makes
any freedom of intention or signification redundant because the possibility of
subjectivity must admit that the prior structure of language constitutes its condition of
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possibility: the symbolic "cannot be conceived as constituted by man, but as
constituting him."11 Lacan therefore abandons an earlier position in which he
considered the possibility of the availability of "full speech" to the subject - defined
as the subject speaking about himself to the analyst.12
The Symbolic determines that meaning cannot be founded on the pre-linguistic
intentions of a pre-linguistic consciousness. Because the foundations of signification —
the "locus of the treasure of the signifier"13 is deposited not in the subject but in the
Other14 - a system of operations which is certain but inaccessible - the subject cannot
explore the deeper presuppositions of their own constitution. The subject, therefore,
can never enter discourse with the capacity for their speech acts to referentially stake
out unambiguous territories of subjective desire or belief since these always emerge
and ultimately belong to the Other. Lacan concludes that because the self-identity of
that which speaks the discourse of the subject is a fabrication , the symbolic is in the
last instance determinative.
Rousseau is heir to a repressive theory which identifies the oedipal narrative as the
best explanation of the subject's emergence under the law.15 The authority of the
oedipal model stipulates that the condition for entering the Symbolic is castration, the
intervention of the paternal metaphor in the dyadic pre-social relation of mother and
child.16 In this context autonomy can only mean that the oedipal 'cause' is modified
.17
by the subject's choice of a self-interpretation. .Rousseau identifies the validity of
the paternal break in its capacity to recapture subjectivity in a relation of the whole to
the whole18 - the subject and the community. For Rousseau, then, were the subject
simply to accept castration it would fail to recognise itself in the symbolic order19.
This failure of recognition is not to be interpreted as a site of negation, but positively
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as the location for the subject's consciousness ofmissing from the system - recounted
below as Rousseau's life in exile.
Lacan argues that the lack of coincidence between self-interpretation and social role
requires subjective wholeness to be ultimately founded in fantasy.20 Because the
impossible point of overlap defines the relation of the subject and the constitutive
system, the subject is defined as essentially lacking. What it lacks is that which can
never appear in but constitutes consciousness. Lacan proposes that the object (a)
functions as the excluded remainder, marked by an absence, which the subject
identifies imaginarily as the point of coincidence of consciousness, intention and
objectivity.21 If the subject is to claim autonomy in the mode of self-reflection, it must
identify itself as starting from a point not of coincidence with the system but as
missing from it. The missing subject is both a first step beyond the system, and an
irretrievable distance from it.
The subject and the cause can never coincide, nor can the subject fully appropriate the
origin. This non-coincidence is conceived dualistically only under realist modes of
interpretation of 'cause', which seek the 'truth' of the origin." Under hermeneutic
modes of understanding, the loss of the cause (truth) is conceded, and in its place is
put competing interpretations which never ultimately or finally resolve the tension
between subject and cause, but seek to effect and modify each other through a process
of learning and clarification - not ultimate revelation. The cause is then continually
reinterpreted and renarrativised. No interpretation stands for the truth of the cause or
the subject; and each interpretation proposes a potential reassignment of the
significance of narrative components in a subject's history.
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However dominant the process of enculturation, in other words, the subject under the
law is still a subject, and ultimately a self-interpreting one.23 The uncoupling of
legitimacy from traditional and transcendent sources of validity opens the relation of
facticity to validity to reflexive forms of legitimation centered on the socialised
subject's interpretive competence. Self-interpretation, however, must be understood in
the light of the relation of intention to signification outlined by Lacan which reveals
the power of subjective value or desire to promote the preference for one
interpretation rather than another. At the same time, because self-conception cannot
simply be equated with the intersubjective position, the choice of an interpretation
reflects the values and desires of the subject as they develop in a normative context. If
the subject is to be self-acquainted, this structuring desire in turn needs to be avowed
and understood, although it cannot be made an explicit object. In the process of
avowal the subject's desire is not simply discovered, it is contextualised, interpreted
and intersubjectively positioned by a subject who is contextualised, in turn, by other's
desire.
Subjectivity assumes narrative form to the extent that the subject's inability to make
itself an object of consciousness drives the quest for self-representation.24 For
Rousseau autobiography in the form of secular confession was the narrative vehicle
par excellence for the self-interpreting subject seeking to articulate "who he is and
25
who, with the will to authenticity, he wants to be." The temporality of the subject is
essential and posits a tension between the subject's understanding of itself in time and
its inability to recall the origin. The time of the subject in narrative is the time of a
subject who retrospectively designates an origin. The act of interpretation itself
depends on the recognition of the desire that motivates the act of designation. In fact,
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the coincidence of the two necessary times which cannot be grasped - the beginning
and the present - is the impulse for the subject's avowal of 'my' time as 'another'
time. Lacan argues that Freud's dream text - Father, cant you see I'm burning - is
both an introduction to "another reality" and "an act of homage to the missed
reality".26
The father who dreams of his child in flames in the next room only to find him alight
when he inspects misses the event itself - the candle falling - on his arrival. For
Lacan the subject is always late on the scene in precisely this way, such that the "cruel
point" of the narrative is that the coincidence of the subject with the real (the event)
27
can only occur in a dream. Lacan's account undermines the possibility of the liberal
will choosing its own constitution. In this sense, Maclntyre's critique of liberal
versions of authenticity fail to apply to Rousseau. This is not because they undermine
the freedom he espouses, but because they exceed the limits he places on identifying
any reliable source or foundation for will formation. In arguing that the only coherent
identity is the "narrative unity of a single human life" embedded in the forms of the
community, the tribe or the family, Maclntyre idealises the community as
foundational. For Lacan, because of the alienation of the signifier in the Other,
subjects are always already alienated from the community through the very thing that
binds them to it - language. Maclntyre's argument bears close affinities with
Habermas' reconstruction of the ideal speech situation as the locus of pure
29
communication, or pure intersubjectivity - an argument that concludes with the
recognition of lacuna similar to Lacan's.
For Maclntyre, moral reflection cannot be conducted by a subject with privileged
access to their intentions and desires but can only occur from within a tradition - from
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social roles acquired at birth which represent commitments: "These constitute the
given ofmy life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own
30
moral particularity." Habermas begins his reconstruction of contexts of self-
understanding and understanding in general by critiquing the monadological
• 31
assumptions of Chomskian theories of linguistic competence. He posits instead a
priori intersubjective conditions of the validity of speech acts. Whereas Lacan views
language as a priori and deterministic because it is a system, for Habermas an a priori
language is emancipatory to the extent that it is prior to the subject in isolation, not to
32
subjectivity in the form of intersubjectivity. It would be paradoxical for an
individual will to view the legacy of the past as the consequence of choices that can
be freely discarded since, in doing so it would be undermining its own basis for
33
choice. The claim of history, for Maclntyre, is that roles impose constraints on our
choices, which cannot be treated with indifference without inviting a loss of personal
identity, and a sense of alienation from the community. For Habermas, for subjects to
enter enunciative roles, they must possess and use these intersubjectively constituted
semantic rules. These rules do not describe the forms of speech situations as they
occur but are the counterfactually presupposed conditions of there being any speech
situation at all, no matter how distorted. Habermas admits, then, that every occasion
for real subjective speech is "this unavoidable fiction" of an ideal set of conditions.34
For Lacan, this represents the impossible coincidence which is only available in a
dream. What distinguishes Habermas and Maclntyre on the one hand, and Lacan on
the other is that for the former primordiality in the form of linguistic or narrative
presuppositions issues in consensus and dependence on the milieu for meaning,
whereas for the latter primordiality vacates the milieu of meaning. For Lacan, what is
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most fundamental is not universal conditions of communication but the difference
between the utterance and the subject of the enunciation. More fundamental than
speech, in other words, is the difference between what can and cannot be said. For
Habermas, on the other hand, because the presuppositions of speech and
understanding can be reconstructed through linguistic science, everything is
potentially explicit, and the only things that cant be said are the product of intentional
obscurity.3''
Both narrative unity and the ideal speech situation intend to offer independent criteria
for assessing the claims of historical subjects. However, Maclntyre bases subjectivity
on the inherent power of available social roles, and fixed roles cannot respond to the
contingencies of social transformation. The ideal speech situation examines the
legitimacy of subject's entrance into conversation by defining a priori the appropriate
uses to which utterances can be put. If it does not fix subjects to preconceived roles, it
eliminates the legitimacy of subjective self-interpretations which cannot be extended
and embraced universally as relevant for all.36 The truth conditions of the ideal speech
situation are as stringently rational as Rousseau's demand for absolute consensus as
the basis of legitimacy in the Social Contract. Rousseau's autobiographical narrative
is not bound to the truth in this sense but is one which reimagines new possibilities for
the self through self-interpretation. For Rousseau, the self is oriented to the future at
least in the sense of not being a mere product of its past. In its imaginative suspension
between origin and anticipation Rousseau's self both relates them and puts them in
tension. This tension is in part inherent and in part the product of subjective choices
exercised by the unbound subject. For Maclntyre, the future reimagined by the
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unbound subject is not in tension with the past but pure contingency. Historical
criteria determine and are erected against arbitrary choice.
However, there is nothing in the notion of narrative unity that inherently contradicts
the preference for themes other than acceptable goods, the aim of undoing one's ties
with the past, and the existence ofmultiple narratives. For the Rousseau of the Social
Contract, embeddedness in the community is compatible with critical transcendence
of the historical situation. Rousseau, even in the narratives of his subjective choices,
accepts and affirms that castration is foundational. However, in the existential
narrative of the Confessions he indicates that to dialecticise castration is not to remove
the foundational event from its place of primacy, but to remove the event from its
place in ontology.37 The subject then accedes to a position with respect to the cause
which allows for the subjectivation of language, the other, the given. Autonomy is a
self-formative processes in that it is the process of development of a being who
possesses the capacity for altering their agency through altering their comprehension
of themselves. However, agency cannot be purely guided nor comprehension
determined by intention. Rather, self-transformation works through an always already




When Rousseau, in the Epistle Dedicatory to the Discourse on Inequality - in
which he asks leave to bring the work under the auspices of his native city and its
39
"magnificent, most honoured and sovereign lords" - looks back after a thirty years
exile, he describes Geneva as the perfect republic. In terms familiar from the Social
t
104
Contract, the republic reproduces the state of nature in society by securing liberty
under the law, and advancing individual interests only through a general will.40
Contrasting his own conditions to that of his "Fellow-Citizens" Rousseau reminds the
Genevans that their subjectivity, like natural man's, is appropriative to the extent that
they need only seize what is readily available and in this case offered them: "your
happiness is complete, you only have to enjoy it; and all you need in order to become
perfectly happy is to know how to be content with being so."41
Contentment is compatible with a modest form of knowledge - the "happy ignorance"
of the Spartans described in the First Discourse.42 However, Rousseau's own
knowledge, he implies, is incompatible with contentment. As a philosopher his
perspective on the republic embraces a knowledge necessarily a degree beyond
happiness, unable to achieve the affective investment that completes the well-being by
immediate appreciation. The perspective of the philosopher may not be available to
the exiled youth; it is, however, 'fatefully' inscribed into the episode that the
attainment of happiness and the course of full knowledge are divergent.
Earlier in the Epistle, Rousseau compiled the conditions of worldly satisfaction. These
include — referring to Geneva - "to be born within your walls".43 Clearly, to remain
within the walls of Geneva is irrevocably to tie happiness to ignorance. At the time of
writing the Epistle, Rousseau - like the sixteen year-old Jean-Jacques of the
Confessions - finds himself an outsider to his homeland who claims fraternity despite
failing to meet his own criterion for citizenship - residency. Given that, "when the
state is instituted, residence is consent; to dwell in the territory is to submit to the
sovereign,"44 then if the young Jean-Jacques' failure to return is not a withdrawal of
consent to and reaffirmation of the compact but a "youthful want of prudence,
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Rousseau's continuing absence is, apparently, precisely such a withdrawal of consent
to the state's sovereignty. It is not possible for Rousseau to avoid identifying himself
as the "anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws and justice, and of
sacrificing, at need, his life to his duty"46 and consequently subject to banishment (or
death). However, having drawn attention to the need to distinguish between
'expulsion' and 'abdication' in the case of James II47 Rousseau makes himself-
especially in the light of his claim to membership - subject to the same distinction.
Rousseau can show himself to be a truer citizen than the Genevans in accepting
permanent exile over -re-integration. If the Epistle Dedicatory identifies a
misjudgment in which, free to do as he ought, Jean-Jacques does otherwise, no
remorse accompanies a later reassessment which shows the imperative Geneva
represents to no longer bind him. Referring to his desire to be with Mme de Warens,
Rousseau invokes the imagery of the wall: "I knew that to return to Geneva was to
place an almost insurmountable barrier between her and myself; unless, indeed, were I
to repeat the action I had just taken." Sustained transgression takes over where once
repetitive actions concluded in re-integration. The breach of the wall initiates
narrative through which the subject exceeds the forms of universality.
Whereas the Genevan's adherence to the city is secured through a blindspot (their
happy 'Spartan' ignorance), Rousseau claims that he is in a position to survey both
sides of the barrier. The wall is only insurmountable when it is the law. However,
Rousseau suggests that his transgression and exile, rather than disrupting, only
reorients the law towards its true form. If the Genevans dwell within their walls, he is
the true Spartan because the law is something he "carrie[s] ... in (his) own heart".49
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Maclntyre argues that traditions come with resources ready to hand to transcend the
limitations of their own situations when circumstances demand novel historical
responses. His aim is to demonstrate that, although morality is grounded in the
historical and cultural conditions that produce it, this does not invite a conclusion of
relativism and incommensurability since those traditional resources can resolve
internal contradictions. Moral reflection draws, for instance, on the secure and agreed
meaning of moral terms which underpins certainty of judgment/0 In Rousseau's
Geneva, referential stability and the judgment it grounds depends on the unambiguous
ordering of social roles by authoritative political institutions. The conclusion is self-
serving: individuals will reason effectively if the good upon which they reflect are
already secured by and reflected in the political community. Non-arbitrary moral
justification requires a prior commitment to those institutions. It is only from within a
given polis already provided with a hierarchy of specific values, that rational
reflection on value and order can be conducted51.
The Genevans exist within their law, but Rousseau is the cognisant subject who fully
coincides with the law. The wall for Rousseau does not construct the law by exclusion
but represents the site where he claims it reflexively, accepting it on the basis of
rational criteria. His survey is an analytical suggestion which explicitly revises
conceptual frameworks constitutive of self-identity. Redescription has consequences
for the subject - since every framework is evaluative of who one is - and hence for
what it is to be a (here, legal) subject. When the subject transcends the blindspot and
freely chooses the law, however, he is forced to admit that the law does not define the
city which he now rejects in order to remain the true citizen. Because this can only be
determined by crossing the boundary, the only lawful condition for the citizen is exile.
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Also, because the subject cannot reflect on the object without reinterpreting and
52
altering it, Rousseau must suffer exile or risk undermining the law for others.
For Rousseau, then, the polis has only a limited capacity for internal criticism.
Maclntyre argues that epistemological crises reveal the cultural traditions for
overcoming value incoherence caused by new standards of evaluation confronting
ci
established criteria. Rousseau's exile is itself the product of a crisis. As the exile he
exposes a gap in the Genevan's experience. In advising them to be happy, he reveals
that the conditions of residence and citizenship do not automatically guarantee
happiness. He raises doubts as to whether they in fact possess the good they claim.
However, he overcomes the potential incoherence that may arise from the relative
positions of exile and community by suggesting that the criteria for coherence are
those prevailing within the existing community ('knowing how' to be happy). Any
potential incommensurability is resolved by judging the external standards of the
alternative tradition from within the community in question.
Rousseau's comment on the Genevan's happiness draws attention to the possibility
that it may depend on the irrational condition of valuing some goods more highly than
explanatory adequacy warrants. At the same time, the imagery suggests that, for the
citizens, the republic is a unitary space created by a wall acting as a mirror reflecting
the enclosed space as if it were as extensive as their desire. They are free, satisfied
and 'happy' to the extent that the city and its walls are the measure of the real. In
other words, explanatory adequacy is itself related to the tradition which has
formulated the values by which the community lives. Rousseau's identity, on the
other hand, exceeds narrative form and twists free of universality. At the same time, it
appropriates form and universality to itself, becoming in the case of exile the truth of
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one who could not remain within the interpretation offered. Narrative is also
productive and acts back on the narrator. In narrating himself Rousseau temporalises
his identity and introduces self-consciously recuperable difference. For Maclntyre, on
the other hand, traditions are rational enough to preserve a fundamental continuity
between the beliefs that resolve crises of value and the beliefs held prior to the
crisis.54 However, demonstrating rational superiority from within a tradition means
denying the normative force of community values shaping explanatory criteria.
The conflict between the embeddedness of values and the transcendence of communal
limits cannot be overcome by reference to given values. Narrative, as Rousseau
discovers, seems inevitably to open the possibility of becoming qualitatively different
from others and from a prior self. Rousseau's breach of the wall reformulates his (and,
effectively, the historical-communal) horizon of understanding.
Rousseau is correct to assert that self-consciousness requires another framework
allowing a different attitude and understanding of oneself to be adopted. However, he
is dedicated to a realist process which misconstrues the unconscious (the condition of
happiness for the Genevans) as a realm of ignorance and reads the therapeutic process
in purely epistemological terms (from self-ignorance to self-knowledge). For Freud
acts of self-reflection involve more than discovering some previously unnoticed
mental item:
It is a long superseded idea, and one derived from superficial appearances, that
the patient suffers from a sort of ignorance, and that if one removes the
ignorance by giving him information (about the causal connection of his
illness with his life ...) he is bound to recover. The pathological factor is not
his ignorance in itself, but the root of this ignorance in his inner resistances; it
was they that first called the ignorance into being, and they still maintain it
now.55
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The source of effectivity of an unconscious item is not its exclusion from
consciousness, such that by bringing it to consciousness it is eliminated as
dysfunctional. Self-ignorance is not the source of repression, information is not
automatically resistant to dysfunctionality and ignorance cannot be undone simply by
the passive provision of information. What is at issue in psychoanalytic self-reflection
is not simply an item of unconscious representation, but one that has become
unconscious56 - repressed, disavowed, excluded. To become conscious, to be
avowed, recognised, assented, its place, and connection with other areas of subjective
life must be worked through. The source of self-ignorance is a set of attitudes held
under a particular understanding of who one is.
Self-reflection is more than gathering a belief about one's past - it means grasping the
significance of beliefs and desires that determine one's relation to oneself and others.
The vindication of the narrative is judged from the perspective of reconstituted self
and on its practical implementation. Rousseau's narrative shows the subject to be self-
interpreting and self-transforming. It also displays a duality that inhabits subjectivity
committed to self-analysis. The subject can see himself differently only by
interpreting himself differently, and thus becoming different from what he was.
Genevan ignorance is neither a theoretical entity nor a useful fiction. It is a possibility
for further articulating indeterminate experiences. These articulations will only have
the shape designated by creative interpretations. These interpretations, in turn, involve
agents in reinterpreting in accordance with progressively developing narrative. New
possibilities of self-understanding rest on self-transfiguration. Rousseau relates
himself to the Genevans for the purposes of self-reflection. It is there that he sees the
repression, disavowal, and foreclosure that determined life in Geneva, and constituted
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the legal subject, and he uses it to assess his current self-understanding as a subject
(standing, nevertheless, he presumes, outside the cause) - and his relation (as exile) to
them (as citizens).
Rousseau bases the difference between himself and the Genevans on their position
relative to the wall of the city. However, Genevan ignorance is as much a sacrifice as
the subject's exile: since the conditions of meaning are elusive for all subjects, their
objectification into forms of communal life in the city can neither convince Rousseau
nor complete the Genevans (be "all" they need). Therefore, all subjects relate to the
guarantee ofmeaning in the same way - the Other is as inaccessible to Rousseau as to
the Genevans. The condition of exile is not simply the position Rousseau assumes in
relation to the community, but the condition of all subjects within the community.
Since subjectivity is founded on the inaccessibility of the truth to the subject, the
mutual recognition of subjects and the governance of discourse by language leaves
subjects uncertain as to who they are, and where they stand in relation to each other.
Rousseau's exile is, therefore, not a privileged epistemological condition but only a
particularisation of the generalised condition of exile defining all subjects and the
condition of intersubjectivity itself. Indeed, the difference between Rousseau and the
Genevans only disavows the fact that the condition of exile is never fully conscious.
Rousseau seems not to know what he is saying about himself in terms of his own
criteria for appropriate categorisation. An avowal of the internal exclusion is equally
an admission of 'ignorance'. It is not knowledge that distinguishes Rousseau from his
fellow Genevans, but an important difference in their respective ignorance. The
difference is that Rousseau gives form to the subject's distance from the conditions of
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subjectivity. Happiness is precisely what cannot be reflected on. Once it is attained, it
satisfies and negates reflexivity - happiness is the satiation that hallucinatorily bridges
the gap between self and other. The imaginary completion of the subject (through
happiness) is raised in Rousseau's self-interpretation as the impossibility of
calculating the effects of knowledge. The condition that knowledge would satisfy
desire (happiness) is what the narrative of his own exile undermines.
SELF-DENIAL AND SELF-SACRIFICE
Rousseau seeks a political solution to the problem of the non-coincidence of self-
certainty and intersubjective relatedness. Unlike Hegel, however, Rousseau does not
frame his solution in terms of the state's recognition of the individual as such/7 The
common structure of law and liberty centered on the will of the legal subject subjects
all transgressions to self-punishment. The force alienated to the community can only
be returned in kind, and is in fact returned when the citizen expresses that force
against himself, as a self-recovery ofwill. Maclntyre provides a framework for
understanding Rousseau's anti-liberal approach when he embeds the foundation of
moral reflection in the individual's social role. If self-understanding is role-bound,
deviation from communal norms results in subjective incoherence. Autopunition,
therefore, embodies and expresses the logic of citizen autonomy in that it
reacquaints the ideal and the real self in a moment of violent encounter. The
proposition of being "forced to be free" is completed by an autopunitive subject who
seeks his own punishment when he exceeds his freedom within the symbolic.59
As the Social Contract equates the punishments of the death penalty and exile,
autonomy assumes the form of voluntary self-sacrifice.60 Similarly, anyone who
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professes a civic oath and then commits a crime should "be punished by death: he has
committed the worst of all crimes, that of lying before the law."61 The law is that
which does not lie. The law represents the subject to the extent that, as the child
becomes the subject of language, it dissolves into the structures of signification.62 The
taking of the oath is voluntary, but only to the extent that the alternative to complete
subjectification is exile. The oath embodies the same force of reason as Habermas'
ideal speech situation in that every empirical utterance presupposes it
counterfactually, even though no empirical utterance embodies it. The choice of
submission is therefore a 'forced choice'6' in that the subject who embraces the
condition of subjectivity under the symbolic disappears as a particular subject64 -
since the primordiality of the oath decrees consensus and the subject's dependence on
the state for meaning. The subjective state is an emptiness experienced as a lack
unless filled in by the symbolic.65 The subject accepts the normative interpretive
framework as a self-interpretation and becomes the subject normatively stipulated.
Denial of the oath under these conditions is self-denial.
Denial of an oath is the greatest crime because it exposes the condition of discourse -
that its pronouncement cannot guard it against (in fact are the source of) its own
contradiction. Contravention of the law is self-contradiction and produces a tear in the
symbolic which is re-woven by the desire for self-punishment. Rather than force the
subject into a double relation in which it both recognises its desire, and the validity of
the law which is witness to its transgression, the desire for unity and the will to
completion re-establish the law. All crimes against the republic - the source of life66 -
are irrational but explicable as the desire to reconcile real and ideal: who the subject
is, and who the subject wants to be.67 The permanent discordance between self and
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social reality is dialectically resolved as real inadequacy (the alienated self) is
compensated for by means of the social role (the self-punishing citizen). The
inadequacy is a source of guilt which the crime, by triggering self-punishment,
relieves the deviant of. The crime therefore sustains the illusion of an ideal self which,
through self-destruction, counterfactually cures itself of the alienation of its actual
self. The transgressor must take a narcissistic pleasure in the law if it is to see itself
reflected in the force administered against him by the apparatus of the state.
In strictly normative theories, who one is and who one wants to be is resolved in
terms of the social role. In reflective theories of subjective constitution, self-
interpretation will encounter an initial lack - the experience of having had a place in
the symbolic now foregone. But this alienation does not - as it would for Maclntyre -
represent the impossibility of being, but the very possibility of being, the pure
possibility of the subject. The subject is lacking, missing, or only possible because it
is semantically unformed. It is a subject whose story is waiting to be told. This story,
as Rousseau indicates when comparing himself to the Genevans, is still closely related
to an established schema. However, new meanings are given to past events - and
since these events are constitutive of the self, their reinterpretation entails a
reconstitution of the subject. In the context of reflective theories of subjectivity, the
remoteness of the cause of the subject is alienating until the theories become
explanatory, and true, in being accepted by the self-interpreting subject.68
THE PORTRAIT OF THE KING
However, the subject cannot appropriate meaning or reframe authoritative
frameworks intentionally. Rather, intentions themselves become dependent on other
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contexts. Rousseau states that he has a well-known and unambiguous attitude towards
the King of Prussia which is obvious from the straightforward meaning of the couplet
he has inscribed on the face of a portrait: "He thinks like a philosopher, but governs
like a king".69 The inscription is intended to be unambiguous - and have the same
mimetic relation to its referent as the image. However, the inscription introduces
another and different order of signification. Furthermore, the co-existence of image
and text suggests that neither is unambiguously referential.
Cohen explains that the couplet is in fact inscribed on the verso of the portrait, not on
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its recto as Rousseau claims. The inscription on the verso suggests that revelation
(truth) awaits the subject's being overturned rather than faced. The subject, therefore,
can only arise under conditions of disappearance. Furthermore, the couplet Rousseau
inscribes under it requires explanation: "This verse, which from any other pen would
have been high praise, contained as I wrote it no ambiguous sense. It was besides,
only too clearly explained by the previous line." 1 Two further absences structure
meaning: firstly, other writers whose relation to the verse makes Rousseau's
intentions clear, and, secondly, the uninscribed preceding lines necessary for complete
comprehension. Rousseau's attempt to convey a personal meaning with respect to
absolute authority gives rise to the paradox that the real is both what representation
presupposes and the excess which escapes symbolisation. Meaning is not present as
real, but constructed retroactively as what continuously slips out from under the
process of symbolisation.
Identity is therefore structured by unseen perspectives. The canvas on which the
king's portrait is painted is an image of the dividedness, the two-sidedness, of
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castration. The foundational event, in other words, has always been constructed with a
recto and verso, writing and anamnesis, logocentrism and its other. In being
inaugurated in this manner, culture and subjectivity are determined in the act of
72
determining the other. The portrait is turned over to complete the picture: the other
side is what is withdrawn but continues to effect. The splitting of the I into ego (other)
and unconscious (other's discourse) brings into being the surface with two sides - the
visible (face/verso) and the invisible (recto/meaning), the invisible support of the
visible.72 The split is the condition of possibility of the existence of a subject. At the
same time, only the split subject can overcome the division - alienation and
separation are two sides of the same subject, whilst their overcoming is the realisation
of the subject.
Putting the I back into the traumatic cause is paradoxical, because retrospective
designation is the revelation of an immediacy which can only be known in its 'lost'
form. The objective past is the condition of retention and recollection, but is itself the
product of that recollection. The master signifier cannot be brought into discourse
without the action of subsequent events. Subsequent events are read as 'caused' by the
master signifier so as not to qualify it and demote it from its position of authority. So,
Rousseau's ambiguous remarks are only revealed by the contexts, not qualified by
them. However, what subsequent conditions reveal is that the master signifier as the
pure, undialecticised 'event' is non-sensical in both senses of making no sense and
having no impact on sense-cognitive apparatus. At the same time the precipitation of
subjectivity occurs in the splitting and dialecticisation of the cause. To bring about the
effect of signification the subject must dialecticise the master signifier, splitting 'it'
into two signifiers - a prior and subsequent. Therefore, the meaning of the master
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signifier (the event) is created for the subject at the same time as the opposition
between signifiers allows for the subjective position. The subject is what bridges the
split coming to be between the two signifiers.
Rousseau explores the retroactivity of signification in an episode where the sight of a
periwinkle reminds him of the first such experience.74 Because his perfect memory of
the periwinkle is not a matching of current sense datum with retained impressions77,
the nonsensicality of a master signifier is detectable. Recognition here is independent
of interiorised subjective vision and supports an anti-idealist reading which sees
memory as something essentially different from perception. Recognition depends on
an unconscious impression being brought to light retrospectively - the second
instance reveals the significance of the first through reactivation, even though the
second must (only logically) depend on (and 'be') a trace of the first. As with the
portrait of the king meaning is not created instantaneously, in a matching of
inscription of object, but after the event, ex post facto.76 Because the periwinkle is not
contained in a cognition that replicates an origin, but in a subject alert to the absence
of that origin, the search for the authentic subject can never be completed as the
localisation of an event, that is, ontologically. The subject's appearance is imperfect
and unspecifiable because the first event does not bear fruit until a second has
occurred. The isolated signifier is irrational until it emerges in a context which
77 •involves the other. As Rousseau maintains: "the objects of which one speaks must be
understood."78
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A STORY OF FATE AND FREEDOM
Rousseau's discourse of the law is concerned with the problematic of the convergence
between the law and freedom. The law unifies the subject and the unbound subject is
not free, since freedom is under the law: "With this the great legislator concerns
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himself in secret, though he seems to confine himself to particular regulations." The
legislator's concern with the generality of the law is exercised through particulars
which trigger a crisis of the whole subject. A single contravention of the oath, for
example, is enough to tear the subject asunder and trigger a reconnection through
identification with and internalisation of the symbolic order. The death penalty as
self-sacrifice employs the same logic with which Zizek explains sublimation under
80the figure of the simultaneously healing and smiting spear. The deviant is the
expendable means to a higher level of integration, the loss which is itself the
condition of recovery. The procedural steps which reinstate the subject are the same
ones that initiate the legislators program. This can be seen when Rousseau employs a
similar logic to answer the central legislative question of who "is a fit subject for
legislation?"81 In doing so he contemplates a re-birth:
There are indeed times in the history of States when, just as some kinds of
illness turns men's heads and make them forget the past ... horror of the past
takes the place of forgetfulness, and the State, set on fire by civil wars, is born
again, so to speak, from its ashes, and takes on anew, fresh from the jaws of
death, the vigour of youth 82
The lost origin (the repression of the horrors of the past as forgetting) is the means to
subjectivity (born again from the ashes). Castration (the jaws of death) signals that the
subject under authority relies on the benevolence of the other. That is to say, the
subject's self-assertiveness must be recognised by the structure through which that
subjectivity is being asserted. As a servant in the Solars house Rousseau properly
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translates the family motto for the assembled guests as 'some strike but do not kill'.
What has been translated alludes precisely to the castration necessary for
subjectivation. What is figured there is that 'putting into words' heals the wound
inflicted upon the subject when the subject is integrated into the symbolic. The
approval with which his masters greet his efforts represents "one of those rare
moments that put things back in their proper perspective, repair the slights of true
84 ....
merit and assuage the outrages of fortune". But subjectivation is perverse because it
means self-objectivation, conceiving oneself as no more than an instrument of the
or
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system. This emptiness of subjective substance is offset, under the paradoxical logic
of the healing spear, by a restoration of jouissance - the recovery of some of that
wholeness and freedom to act unrestrainedly associated with the enjoyment of the
unsymbolised body, the body prior to its categorisation and rationalisation.
Rousseau's instinctive response is telling. The repaired subject exceeds its role.
Expressing more than is required, Rousseau overfills Mile Breil's glass, spilling water
over the table and onto his attractive mistress.
The symbolic is the agent of possibility for the subject, but only to the extent that it
defines a limit. For Rousseau walls are agents and embodiments of symbolic
castration. Rousseau draws on the symbolism of walls in classical literature as
'principles of retardation'86 which delay or restrain destructive forces - both from
without and within. In Emile, the educator is advised "to put a wall around your
Q-7 .
child's soul" to preserve his young charge against the effects of social corruption.
Lycurgus - the Legislator of Rousseau's Social Contract - forbids the building of
walls, asserting that the nation's warriors were sufficient for the purpose: 'We sit
Sparta lapidibus circumdata: ibi muros habit ibi viros" ('Let not Sparta be
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surrounded with stone: there she has walls where she has men').88 The Spartans are
walls because the symbolic has been inscribed on their bodies and turned them into
citizens.
The Spartans are the immovable signs of the complete operation of the law. The
totality of the law is encoded less in its visible forms (walls) as in unwritten laws
which the legislator works on in secret.89 The law's agents are not self-identical, or
rather, are so in that they represent and register the form of the law. Rousseau's
narrative, on the other hand, represents the space within which interpretation - a
reflexive relation to the law - may emerge. Narrative is instigated because the search
for a form of the legal subject of a contained tension between obedience and
autonomy. The autobiographical subject emerges in narrative at the point of
dislocation, at a distance from the principle of command where the oath is distinct but
faint. At this point the subject rediscovers a jouissance which obviously cannot be
incorporated into the formal law but which dialecticises the ground of lawful
subjectivity — frees the flesh from the stone of the wall — and emerges, if not as
autonomy, then as that with which autonomy is entwined.
Towards the end of the first book of the Confessions Rousseau recounts how, when, at
the age of sixteen, he found himself locked out of Geneva for the third time, he
decided not to return to face the punishment that he knew awaited him. While
avoiding the physical consequences of repeated transgression, the unmistakable
phallic imagery of the drawbridge conveys in full the means available to the
patriarchy to administer a more potent symbolic punishment - that is, to endorse or
condemn by means of inclusion or exclusion from the city:
120
I saw them raise the first bridge, I trembled as I watched its dreadful horns
rising into the air, a sinister and fatal augury of the inevitable fate which from
that moment awaited me90
Where once the disobedient sojourner's 'fate' had been to return and be duly punished
before being reinstated into the community - as are his fellow apprentices on this
occasion - Rousseau now clearly uses the word to refer to seeking in the world
outside that which the patrie cannot provide and, indeed, opposes. However, it cannot
be reductively assumed that Rousseau has invested the subsequent narrative with the
basic nature/culture dichotomy, nor that 'fate' (the force of the Genevan law) can
simply be avoided in the search for 'freedom' (subjectivity).
Fate suggests that the moral trajectory subsequently narrativised re-imagines the
whole, but that it does so without freeing itself from the terms provided by culture.
The subject is not condemned to repetition and indeed the mechanical repetition of
return-punishment-reintegration is apparently broken when Rousseau flees Geneva
and, in the ambiguous space of the outside world, represents himself as the agent of
self-willed motion: "I had only to take one leap and I could fly through the air".91 If
the privilege of exile is to escape recognition by the law in the sense that the law only
comprehends actions that are repeatable, it is not in order to reconceive causality
skeptically in terms of chance. Some existential involvement with the mechanism of
the law predicates subjectivity, condemning the subject to repetition even if he cannot
represent it to himself. Law is a condition of possibility of narrative at the same time
as the subject emerges through the renarrativisation of the events that comprise its
career through the law.
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Whatever innovation exile introduces is immediately qualified as, even outside
Geneva and apparently self-directed, Rousseau experiences conditions similar to those
he left behind and reiterates, in mice, the narrative of the first book. M de Pontverre
sends him to Mme de Warens who directs him to the Catholic hospice at Turin where
he renounces the Protestant faith and is baptised into the Church. As Rousseau enters
the hospice he notes - recalling the gates of Geneva - "I saw a great iron-barred door
Q9
which was shut and double-locked behind me" - and experiences the same
confinement which caused him to posit the preservative separation of self from citizen
in Geneva. In the hospice the dissolution of the integrated self is figured through the
separation of the sexes within distinct spaces, and Rousseau identifies with the female
converts as in Geneva he had recognised himself in 'feminine' acts of private
imagination rather than masculine actions of public virtue.
Once converted Rousseau again undergoes expulsion from a universal institution -
here the Church rather than the republic. His expulsion immediately after conversion
comically mixes membership and physical ejection; but it is through being cast out
that he recovers — as he had when leaving Geneva — a quantity of freedom from within
fatality:
So far from indulging in tears and despair, I merely altered my hopes, and my
pride lost nothing by the change. Never had I felt such confidence and
security. I believed my fortune was already made, and I congratulated myself
on owing it to my unaided efforts.
The confidence with which Rousseau re-interprets values and formulates new desires
("I merely altered my hopes") is not empty, but conceals a mechanism which
condemns him to a reiteration of the same conditions both within and beyond the city.
As a mere renegade, Rousseau is simultaneously mastered and able to indulge in such
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a way that, as he heads for Turin, he feels himself to be both under Mme de Warens
"direction" and giving full vent to his "passion for wandering"94 - both determined
and free.
The law attempts to identify a subject through representation in signification. It must,
therefore, avoid such a compromise formation of subjectivity as is evident here,
between the subject to be and the fully constituted subject. Narrative itself
simultaneously anticipates and qualifies closure. The concrete instances of narrative
reveal themselves under analysis as uncertain points of arrival and departure.
The choice of turning contingencies into unitary foundations appears arbitrary rather
than normatively motivated. The law in general cannot restrict inherent tensions, but
the dialectic of narrative recognises jurisdictions other than the proper jurisdiction of
the law of canonical forms. Containment ultimately relies on distinguishing between
minor jurisdictions and the law proper, thereby binding the subject — repeating the
resolutions of the autopunition - precisely at the points of potential resistance.
DEVIATION AND RESTORATION
For Rousseau, the site of subject formation identifies both maternal and paternal
jurisdictions. The recovery of fatality within freedom is associated with this
bivalence, but does not assess that bivalence for its rationality - that is, whether
freedom is no more than a disavowal of determination. A suspension of this
assessment occurs because, in narrative, description itself constitutes the subject
which is decomposed and multiplied through it. The narrative also produces a panoply
of new image and symbolic configurations of the subject, and a multiplicity of events
through which the subject emerges in relation to the cause. Subjective cause, as
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subjective form, is decomposed, revealed, widened and deepened in the process. The
self-interpretation that reflects back on and to some extent becomes the cause is
forged in acts of translation between subjective memory and imagination. In what
follows, the subject's figuration of the role of castration, and the resolution of
subjective denial will emerge as constitutive of the self-interpreting subject.
The law is a system in which the father is installed as a source of coherence. The
I
paternal function is to provide an anchoring point as a primordial signifier for all
others to take their meaning relative from.95 However, Rousseau's relations with his
father are marked by increasing distance and a cooling of paternal affection until the
elder Rousseau is critiqued as a negative example96 and replaced by ideals such as
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George Keith. Ideally, the father secures the child's adherence to the law. However,
Rousseau's relation to the law is jeopardised by Isaac who embraces the ideals of
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"liberty and honour" in such a way as to reveal a dislocation between the city and
the subject ending in his own exile99.
Rousseau's instinctive reaction to finding the bridge rise before him on his late return
to Geneva - "in the first access of grief I threw myself down on the grass and bit the
earth"100 - draws on the symbolism of the earth as a universal origin. Rousseau's
desire is to set in train and opposition between universals - the maternal and
paternal.101 However, the origin is resistant and will not accommodate the exile. The
mother is an oppositional force operative (albeit negatively) in his departure.
Rousseau claims that, even against his own will to leave, his cousin Bernard might
have dissuaded him.
But the more I have thought over the way he behaved to me at the critical
moment, the more persuaded am I that he was following his mother's
instructions and perhaps his father's as well.102
Rousseau's groundless conviction is located amongst subsequent developments ("the
more I have thought ...") rather than the identification of causes. The retrospective
assignation of meaning indicates hat the simple binary of nature / culture cannot be
reiterated as a paradigm. The existence of the same gesture towards the earth with
other significations suggests multiple and equivocal meanings which cannot be
ordered and arranged relative to each other by subsuming them under a more general
referent. The gesture of kissing the earth arises in a number of contexts encoding
moods from the grief stricken to the ecstatic. Thinking that he was "taking final leave
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of Les Charmettes" ~, Rousseau says, "I did not depart without kissing the earth and
the trees, and turning back again as we went away".104 On fleeing France for Berne
Rousseau recalls how he "flung (himself) on the ground and kissed and embraced it
crying in delight: 'Heaven, the protector of virtue, be praised, I am setting foot in the
land of liberty".105 A little later, "to my pure and deep delight, I felt myself clasped in
the arms of the excellent Roguin."106
In the symmetry of these moments, the child's grief seems at last to be assuaged, and
the mature philosopher restored to a lost territory. Roguin's embrace is fraternal, and
Rousseau is amongst citizens. However, as the gesture is doubly encoded as both a
desire for the return to the maternal and for repatriation, it is a reaction that sets in
motion two apparently opposing forces corresponding to the paternal identity which
fails to secure Rousseau's position in the community, and the maternal identity which
actively distances him from it.
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Derrida reads Rousseau as arguing that moral decline and perversion are ushered in
by the cancellation of the original condition. The unavoidable substitutive
organisation of meaning in which reality is an effect of the endless chain of
107
supplementation undermines the hope for ontology. This "substitutive
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perversion" reaches its height when (referring to Emile), mothers have ceased to be
mothers.100 However, Rousseau insists on moral salvation through complete
denaturation - symbolisation. The celebration of motherhood in Emile occurs in the
example of the Spartan mother who celebrates the victory of the state rather than
grieving the death of her sons."0 In this example, the citizen-mother and natural
mother are revealed as unexpectedly similar.111 In the Second Discourse Rousseau
argues that there is no natural relation between mother and child because there are no
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essentially maternal actions. "Later examples of the mother's "tenderness ... for
113* • • • ...their young" illustrating natural pity are not inconsistent because pity is a universal
and not a specifically maternal trait. Motherhood is therefore a choice - adoption
rather than natural necessity. In Emile Rousseau encourages mothers to "follow the
master's wishes"114, and subsumes motherhood under the authority of the Tutor: "Do
not argue with the nurses; give your orders, see them carried out."115
Rousseau's solution to the endless regress of maternal signifiers is to reorganise that
substitutive chain by means of the paternal master signifier.116 The mother is
symbolised relative to the father - she is conferred citizenship (symbolic status) not in
her own right, but is "citoyenne" as the result of being a member "of the family of a
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citizen so called". The father alone bears the proper name of citizen.
With the instatement of this second instrument, the mother's desire ('tenderness') for
the child can be symbolised. Indeed, the mother's tenderness is turned into an
126
ordinary signifier ab initio as an instance of universal pity, not specific, object-related
affection. Symbolising the maternal role makes the mother displaceable by a number
of other signifiers. In Rousseau's terms, motherhood is adoption rather than necessity;
it is located in the symbolic, not prior to it.
The mother's role is to provide for the early development of the child whose nature is
only ever considered in relation to the absent father. Pre-history is selective of a
masculine inheritance, while the mother is never described as a contributor to the
child's contribution but only its carrier.119 For Rousseau the child is always the
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father's image - the mother's role being to perpetuate that image in the world.
Indeed, in the Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre Rousseau argues that "all the
austere duties of the woman (are) derived from the single fact that the child ought to
121have a father". The 'ought' identifies an imperative making the father a particular
122kind of signifier — the primordial or master signifier. ~ The primordial signifier is the
123sine qua non of subjectivity, without which there is no possibility of a subject.
However, the primordial signifier is only brought into effect once other signifiers
come into relation with it.124 If primordiality is not established events assume unstable
configurations and only relative relations.
Subjectivity occurs in the relation between signifiers anchored by a primordial
signifier. A significant instance of the process of subjectivation occurs conferring of
names in the Confessions:
'Little one' was my name (petit fut mon nomj, her name was 'Mamma'
(Maman fut le sien), and we always remained 'little one' and 'Mamma', even
when the passage of the years had almost defaced the difference between our
ages (efface la difference entre nous). The two names, I find, admirably
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express the tone of our behaviour, the simplicity of our habits and, what is
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more, the relation of our hearts.
In Kripkean terms these names are 'rigid designators'126 in that they always designate
the same thing, unaffected by time. Rousseau draws attention to the fact that these
names do not designate positions in a system, because even as the relative position
between the signifiers changes, they remain fixed and true. Names become true in
their triumph over flux. That change however is an erasure of difference, or a
convergence, and so points to a controlling signifier elsewhere than amongst the
subjects so called.
Rousseau explains how signifiers attained stability in the first place: "things were
127called by their true name only once they were seen in their true form". The scene is
one in which: "a savage upon meeting others ... fright will have made him see these
men as larger and stronger than himself; he will have called them Giants." But, after
some familiarity, "he will restrict the name Giant to the false object that had struck
him during his illusion".128 Rousseau allows the subjects of this language game the
capacity to make an impossible adjustment giving 'man' and 'Giant' their proper
identity rather than a relative identity. In overcoming the illusion, subjects see things
for what they are rather than as a condition of simultaneous presence and absence —
'man' as 'not Giant' and vice versa. How can this be unless the truth of these things
was known beforehand? Somehow, the process of dialectical adjustment lands on the
truth which lies beyond its capacity - it discovers what the first, figurative function of
language had missed. The circularity of naming is 'vicious' only if an exact origin (a
proper name) is required.
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Again it can be seen that the law operates against the compromise formation of
subjectivity between an anticipated but unfulfilled futurity, and a fully fixed position.
The subject is caught in this split between what it is necessary to presuppose in order
to have knowledge, whilst admitting the inaccessibility of those things to knowledge.
The paternal signifier is not an original signifier as ontological event, but is revealed
only once it is recognised as an imperative of the process of signification itself. The
lack of a name at the origin testifies to an already displaced originality - the birth of
the name in the other, and the paradoxical reliance of the autonomous (self-naming)
subject on the other to satisfy the economy of signification.
Clearly, there is no ontological category of the name which assigns the right one to
the right subject.129 'Petit' and 'Maman' represent regulated points in a functional
system. Names are not indexicals which "distinguish things according to their
natures",130 rather, the appropriate name is the function of a history of calling (a
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symbolic function), ~ and of a legitimately designated name-giver (a symbolic
authority). Emile "shiver(s) at the name Sophie" and, "struck by so dear a name, he is
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awakened with a start and casts an avid glance at the girl who dares to bear it." The
Tutor asks, "What? Ought the mere agreement of a name have so much power over a
wise man?"134 If the name agrees with the object against which it is to be tested, it is
because it is assured by the unpronounceable nom du pere from which signification is
derived. There is no natural name even if there is perfect 'agreement' of name and
thing.134 The name comes from the other - from that which has no name but goes by
the name of the nom du pere. The name seems 'necessary' to what appears in the
world without a name because that necessity comes from the father.
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The name 'Petit' is a construct the making of which can be traced across several
episodes. It appears first in an early romantic adventure in the company of Mile de
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Vulson and Mile Goton " in which Jean-Jacques was an instrument in their true
romances: "Such artful maidens know how to make use of a little man (petites
poupes) as covers for their affairs with their elders, or to tempt real lovers by making
an attractive show of unreal ones."136
Through the cover of the name the shape of the real can still be discerned. Possibly,
only through the name can the real be figured. However conceived, the name is the
fragment which bears the stress of the relation between intention and the real. The
reference to himself as a 'little man' recalls an earlier incident in which a precocious
sexuality is stimulated by the spanking delivered by Mile Lambercier. She notices the
consequences and:
Two days afterwards we were made to sleep in another room, and
henceforward I had the honour, willing though I would have dispensed with it,
of being treated as a big boy (en grand garcon).137
The oxymorons 'little man' and 'big boy' identify a contradictory subject which the
neutral form 'little one' defuses in order to restore the appropriate innocence of
childhood, and halt Rousseau's unwilling expulsion from the "earthly paradise" of
Bossey.138The subject is, therefore, a sedimentation of meanings furnished by the
other - as Giant was when man experienced his lack. However, Rousseau idealises
the subject as innocent in order to purify it of the tension which both bears and is
borne by the relation to the other.
The oxymoron resumes the logic of the smiting and healing sphere. Rousseau
describes how he "swelled with pride when she preferred me to grown-up rivals,
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139whom she appeared to slight." " Of course, both the appearance and the preference
are false, but the restoration of the subject is necessarily mounted on the fantasy of a
return to wholeness. The name in fact marks the site of the subject of castration who
must abandon the paradisal complementarity with the mother. Rousseau's pride is
only another temporary correction to the state of permanent injury which makes the
injury the ironic locus of fulfillment.
If the subject is what sediments as the effect of one signifier on another
(intersubjectively), then it is a subject of meaning (and is deprived of being). The
symbolic intervenes in the real, and annihilates pure bios. Language replaces the
fixation of the pre-symbolic with substitution and displacement, translation,
metaphorisation and the transference of fascination from one object to another. The
subject, then, is not only sedimentation, or objectification but a relation of signifiers.
Subjectivity is a position in the system of signification and the path forged between
signifiers.140
Rousseau makes the mistake of believing that he has acceded to full subjectivity
through the relationship he has entered with Mme de Warens. However, he has done
no more than fill the space provided by her. Congruent with the adventures and
incidents through which the name developed, the name identifies that which occupies
the place of desire. Rousseau's fantasy of a relation with Mamma has opened the
possibility for subjectivity, but only as an emptiness to be filled. What he discovers at
this point is that there is nothing more to the subject than this void. It is the passage
from consciousness to self-consciousness at this point that elevates the subject - not
in the sense of a telos, or something to be fulfilled which will fully constitute
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subjectivity, but in the sense of a precipitous suspension of the subject above any
possible ground. It is, as Zizek says referring to Hegel, the feeling that "there may yet
be something".141 The subject is therefore put in a position of reliance on the other -
autonomy calls upon the grace of authority to recognise it.
The crisis of subjectivity for Rousseau is, in other words, to be seen in terms of the
"absolute maladjustment of the predicate to the subject".142 So, Mme de Warens
'names' not Jean-Jacques but a position with respect to her which may be filled by
anyone. Not surprisingly, then, Rousseau returns to her only to find his place usurped
by Wintzenreid.141 Resolving to devote himself to Mme de Warens, she welcomes
him back "as if I had brought back treasure" {Elle me recut come si j'avais rapporte
des tresors).UA 'Treasure' designates the real, not a mere relative value, and
Rousseau's determination as a subject is confirmed by it - since he thereby resumes
the status of 'idol' he had as a child.14:1 However, the self-sameness is an illusion since
Wintzenreid so impresses Mme de Warens that "she thought this young man was a
treasure" {Elle crut ce jeune homme un tresor).]4<) Both Jean-Jacques and Wintzenreid
are treasures, at different times, and interchangeably. Rousseau presumes a crisis in
which meaning has been jettisoned, and signifiers represent nothing in particular.147
On the contrary, the displacement of subjects testifies that the master signifier is in
place, and castration has been.
Rousseau's deflation occurs in the face of the fact that, after the law the real does not
exist. It continues as a remainder alongside the symbolic, inaccessible to symbolism,
1 ^JQbut enabling the articulation of that to which there is no access. Mme de Warens is
not the Other guaranteeing the meaning of terms and Rousseau's sense of treasured
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identity. Because any subject can be a treasure no signifier is related to the absolute,
and no signifier identifies a subject.
TO KNOW A MAN
Rousseau's response to his loss of status is to remain in the house to supervise
Wintzenreid. He accepts his repositioning with a pathos that avows castration. To
accept his own, of course, he must embrace Mme de Warens' lack, her inability to
guarantee the uniqueness of individual signifiers. The mature response is itself the
overcoming a compromise formation in which Rousseau enacts the classical fetishist
symptoms of simultaneous disavowal and acknowledgment of female castration.149
As a young man Rousseau attempts to disavow the woman's castration and recover
the maternal phallus.150 In one episode he exposes himself to female passers-by and
then attempts to escape into "subterranean passages"151 pursued by an angry crowd.
Entering the maternal space for protection he finds that, rather than going on "for
ever" as he had assumed on prior investigation, he is soon stopped by a wall and
1 5"?
unable to go further. ~ The wall, as previously noted, is evidence of the process of
subject formation, of castration. Rather than the escape route Rousseau imagined, his
memory of the expanse of the crypt misleads him. The crypt is not a theatre for
staging the shattered symbolic, but a platform for reassembling the symbols of
authority. Rousseau looks upon it as a place in which secrets may be guarded.
However, it calls forth the interdiction as the space is almost immediately filled with
his pursuers: "In a moment I was caught and seized by a big man with a big
moustache, a big hat and a big sword, escorted by four or five women each armed
with a broom handle".153
133
Caught and confronted by hyper-masculinised threat, Rousseau extricates himself by
posing as the abused son of a cruel, aristocratic father, thereby winning the "terrible
man('s)" sympathy. Paternal severity is momentarily replaced by paternal
benevolence. Rousseau attempts to promote his own interpretive strategy, however,
he is dispossessed of discursive authority. The episode concludes in an act of
expulsion as the man - having stripped Rousseau of his mask - punishes him by
means of a "mocking imitation" of his pleading voice: "I am a prince. I am a prince
and a coward. But don't let his highness come back again."154 The man is the
conventional voice of the father telling the son that he has entered that place for the
last time, that this is the point at which he gives up jouissance.155
The entire scene is one of dispossession. The repressed unlikeness of the women is
acknowledged by having them accompany the man carrying their phallic broom-
handles, bearing the signs of authority. The women are condemned to imitate men
even though it is they who measure the gravity of the transgression and recognise the
failure of authority to properly punish the transgressor: "from the way the girl and the
old women scowled at me ... I concluded that ... left to them alone, I would not have
got off so cheaply."156
However cloaked in mimetic displacement, the scene suggests - through the male
authority's actions - that, ultimately, no matter how surreptitiously bypassed, a true
form of authority exists, and responds to the true identity of the subject. It is not the
women, then, who, simply by bearing the signs of authority, expose its contingencies.
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Their role is not to implement the law, but - as the objects of the subject's desire - to
reposition the subject's desire in relation to the law.
On two occasions the breast becomes the site of considerable anxiety. A comic
triumph concludes the incident in which the Countess de Menthon - a rival of Mme
de Warens' - attempts to expose the latter's breast on which, it is rumored, "there is a
mark ... like an ugly rat, so much so indeed that it almost seems to be moving".157 In
trying to expose the disfigurement, de Menthon only manages to make Mamma
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'unforgettable' by revealing her beauty. The unblemished breast only confirms
Rousseau's advancing construction of de Warens' perfection - the site of ontological
security ready to serve subjectivity when and as required. The demotion of the love
object and destabilisation of ontology is never introduced through Mamma but is
displaced onto the Venetian courtesan Zulietta, who presents an exterior perfection
disguising a marred interior.159 Venice is the city of the imagination. Enchanted by the
singing of the scuolae, and convinced that such voices could only belong to women
equally beautiful, Rousseau desires to meet the 'angels behind the grille'.
He is cruelly surprised at their ugliness but asserts, in a symbolic disavowal of
castration, that "their voices lent such an imaginary charm to their faces ... I persisted
in finding them beautiful, notwithstanding the evidence of my eyes."160 Becoming
suspicious of the authority of the imagination, Rousseau subjects Zulietta to an
investigation designed to locate her reality elsewhere than in an appearance which
seems to defy imagination,161 focussing on anomalies such as the discrepancy
between her beauty and her availability to him. Like de Menthon before him
Rousseau searches for a defect to satisfy an uncanny sense of foreboding, thus
disrupting the rule of the imagination.
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Zulietta represents the limit of Rousseau's enchantment, and the point at which
appearance submits to the compulsion to investigate. When the courtesan advises him,
"Gianetto, lascia le donne, e studia la mattematica"162 ('Jean-Jacques, leave women
alone and take up mathematics') she points to the break in the lyricism of his sense of
romantic completeness. With Zulietta, "what might be ineffable pleasure turns to
poison in (his) wretched head."163 The cause is Rousseau's attempt to locate the
source of an anxiety so deep that, once revealed, it unveils a general condition and
results in universal reassessment. Thus, when Rousseau identifies Zulietta's
malformed nipple as the reason for his hesitancy and apprehension, he concludes that:
It results from some remarkable imperfection of Nature ... I saw as clear as
daylight that instead of the most charming creature I could possibly imagine I
held in my arms some kind ofmonster, rejected by nature, man and love.164
Under the rule of law, the primitive love object is transformed from the site of
pleasure and affirmation into a locus of revulsion and universal doubt. The comic
reassurance of the revelation of Mme de Warens gives way to the absurd dread of the
sequel. Once radical desire traverses the now fundamental law Rousseau can know
discrepancies before verifying them - suspicions becomes the self-affirming
fulfilments of determinations made under the law.
Embracing the law as an imperative determines a suspicion against nature. Zulietta's
malformed nipple is as much a product as a sign of this suspicion, but Rousseau
privileges the discovery as the moment, not of doubt, but complete self-discovery: "If
there is one incident in my life which plainly reveals my character ... Whoever you
may be that wish to know a man have the courage to read the next two or three pages
and you will have complete knowledge of Jean-Jacques."163 The episode, then, is
central to the labours of autobiographical discourse - "to know a man". In the
certainty of self-knowledge, Rousseau can derive some satisfaction from his suffering.
Dread is the very moment of subject formation under the law to the extent that it
signals the emergence of identity in the risk of regress to the pre-ontological condition
of indistinctness, merging and unrecognisability. Zulietta's melancholy attraction
repeats the descent into subterranean depths holding the promise of meaning.
However, to dare to cross the pre-oedipal threshold and stare at the maternal body is
to risk lifting the oedipal interdiction.
Previous to both Mme de Warens and Zulietta Rousseau had delivered a testament to
the character of Countess de Vercellis' struggle with breast cancer.166 There the love
object decays, and corrupts the body and the subject along with it. His relationship
with her is disappointing as he experiences neglect ("it was natural that she should
take a liking to a promising young man ... But she did nothing for me",167) and
ultimately negation ("she finally asked me no more questions and never spoke to me
except to give me orders. She judges me less by what I was than by what she made
me; and since she saw nothing in me but a servant she prevented my to her in any
other light."168). Unlike Mme de Warens, Rousseau cannot tell the story of the
Countess as one in which the subject secures affirmation through the object. The
Countess is cold, dignified and "philosophical."I69 The ambivalence characterising
the previous episodes is absent in the one involving de Vercellis. Rousseau can derive
no satisfaction from his suffering as his disappointment is complete and he cannot
position himself anywhere in the other's desire. Her death is the signal of his
complete castration as she takes all of herself with her in death and he cannot recover
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even a modicum of the real from the other to satisfy the formation of his desiring
subjectivity.170
The Countess' death provides the framework for assessing the labour of self-
knowledge. The fetishist may disavow the perception (or fact) of the lack. However,
as the castration is never perceived the fetishist may in fact be rejecting the theory of
subject formation which underpins it. When de Menthon exposes de Warens' lack of a
blemish (lack of a lack) Rousseau may take pleasure in the subject's restoration to full
reality. When Zulietta is revealed as flawed, the subject senses a disturbance beyond
perception affecting the conceived presence of the subject itself - as if the blemish
were a threat to a presumed prior wholeness. Zulietta is rejected by "nature, love and
man" - all undiminished wholes, or ideal presences, which the subject has an interest
in preserving as such. What Rousseau achieves through witnessing the death of the
Countess is the necessary displacement of subjective presence from the unknown
plenitude of pre-ontology. The response to Zulietta, then, identifies self-knowledge
concretely but ambivalently with castration as the cause of the subject.
THE PONT DU GARD
The final step from pre-ontology to the known but unmarked presence of the paternal
signifier in order to feel its presence as the first loss does not occur until Rousseau's
acceptance of the law in the presence of the awesome Pont du Gard.171 The Pont du
Gard clearly recalls the horned gates of Geneva. However, where the horned gates
signaled expulsion from a city which repressed the imagination, the Pont du Gard
absorbs the power of the imagination: "for once the reality exceeded my
expectations".172
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The Pont du Gard simultaneously appears within and stands outside symbolic
castration as its own law, its own reality. Outside the locus of the treasure of the
signifier17, it both is its own reality and ensures the reality of derivatives. In this sense
it underpins the interpretations available to the subject. Those interpretation calls on
the Pont du Gard as phallus, in the sense of the structure's being not a figure of the
transcendental signifier but of a first loss174 and so a signifier that stands at the
frontier between the real and the symbolic. Rousseau's self-understanding is
consequently phrased in terms of an irrecoverable origin: "if only I had been born a
Roman."175
The Pont du Gard is able to substantiate its own being as the image that takes the
place of the real. Initially, it is held to be a protection "against the girls of
Montpellier" about whom Rousseau had been forewarned. They are prostitutes like
Zulietta - in whom terror had mingled with delight as the subject approached the
threat of the pre-ontological encounter with the maternal body, until it was finally
suspended by the arresting flaw. The experience before the ancient structure reveals
the subject's inability to substantiate its own being, to recognise itself as complete
unless represented in its own reality. The Pont du Gard distances the menace, and
through its activity of foundational signification relieves the subject of having to
approach and comprehend the real for themselves.
The subject appears in this space between pleasure and terror: "in spite of all my
smallness I felt my soul to be in some way elevated."176 Rousseau is both fantasising
the ideal of non-castration and acknowledging his castration - his place in the law.177
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The rhythm of elevation and nihilation marks the Pont du Gard as the spear that deals
the wound (smallness) and that restores (elevation) the subject through it. However,
unlike the incident at the House of Solars, the Pont du Gard calls the subject to virtue
- to resist the allures of courtesans. Rather than respond through the sexual excess
expressed over Mile Breil, Rousseau arises as a subject through the stoic intervention
into sexual peril.
Reference to "reverence", "reverie", and "rapturous contemplation" situate the
satisfaction somewhere between rationality and imagination. The sublimity of an
event the reality of which is greater than expectations (interpretive frameworks) -
signals a dislocation between image and reason giving rise to both the pathos of the
178sublime (filled in wishfully - "if only I had been born a Roman") and the exercise
of rational interpretation and theory construction. The wish identifies the first loss as
'something about the subject' itself; principally that the subject is something in
relation to the revered and dream-like (reve) structure.
In terms of the Epistle Dedicatory, the Pont du Gard is the wished-for in every sense.
The Pont du Gard is the symbolisation of what ought to be symbolised - castration
through the paternal signifier. It reorganises the lost past like the oedipal mechanism
which retrospectively designates all prior desire as disorder. Musing "if only I had
been born a Roman" suggests that the solution to the problem of integration can occur
only at or more likely before birth. Consequently, to revere the Pont du Gard is to
acknowledge subordination to an order which cannot be grounded in experience: that
is to say, by the subject occupying the place of subject formation (the other)
subsequent to its interpretation of the causes and consequences of those formative
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processes. In other words, the only certainty is not the fixed, discoverable ontological
event but the context of another narrative framework, another place and time, another
scene. There can always be - albeit within intelligible limits - re-interpretation, and
re-narrativisation of the process of subjectivation. The Pont du Gard is a monument to
subjective dispossession in that it points to the cause at the same time as establishing
its inaccessibility. The Pont du Gard requires the subject to draw on reserves that can
only grasp the real in reverie and reverence - or as Lacan says, in a dream, which
nonetheless means something.
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Rousseau's Emile posits autonomy as a separation of the self from the effects and
influences of others. Consciousness, in other words, separates itself from the object
that gives rise to it. Emile's education is therefore an example of self-assertion
against, and nihilation of, the other. The other must be transcended since the subject's
recognition of it is a reciprocation of the recognition it gets from the other. This
interplay and exchange of recognition threatens the self-sufficiency of the subject. For
Sartre the I must reject the Me as object to be autonomous.1 This means rejecting
authenticity for the sake of autonomy - abandoning self-reflexivity. According to
theorists of intersubjectivity such as Mead and Habermas, the other can be refused but
not negated. In this respect, they are both proponents of the Hegelian insight that
reason educates (Bildung) desire and transforms it, thereby achieving a non-dominant
relation to otherness. The interaction between subject and object represents "the
repositing of the given ... self-reflection is a return to self from a presupposition that
has been reposited." The look of the other is an invitation to exchange responses and
is therefore a learning process, not a fixation and curtailment of development. The
solution to alienating recognition by the other is therefore to depend on the other in
order not to be the other - to make the other part of self-conscious reflection.
The question of critique is inherent in this view of the subject in language. Because
signification occurs in the relation between signifiers, and meaning is designated
retroactively; the basis of knowledge and subjective understanding is metaphor.
Aemilian epistemology (including self-knowledge) centers on the possibility of
referentiality ('is') and the inevitability of displacement ('as'). It is not possible to
transcend metaphor. Acts of enunciation must be mediated intentionally, but this is
not the coincidence of speech and meaning, only the subject catching what it must
have meant, seeing itself as having meant something. Mead's subject requires a
central integrative ego function which resolves the relations of present self-
perception, abandoned past and future selves. However reflexive integration creates
no more than a new object self because nothing can reflect on the current situation in
which the formed self finds itself.4 Lacan has made this proposition a commonplace
of psychoanalytical descriptions of identity when he argues that, at the universal
mirror stage of child development, the basis of self-recognition is misrecognition/
Mead's construction of the self, on the other hand, neglects the barring of the self
from its own recognition of its alienation in language, and represents the denial of
castration. For Lacan, the condition of possibility of self-consciousness is contained
within the impossibility of ever knowing the self as united, or experiencing oneself as
free.6
The project of autonomy which Rousseau constructs in Emile is based on principles of
education forming a natural man 'for society' without his being 'of' society.7 Emile is
a 'savage in the town' and experiences himself as being "alone in the midst of
society". The prospect of a reconciliation between the individual and society has
given rise to declared doubts but continued to intrigue commentators both of Emile
and the Social Contract,9 Given that Emile sets out to educate the natural man (an
independent whole) while the political treatise is concerned to denature man into the
'fractional citizen' it is difficult to appreciate the confidence with which Rousseau
maintains their interdependence. He claimed, for example, in a letter to Duschene that
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the two texts "together form a complete whole", and that the Social Contract forms a
"kind of appendix" to Emile.10
Communitarians have criticised Rousseau's characterisation of autonomy for lacking
social parameters, arguing that sociality cannot be added to identity but is inseparable
from the conditions of formation of the individual which Rousseau posits 'prior' to
society.11 Rousseau recalls Rawls' 'original position' - where moral reasons are
developed outside the context of society, but precisely for the purpose of constructing
moral society (based on the standard of 'fairness').12 Rawls describes participants
with no preconceptions about the type of society they are to belong to nor the place
they are to occupy within it, making rational choices behind a 'veil of ignorance'.13
Communitarians object to the misconception of the self that this theory entails.
Sandel, for instance, argues against this "essentially unencumbered subject of
possession"14 as being paradoxical in requiring a unified identity prior to membership
in an historical community. Individuals do not emerge from the state of nature with
the capacity for ethical conduct as both Rawls and Rousseau argue. A normative
context is fundamental to self-understanding as a self "wholly without character" is
"incapable of self-knowledge in any morally serious sense."15 In fact, Rousseau, in
the last book ofEmile, appears to concur. The completion of the autonomous subject
by socialisation undermines the claim that Emile is complete at each stage of his
education ("all that a boy can be at his age"16). That is, it admits that autonomy is
fundamentally divided between the choice made by the subject and the historical
context in which that choice is made.
Unity, under these assumptions, is only possible through the transcendence of
historical society by the individual will. The coherence of the Rawlsian moral thinker
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is based on its construction as an independent observer, judging without participation.
The Rawlsian observer in its strictest form would have to transcend the dependence of
observations on other observations. The hermeneutic critique of pure observation
argues that it denies the reality of membership - that is, that all positions are
participant perspectives and that the observer therefore exists in a network of primary
and secondary observations.17 The universalist response to the hermeneutic critique of
this so called 'paradox of form' is that it denies the possibility of developing standards
for the critique of systematically distorted pathological perspectives.18
Critique is the pedagogical aim in Emile. The standard of 'nature' represents an
explanatory theory for distinguishing between good and bad developmental processes,
and between the legitimate and illegitimate practices the individual might assume
with respect to society. Emile rejects learning processes based on hermeneutics - that
is, negotiated understanding in the intersubjective context. Indeed, Rousseau's claim
for the unity and interdependence ofEmile and the Social Contract support
interpretations of the educational program as critical-transcendental rather than
hermeneutic-historical. However, as the observer is contextualised in a relay of looks,
autonomy must centralise context - there is, as such, no simple transcendence.
Rousseau argues that it is impossible to be both autonomous and a subject of the look.
All that can be recognised by either the generalised or concrete other is a role - the
acceptance of available norms, not their renegotiation by an autonomous agent.
However, this argument is based on a reified version of the look - the look as
abstracting, and as abstraction.
The look, in reality, is more differentiated than this - it is evaluative and operates in a
normative context. So, autonomy can be sought beyond the role to the extent that the
150
role is not a fixed entity but designates a negotiable boundary between the individual
and society, self and other. Autonomy, then, is the reconfiguration of an internal
boundary previously internalised by the subject in response to the other's gesture.
This reconfiguration implies an interpretation of the normative context, and thus a
position from which to interpret which does not simply repeat or confirm social
norms. However, the Tutor prevents Emile becoming an object of reflection for
himself. Emile remains fixed in a role constructed through the internalisation of the
Tutor's command without possibility of dialecticisation. Because Emile cannot
symbolise himself to another, neither can he represent himself to himself. Fixated at
the level of a prior transcendent truth (what 'is'), the understanding cannot be freed in
language (as metaphor).
HERMENEUTIC AND CRITIQUE
Hermeneutic understanding presumes to be interpreting shared social meanings, and
public values rather than articulating universal principles of justice grounded on a
priori moral standards.19 This describes a transition from disputing claims to truth to
recognising differences as interpretive differences. Because there is nothing non-
interpretive about interpretations, there are always other modes of understanding,
which, once recognised, opens the subject to the possibility of learning from others.
Hermeneutics thus applauds the existence of a pluralistic society allowing for diverse
interpretations without demanding a resolution to interpretive conflict. Hermeneutics
corresponds to Habermas's aesthetic standards of judgment in that different
interpretations challenge each other to reexamine themselves in the light of the other,
and to forego insistence on their own uniqueness.20 Hermeneutic conversation is the
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form education assumes through the questions raised and propositions stated by
alternative interpretations.
Strictly hermeneutic attempts to understand meaning are sufficient as long as the
meanings to be understood are only temporarily inaccessible because of cultural,
•••21social and historical distance. For Gadamer, hermeneutic analysis works because
22social interactions are founded on a "deep common accord". Habermas criticises this
idealisation of social interaction arguing that hermeneutics neglects social processes
which are not wholly linguistic, and fails when confronted with processes of force and
domination producing "systematically distorted communication" and "pathologically
23unobtrusive speech". ~ Critical theory therefore works to uncover the presuppositions
and operations of the accord. It assumes that pathology may not cause any apparent
incoherence.24 Indeed, because partial perspectives are constructive rather than
restrictive of observation, the distortions a text involves are frequently if not
characteristically not available to those examining its significance.2^
Hermeneutics has taught us that we are always a participant as long as we
move within the natural language ... There is therefore no general criterion
available to us which would allow us to determine when we are subject to the
false consensus of a pseudo-normal understanding and consider something as
a difficulty that can be resolved by hermeneutic means when, in fact, it
requires systematic explanation.26
Critique offers the subject the opportunity to return the negation to the text - to refuse
its meaning when that meaning is potentially damaging. If instructors are understood
as being in the position of the text, critique represents the well-grounded right to
refuse a command or teaching assessed as unwarranted, wrong, or psychopathic. Self-
understanding extends beyond the hermeneutic restriction of a community of those
with whom we share meanings, evaluative norms and experiences.
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In other words, learning and the higher order reflexivity of autonomy begin where
. 77
understanding replaces consensus.
For Habermas the means of avoiding or overcoming the potential damage is to take a
• 28theoretical position from the outset." This position would include a description of
normal developmental processes - so as to assess the damage by understanding the
potential deviations, and avert it. Rather than beginning with a contextual
understanding of the meaning of a dialogical partner's expression, the observer must
rely from the start on an explanatory theory that can transcend the restrictions of the
deformed context to explain the meaning of the deformed behavior, its source, and the
reason for its incomprehensibility. The observer cannot rely on the meaning the
object's behavior has in the language of action and practice of which it is a part
because the point is that this language is deformed. Because the object has no other
language, actions remain incomprehensible even to it. Because of the distortions
within the language of understanding and interpretation itself, the possibility of
29
revising interpretations rationally requires a theoretically informed viewpoint."
According to Habermas, then, understanding will not be improved through
hermeneutic conversation since its evaluative assessments cannot reveal the distorted
character of the assessment, and its cause. Hermeneutic self-transformation simply
reproduces the ideological self-distortion existing in the original self-understanding of
society and its traditions. Habermas argues that what is required is a critical theory of
TO •
society." A critical theory of society would go beyond the hermeneutic offer of
challenging interpretations to develop in the direction of greater depth and strength
without abandoning their distinctiveness. Such a theory involves, amongst other
things, an account of individual socialisation processes, an account of processes of
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social reproduction and transmission of cultural knowledge, and an account of the
possible causes of structural deviation. To secure the objectivity of a critical social
theory, Habermas appeals to reconstructive social science. He outlines the project of
such a science in this way: "the object of understanding is no longer the content of a
symbolic expression or what specific authors meant by it in specific situations but the
31intuitive rule consciousness that a competent speaker has of his own language.""
Rousseau is an interesting precursor to this approach, basing Emile's upbringing on
the discovery of his 'natural' developmental stages. Through the paradigm of 'nature'
Rousseau hopes to secure a theoretically informed analysis of the symbolic domain,
32which would reduce the context dependency of understanding. However, he, like
Habermas, must deal with the fact that the interpreter-observer is always already a
member of the lifeworld occupying a specific social, historical and cultural position,
33
achieving an inevitably situation-bound understanding." The goal is an understanding
from the point of view that is on the same level as what is understood.34
Like Habermas, Rousseau believes that subjects have a tacit know-how enabling them
to perform and produce without explicitly adverting to or being able to give an
3^
account of the structures, rules or rationality of those performances. The realm of
nature is precisely such a pre-symbolic, implicit domain. The educational program
renders explicit the practically mastered (and theoretically unarticulated) competences
of undistorted subjects. Unfortunately, Rousseau leaves the exploration of
competence descriptively at the level subject-object interaction. Emile's labours in the
domains of inner and outer nature are not consciously integrated through
communication with other subjects but by raising objective claims and attempting to
fulfill them through the instrumental use of the self and others. Habermas insists on
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the reconstruction of normative relations through a program of "universal pragmatics"
based on the successful performance of speech acts.36 Communicative competence is
the ability to follow, adapt and apply rules producing speech acts about the external
world of objects, and subjective relations to them.37 Communication therefore
involves raising, criticising and redeeming validity claims - that is, conditions which
1Q . . .
make statements true or false" with the express aim of bringing about an agreement
39based on the recognition of the validity of those claims." Reaching an understanding
about truth and falsehood is an inherent telos of the activity of speaking :40 "Thus the
basis for the assertion of identity is not really self-identification, but intersubjectively
recognised self-identification."41
Habermas refers to Mead as being amongst the first to consider the interdependence
of socialisation and individuation.42 However, Mead's account is limited in that it
describes conventional role formation, but not the formation of an independent ego.
Mead's formulation is equally applicable to situations where roles are assumed
without question, or under duress in a desire to avoid the negative consequences of
not occupying proffered positions. The avoidance of similar passive, conformist
performances is at the centre of Emile's education. Autonomy requires the subject to
act on the basis of conviction that can withstand rational critique.4"' For Habermas, the
expansion of the moral outlook to embrace other perspectives constitutive of the
social panoply can only occur in dialogue with others. Adopting Mead's terminology,
this 'generalised' other is both a collective 'we', and a composite plurality which can
be set against the numerically dominant empirical normative perspective44 - an T' or
'you' which may question the 'we'. Aemilian ontogenesis, on the other hand, falls
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short of this position. It accepts that conventional roles do not in and of themselves
define morality, but it cannot provide foundation for autonomous ego formation.
That foundation, Habermas argues, is a rational discourse, wherein the social roles of
self, other and society are interdependent.411 Mead formulates this as the relation of the
I and the Me. The subject self (I) is aware of itself as an object self (Me). The I is
self-aware but caught in the ungraspable flux of present consciousness and thereby
unable to know itself. If it can be said to know anything, the thing it knows is its past
self - the Me. The I cannot know itself because in order to satisfy the unity of identity
it must recognise the Me as itself, and thus become the Me, and no longer be the I.
Identity must contend with this temporal duality - the subject is never what it is but
what it was, an historical figure conceived in the present. However, its essence, the I,
the source and expression of self-consciousness, belongs to an undetermined future.
The indeterminate nature of the I makes of the subject an open whole, a source of
spontaneity, a possessor of freedom. This indeterminacy is a feature of Habermas's
conceptualisation of the I-me relation in terms of the complementary roles of speaker
and respondent: the first raises a proposition structured by social expectations which
the second is free to reject.46
In the following discussion, Emile is examined in terms of the elements of the critical
theory of society outlined. In the first instance, the demand of objectivity - the subject
at one with itself - is identified, as is its unsustainability. This is supplemented with
the search for a higher order reflexivity, which fails because it does not grasp the need
for an intersubjective context. The social context is examined through the techniques
of surveillance in which the external discourse (the gaze) objectifies the self into a
role. Emile exemplifies the danger that development may rest there - the subject
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identifying with the external purveyor of the look and internalising it as his
perspective in order to resolve conflict. Hermeneutic interpretations find the
transcendence of this level of observation is inconceivable. However, the look as an
abstract threat to the possibilities of the autonomous subject is critiqued as
insufficiently differentiated. It is argued that the look is evaluative, and therefore
invites interlocution since evaluative language is contrastive and exists not in absolute
terms or as master signifiers, but as sets of signifiers whose meaning is given by their
relative position in a system. The response to the look (or discourse) is the basis for
the renegotiation of the boundary between the self and other, especially a
dialecticising or interpretation of the internal limit represented by the role. Whilst
each of these formative stages to autonomy is detectable in Emile, autonomy is
ultimately unavailable, since the internalisation and fixture of authority is
overwhelming and cannot be ousted.
MASTER AND SLAVE
In Hegel's description of the Master-Slave dialectic, the Master seeks to be whole
without otherness.47 However Hegel identifies the relation itself as the site of a hidden
dialectic, and consequently of an intersubjective redefinition of identity and
autonomy. A boundary in the transactional milieu defines roles, but these roles are
renegotiable, giving rise to the recognition of flexible boundaries between subject
positions rather than fixed positions for subjects to identify with or assume. The
meaning of the designated roles lies not in the fact that they can be assigned to an
individual, but that they are all available to individuals, and the positions they signify
interchangeable. The slave's role is to remove the otherness of things - to mediate the
Master's relation with the world of objects, and to humanise them (and him). In the
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process, the master believes that he has received recognition for his authentic
independence.
Emile represents a social system which obstructs the interchange of roles.48 Under
such circumstances, the subject develops only as an object self, remaining what they
were made by the other. Emile prioritises the experience of the subject and self-
consciousness as a unity. However, as Mead explains, self-consciousness emerges in
the context of a rift, the disunity of the object of consciousness (Me), and the
conscious awareness of the object (I). Emile accepts Hegel's logic to the extent that
the subject arises on the ground of the other's role, and by cancellation of the other.
Following the master-slave dialectic, women provide men with the conditions under
which they can fantasise their own unity - since, as Rousseau says, women should be
strong for men.49 Women do not work50 only to the extent that they do not humanise
the object field for themselves; that is, precisely to the extent that they labour entirely
for the men whom they allow to position themselves as they would like with respect
to the other's desire, "desir(ing) to be pleasing in men's eyes".51 Sophy is therefore a
bridge without substance, a medium without a reality of her own.
52
Sophy is guided by one precept - "What will people think?" While men are
autonomous subjects to the extent that they transcend, or are free from, public
opinion, women are ethical to the extent that they internalise public opinion as a limit.
53A woman's identity is entirely bound to being worthy of respect. Her social role is
to act as a spectacle of selfless responsibility. For this reason, only women are in need
of mirrors. Emile's room, on the other hand, will have no mirrors54 because going
without having to have their unified image reflected back to them (or, for example,
recognised by others) arms men against any original doubt. Mirrors reflect an
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'effeminate' image to the extent that they are used to compose an acceptable social
persona prior to appearing in public.
Mirrors would denature men to the extent that they construct an appearance different
from their identity - men adjusting themselves before a mirror would be men qua
role, rather than men qua men. A misrecognition of the self through the reflected
image (doubled and split)55 promotes a displaced identity above an essential unity.
Not surprisingly, then, when Sophy discovers Emile (her 'Telemachus') he is exactly
as she imagined him.56 Sophy, on the other hand "delights us, we know not why,"37
suggesting that object and construct are not as exactly aligned for her as they are for
58Emile.' Sophy is a role, not (yet) a self; her existence is conventional. When Emile
first encounters Sophy it is, significantly, the name which 'arrests' him.59 The name is
necessary, because the object cannot speak its own reality. We are in fact told that
even though she seems to speak of her own volition, it is Sophy's mother that makes
her speak.60 Rousseau informs us elsewhere that nature has no need of names, and that
in a perfectly mimetic art such as classical realist painting, the name of the painting
under the picture is unnecessary61 because the observation is self-supporting, and not
a reference to other unsupported observations.
The openness to the other defining love represents a threat to the integrity of the self.
Absolute self-sufficiency is revealed as a specular relation to the other when Emile
reacts with horror at the news of Sophy's death.67 The Tutor takes this opportunity to
construct Emile's integrity, removing her as a condition of identity for him. This
negation of Sophy is the condition of possibility of Emile's virtue (his self-control).63
Love, in this sense, is a subject-object relation which facilitates the self's mastery
over otherness. Love is an illusion, Rousseau maintains, because it is entirely a
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product of the imagination. It is, however, illusory in another sense. What it does is
not hide the presence of a real relation, rather it reveals the emptiness of independence
conceived in absolute terms.
Sophy's best prospect - marriage - will only produce a seamless being to the extent
that she is subsumed under the authority of her husband.64 Ironically, her
independence in the choice of marriage partners is encouraged by seemingly liberal
parents who wish "to make (her her) own mistress" so that she can choose her
husband in "full liberty".66 However, this liberty is subject to the "opinion of others".
She is permitted to "judge for (her)self until" the danger of fascination swamping
reason and the threat of filial abrogation of responsibility arise. In both pre-married
and married life autonomy only exists against an ultimate background of authority.
A NATURAL LANGUAGE
Rousseau identifies this condition of monadic unity as the only condition of freedom.
Sartre recalls Rousseau's systematic premises when he argues that the subject is
essentially a consciousness never at one with itself, seeking a self-enclosed matter of
factness.66 Emile's education is founded on the incompatibility between the openness
of subjectivity and the ideal state of quiescence. For Rousseau, the education attempts
to recapture the homeostasis of nature for Emile. This calm of nature represents a
condition in which the subject is controlled only by the forces of nature, or
'necessity'. Emile's ontogenesis - the preservation of his natural development - is an
attempt to maintain the totality of the subject. However, detotalisation occurs in the
temporal lag between stages because then the subject is forced to relate to itself as a
not-self - that is, a current self (Me) encountering its current limit with a self to come
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(I). Paradoxically, to be itself the subject would have to exceed itself because this
temporal lag between I (self-conscious subject) and Me (object of consciousness) is
both necessary to identity and opens the subject to uncertainty.
What is revealed in Sophy's persona is in fact equally revealing of Emile, and of the
status of the education and its search for a theoretical perspective uncompromised by
temporal and linguistic displacements. Emile is subjected to a pedagogy whose effects
are to remain 'imperceptible' to him. As he moves from one relation to another, and
from circumstance to circumstance, he is not to be made to feel the context
dependency of his condition. Thus, the Tutor contrasts Emile's education to one in
which the subject passes through "many hands" - but can only secure the difference
by ensuring that he and the nurse "seem like one".67 What is imperceptible to Emile is
the deposition of a germ of otherness in the constitution of his identity in the forms of
the exteriority of another will, and of the displacement of language from nature.
Emile's condition is imperceptible to him because the education is presented as a
restatement of the same, a locating of the thing rather than a hermeneutics of revisable
interpretations.
The fable of the 'Fox and the Crow' explores the workings of a powerful cultural
mythology representing reality to the child in such a way that "they get hold of it in
the wrong sense".68 The sense in which the child gets hold of reality wrongly is that
he grasps it by means of language rather than directly. The world is semanticised
("Word! Words! Words!"69) in direct contradiction to the prime tenet of the education
which is to show the thing rather than use the word or symbol. The fable establishes
the full range of possible substitutions in the poetic realm. In that domain the
trickster-fox is the producer of a perverse discourse which can "compare qualities as
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different as those of song and plumage".70 In the fable, conventional substitution is so
entrenched as to function as natural signification. Alarm is expressed at the mention
of the phoenix: "All of a sudden we are floundering in the lies of antiquity - we are on
the edge of mythology."71 The phoenix introduces an irreconcilable difference
between sign and signified in which nothing is taken for something, in which ground
completely gives way at "the edge". Rousseau consistently evokes the dangerous
edge, the place where ground suddenly and irretrievably gives way, as a threshold
between ontogenetic stages of development and levels of understanding which needs
to be negotiated through revised conceptions ofwhat constitutes adequate
77
foundations: "One language supplants another" - "this progress is quite natural."
Being 'at the edge' therefore introduces liminality rather than utter groundlessness.
Language cannot be completely purified of strategic and rhetorical effects because
there are no firm boundaries between language games. To be at the edge is to be in-
between, to work with the reality of an original displacement or metaphor as the
condition of consciousness - not knowledge 'is' but knowledge 'as'. The latter is the
distinctive sign of meaning. When the Tutor teaches Emile to find his way through the
world without the aid of maps he presents this as an education in the direct
apprehension of natural phenomena. Lost in the forest of Montmorency and "without
a landmark to guide us" ' Emile and the Tutor attempt to return to the town without
knowing where to look. Rousseau is here interested to address the central epistemic
problem of how anything which was once unknown can be known. What is being
discovered, then, is consciousness, or method - "how to find out for himself'.74 The
thinking and judging subject, then, is the subject of this episode. In particular, it is the
subject of the opacity of the Me to the I - that is, the formative process of the I not
completely retrievable by the I.
In turning Emile's thoughts towards the conditions of knowledge the Tutor provides
him with what Rousseau elsewhere calls "the means to cease being a savage."76 The
process is a demonstration of what is required to bridge "the distance between pure
sensation and the simplest knowledge".76 This distance is measured and bridged by
signs, which at the same time indicate the direction to travel and bar access to the
destination. At Montmorency, "a mere thicket"77 hides the town from view and
instigates the process of reading signs to indicate direction, distance and time. The
sign is a sign because it leads from one place to another, and not because it is 'itself
anything. In fact, the sign, which is essential to the process of understanding, does not
make more present but further displaces and conceals. The distance from sensation to
knowledge is the admission of an essential indirectness, just as the researches in the
forest were inaugurated by wandering, aimlessly at first and then more determinedly.
Knowledge is symbolisation, the translation of the object into language. However, the
condition of translation is original and is not the act performed on a presumed nr-text.
Rousseau is forced to admit this when he says - having first displaced the role of
maps in geographical education — "no matter whether he carries maps in his head,
78
provided he understands what they mean and has a clear idea of making them." The
education in orientation appears to occur in an asemic space. However, this is only
because the 'original' marking - the Tutor's education of Emile in seeing as 'seeing
as' - is not revealed until it is re-marked.79 This retroactivity of effect is revealed
when Emile, delighted by the discovery of the town, acknowledges his debt to the
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mediating code: "Emile (clapping his hands): 'O, I can see Montmorency ...
80
Astronomy is some use after all ..."
• CI
Rousseau argues that fables are not suitable for children but suitable for adults.
Sophy is fabular (a product of the imagination) in the sense that she, too, has been
semanticised. Successful semanticisation for Rousseau means mimesis. The best
example of this is musical. Melody is mimetic because - like Sophy prior to Emile's
meeting her - "it is in the reader's mind all along."82 By this Rousseau means that "in
a melody, sounds act on us ... as signs of our affections."83 Nonetheless, "one has to
understand the language in which one is being addressed if one is to be moved by
84what one is told." Successful mimesis, then, understands that things of themselves
are inaccessible and must be mediated by discourse: "objects have to speak in order to
make themselves heard; in every imitation some sort of discourse must always
complement the voice of nature." Even the most direct access to nature lacks
immediacy: "for we cannot touch, see, or hear, except as we have been taught."86
Sophy is allowed to wear cosmetics to the extent that they intensify her beauty - that
is, emphasise nature. This permissible semanticisation marks (and obscures) the
subject as a product of substitution: that autonomy is an act of metaphorisation to the
extent that the subject enters relations with others and through them negotiates
boundaries of identity and discourse. Meaning only occurs when statements are
situated in a context of other statements. The I therefore arises in a place foreign to it,
where forces of otherness once dominated. To recognise itself, it must subjectify the
site of alienation. In Emile, this subjectification is figured in the student occupying
the place of the Tutor. The goal of the education is said to be to dialecticise isolated
terms, to introduce the first signifier (the Tutor) to another (Emile) and to forge
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meaning from the relation. The subject is precipitated by dialecticising the master
signifier so as to bring other signifiers into new relations with the cause. However, the
terms of subjectivity remain dualistic and the subject cannot project itself as a self-
positing consciousness. Because reflection is unable to lift the subject out of the world
of objects the only possible mediation is a totality spanning both intersubjective
relations and objective authority - the Tutor. The rule of 'one teacher for every
oo
student' asserted at the outset of the education exists to suppress the experience of
difference, disunity, and dissonance between self and society which are essential to
the emergence of self-consciousness.
THE COMMAND
Hermeneutics argues that consciousness of the limit develops from the challenge to
integrate the unexpected. Subjective self-consciousness emerges from the sense of
anticipation that comes from a world of open possibilities constantly moving towards
OQ
that which is not. Self-consciousness less likely to develop in a controlled
environment, where the encounter with novelty is diminished, since the sense of self
is a dialectic between the present of consciousness mediating between the anticipated
(not yet / self as lack) and the immediate past of consciousness. A pluralistic
community is therefore central to the practice of hermeneutics because challenges to
self-understanding can only be issued from beyond the sphere of familiar knowledge
and conversation partners. Rousseau, however, devalues the tension inherent in an
open future, placing a higher value on consistency instead. Indeed, it is extraordinary
that in his discussion of the establishment of culture (as agriculture) Rousseau should
posit pre-existing unnatural qualities of labour and foresight in nature itself.90 The
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principle of agriculture is "known' prior to its practice91 and thus, as an idea, is
anticipated.
The education, therefore, raises the prospect of autonomy only to nullify it. In
hermeneutic terms, once interpretation is installed above epistemic foundations the
process of justification becomes dialogic and dialogue unlimited. The Tutor's
discourse, however, must form part of the conditions of objectivity. This is achieved
92when the source of instruction as another's will is obscured. What is ultimately to be
hidden is the structure of the subject's identity as the internalisation of an external
limit. On the one hand, the individual is molded on the natural object as speech
follows need. On the other hand, speech is 'imperceptibly' modeled on the Tutor -
"the pattern he shall copy".94 Like the 'innocent' semanticisation of nature through
music, the commanding will is not additional to the conditions of possibility of nature,
understanding or subjectivity. The Tutor's commands are a force of nature rather than
the expression of another: "let the curb be force, not authority ... do not forbid him
but prevent him ... Let your 'no' once uttered be a wall of brass."95 The interiorisation
of authority removes the need for correction and conflict which would itself present
the child with the opportunity for resolution through a transcendence of his role as a
dependent. However, the child's attention is numbed by being 'naturalised' (based on
need alone) and turned away from the intersubjective context in which need both
arises and is mediated by speech.
The subject's displacement from itself is mediated in other ways. Emile's docility is
secured by maintaining a rigid boundary between his current contentedness and any
ambitions for higher reflexivity. The problem of divinity, for instance, is settled by
negation. Since it is not possible to understand the fundamental fact that God 'is', the
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Tutor counsels that it is better for the child to have no ideas of it than to have
unworthy ideas.96 That is, it is better for the child to consider that God exists and that
this underpins the science of his education and the facticity of his social position, than
for him to think that nothing does, or that God can only be understood metaphorically
(in terms of 'as') which tends to endless regress. Here Emile encounters the original
aporia of language - that 'is' is necessary but incapable of signifying. What it marks
is meant to be self-evident. However, self-evidence is at once the end of language,
and the condition of language: 'is' appropriates the human subject as the subject of
language, and bars it from entry into the real which 'is' marks the entry point to.
Emile's indifference to things beyond his reach invokes the oedipal docility of the
pedagogy: the only proper response to the incomprehensibility of God is to follow the
father's religion. The education admits that the symbolic order has no place for truth
as it reveals that at the point of greatest freedom - the freedom to choose faith, or the
ground of the self-grounding system (analogously in Sophy's case, the freedom to be
bound to whatever master she desired through marriage) - autonomy is subordinated
to authority. Indeed, the individual is dissolved in a self-grounding system, and only
acquires meaning through this subsumption to it. Incomprehensibility refers to what it
is not possible to assume the observer's position with respect to, without revealing the
observer as an observed. Incomprehensibility in this sense reveals that one only sees
what one already knows - that meaning occurs within the hermeneutic circle.
Emile is never articulated as both observer and observed, since the source of the
perspective of the observer is the other. The source of the observer's perspective is
therefore the internalised limit, the not-self. Perspective is the command built into the
very conditions of appearance and availability of the thing (the observed self, or Me).
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It is what Rousseau identifies as the supplemental discourse par excellence: "the very
illusions of perspective are necessary if we are to arrive at a knowledge of space and
compare one part of space with another. Without false appearances we should never
see anything at a distance ... distance would have no existence for us."97 Apart from
this function with respect to its object, perspective has a function with respect to the
98whole system - it justifies supplementary. The Tutor's command is as silent as
perspective is blind. The Tutor's mediation is as necessary as perspective is dispersed.
Articulating the interdependency of self (observer) and other (observed) would
require the self to remain an object of knowledge. Self-determination is the capacity
to adjust to the limit of the self by negating the not-self - to convert the other into the
self. However, the theory of ontogenesis represents an arrested form of development -
the self remaining at the level of the object self, without the development of
reflexivity. Arrest at this level determines the child as dependent.99 Emile is both not
fully recognised by the other (as an independent self) and confined to self-
identification as the object self that he takes himself to be100 - so that, at the end of his
education, he chooses to remain what the Tutor has made him. Emile's self-ascription
is confined to the Tutor's recognition of Emile as mirroring him ("you are my
work"101). Emile is only recognised and recognisable to the extent that he is like, or
mediated by, the Tutor.
SEE AND BE SEEN
For Sartre, recognition by another consciousness (the look of the other) mediates
identity and puts the subject in the position of one such subject amongst others.102 In
fact, it is not the subject's seeing but its being seen that constitutes its subjectivity, in
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that self-description is initiated once the subject becomes the object of a description
by the other. Objectification remains central and the subject is repelled by their
fixation under the gaze, rather than an involvement in communication. The
constitution of the subject under the gaze lacks the capacity to articulate
intersubjectivity, multiple position taking and negotiation available to linguistic
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exchange. In other words subjectivity is only constituted by and when the gaze is
returned to the subject; it is intersubjectively constituted founded on acts ofmediation
and reciprocation.
For Mead, self-consciousness is the essence of identity: subjective unity is secured by
giving the I the power to transform the Me under circumstances which threaten to
destabilise the relation. For Rousseau, a number of problems arise. Firstly, this model
of personal autonomy determines self-understanding as always refracted through the
lens of the acquired role. Because Emile allows for no individual-society dialectic,
any compromise of individuality is diagnosed as alienating. Self-realisation therefore
is ideal or the self is systematically distorted and determined. Secondly, for Rousseau,
threats to the stability of identity are not resolved by giving a reflective subject the
power to reorganise the socially embedded object-self. A scenario in which the I
responds to the Me entails the subject being several things at once, and Rousseau's
education is grounded in the recognition of a natural ontogenesis of development
whereby the subject progresses from one stage of completion to another, one static
system emerging from another.
There are, however, no intersubjective processes in Emile. Communication has an
inner negativity. There are, however, intersubjective preliminaries presented as
objective conditions. The 'imperceptible' actions of the Tutor, for example, is the
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rendering opaque of intersubjective conditions. Rousseau begins from the situation of
'recognition' as the fixation of the subject of and by the look, and concludes with the
necessary failure of interaction.104 The logic of the gaze is psychologised into amour
propre which represents the point of failure of interaction.107 Wanting to be desired
leads the subject to want to be preferred above others. The idyllic festival at the
waterhole106 spirals into violence and bloodshed as a result. In the Social Contract,
because interaction is the vehicle for coercion and domination, so the formation of the
General Will is conducted under conditions in which no communication is
permitted.107
To avoid being reified the subject must reverse the direction of the interaction. The
self that feels restricted and inhibited by the other, returns that sense of inhibition and
108inhibits the other - and in so doing inhibits itself. Reciprocal objectification
destroys communication. Emile both directs objectification at the other saying of a
refused request that "it was impossible" and resists being a participant in the other's
gaze.109 Emile makes the social world a world of mutual objectifications where
concrete relations are relations of subjugation and instrumentalisation. A relation of
communicative agreement between subjects is not possible since one subject must
find themselves in a permanently objectified state.110 How, then, is conflict
overcome? For Rousseau, this means making relations a relation among objects in the
sense that verifiable objective conditions become the basis for intersubjective validity.
"Use" is Rousseau's universal standard, and the means by which to guide and judge
the value of the child's development and the education's achievements.111 The child
may legitimately solicit responses from the Tutor only by means of the issue of 'use'.
Robinson Crusoe, the only book allowed Emile in his education, promotes use
112
value. The pursuer of useful things, such as Crusoe, is the true scientist - and
science is the basis of the education in autonomy. The science of utility, then, is the
normative foundation ofEmile. It provides, says Rousseau, the "standard of
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comparison" since it is disenchanted to the extent that it is unaffected by the
relations between things established in society. Cultural traditions, argues Rousseau,
can no longer provide grounds for value interpretation and self-interpretation: will
formation (somehow) occurs best when the individual places himself outside
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society.
However, the only ground for transcending convention is the natural world, which is
subject indifferent. The disenchanted relation of the subject to the object is transferred
from subject-object to subject-subject relations. Rousseau struggles to point to the
relevance of the scientific attitude to morality. By promoting a spirit of unaffected
observation and inquiry in Emile, the Tutor can teach his charge to "form his
judgment rather than teach him your own".11' So constituted, the child will not be
swayed by a sympathetic appeal until he has first judged the "worth" of the
"sentiments" behind the appeal. Ultimately, the worth of the other's sentiments will
be based on their 'use' - with no explanation as to what it means to assess the 'use' of
a sentiment. Individuals are not related to each other or to norms by anything as
impersonal or neutral as the rational consent promoted here.
If the only fruitful attitude towards nature is that of the observer-scientist, and if this -
rather than a discursive-communicative - is the model for normative evaluations of,
and relations with, others, then social relations are only valid to the extent that they
assume instrumentalised form."6 This is indeed Emile's position: in his view, others
are relevant to him only as tools."7 Emile in fact takes the same attitude towards inner
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nature as outer nature, giving rise to a social world (and a private sphere) marked by
indifference, coldness and strategic actions. Self-mastery, prediction and control
characterise inter- and intra-subjective relations removing nature from the realm of
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natura naturans and making it an object of domination.
The problem with Rousseau, as with Sartre, is that the key interactive situation of
'being seen' is described in a reductivist manner. The scenes of emerging passion at
the waterhole - where subjects gaze and are gazed upon, and the initial impulse of
love turns to pride, then jealousy resulting in bloodshed, in an escalation of violence -
translates the struggle for recognition into a struggle for self-assertion. Two things
need to be said about the discourse of the gaze. Firstly, the look is not an abstraction
absolutely other to the subject. The look emerges from a social context in which the
subject is a participant. The look therefore means something and conveys that
meaning - questioning, consenting, imploring, disapproving, skepticism.119 Secondly,
the look of the other is more qualified than the property of fixing the subject into an
object allows - it is evaluative in the sense that it is open and relational and invites a
response. The object of the gaze assigns a positive or negative ascription to it and
responds accordingly. The look can be interrogated and clarified. It can also be the
object of a demand that it declare or reveal itself. The look is normatively significant
(a look of hate, the look of love, a look of contempt) and meaningful to the subject.
We take a position with respect to these (to some degree internalise these role-related
attitudes) because they occur in normative contexts. That is, the look cannot be
abstracted from this context of social interaction.
No look, therefore, is a metaphysical condition of objectification - it is a moral
reaction. The specific meaning of the look of the other is decisive in the sense that
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through the look of the other one becomes an object to oneself in the linguistic mode.
The subject's response depends on some degree of personal self-understanding -
120initiated by taking the attitude of the other towards oneself. Subjectivity is
inseparable from this degree of normative self-understanding. Here, role and self are
conducted as a negotiable relation - allowing different roles to be exercised in
different contexts without losing one's identity (being reified by the other).121 The
sense of self and self-worth (self-affirmation) occurs through self-recognition which is
inseparable from attaining a specific social place. Self-consciousness (autonomy),
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therefore, cannot be a sense of self-affirmation attained irrespective of the good.
The look does not simply have a reifying effect (an undifferentiated 'being seen'). It
is not identification with a role, but an offer to the subject to occupy a role - it is an
• • i?3offer ofmeaning - which the subject may respond to by accepting or rejecting. The
role is necessary but not sufficient to self-constitution. One cannot simply affirm the
role since that would fix the subject in a conventional form. Neither can one simply
reject the role, since then one would be repeating Rawls' empty 'original position'
and rejecting the basis for developing independence. Subjectivity is completed self-
reflexively, by means of the subject selecting their role. However, in Emile, only one
offer is made, and only one role offered, so that the self-relation is controlled by the
role Emile plays with respect to the Tutor.
Rousseau refers to an episode in Homer where the son of Hector is cured of fear.124
The scene described is one where a helmet worn by Hector frightens the young boy.
The mother reassures the apprehensive child until Hector finally removes the helmet
and the child's composure returns. The scene is constructed in a relay of recognitions
and misrecognitions. First, the helmet obscures the father who is unrecognisable
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behind it. The child, unable to identify with the appropriate figure wins a smile from
the mother who thereby bestows her recognition upon him. The child's identity in this
passage of signification between subjects is, however, only provisional. Most
reassuring, most identity-confirming of all gestures occurs when the child recognises
the father.
Rousseau reconstructs the scene from the Iliad with an emphasis on the articulation of
gazes not found in the original. The looks are highly differentiated, and clearly
evaluative. Significantly, they occur within the context of the normative structure of
the family. In the oedipal terms of role structuring which is central to Emile, the
central fear for the child is the fear of castration which the process is designed to
i
allay. The child is made only one acceptable offer on this occasion. The offer to
identify with the mother, or to internalise that gaze as a prospective source of norms
arises momentarily, and is accepted with pleasure, but assumes a secondary
importance in the context of a scene framed by paternal identity and authority. The
threatening father is, at first, outside the relay of looks between mother and child. The
removal of the helmet figures the child's castration, the precondition of identity
arising in the context of the legitimate family.
This episode illustrates that subjectivity is the dynamic of the self as an object of
social expectation - and the response the individual gives to the normative
expectations of others. Pre-existing norms are therefore necessary to autonomy.
Norms, embodied in the look, do not simply negate. The father's appearance on the
scene from behind the helmet enters the discourse of evaluative statements passing
between mother and child and controls them. His affirmation, and the child's
acceptance, of identity occurs by means of a rejection which is the negation of a
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negation. The mother's affirmation of the child is retrospectively designated as the
negation of a legitimate identity through the establishment of an exclusive relation.
What the child identifies, then, is not simple refusal but a new universal conception
directed towards gaining recognition by others. Even in this most formal context and
the most stringent adherence to the law, the self does not simply confirm itself as a
social reflection.
Rousseau's greatest concern is that the child's earliest ideas will be those of the
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'tyrant' or the 'slave'. In the former he commands before he can speak, whilst the
latter means he obeys before he can act. In the first place the child refutes the social
order prior to accession to the symbolic, and gives up all possibility of sociability.126
The 'no' ungrounded in the experience of a social role is an empty gesture. In the
second place, the pure 'yes' to the social command forgoes any possibility of
autonomous development. Rousseau's solution is to return the child to a condition of
'natural' docility - to expose him to appropriate pain in order to develop his sense of
pity for others.
Emile's education is a training in docility, but one tantamount to paternal authority
and filial duty. The second book of Emile provides not only numerous examples, but a
clear program, of oedipal education fit for training a son to succeed to a proper place
in his father's house, wherein the only 'wounds' he feels are the necessary ones of
castration. The anecdotal material in Book Two refers to 'princes' and heirs'.
Rousseau maintains that he only trains 'men', not 'princes', but his examples are
significant since they undergird and direct Emile's own upbringing. In one instance,
the author recollects a 'triumph' of his own in which the child was returned to a true
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position with respect to his father. Paternal and natural education are exactly
symmetrical. Exposed to the small infirmities of a 'castrating' nature (a studied
paradox), the child is kept from complete destruction. It is not insignificant in this
case that the son's position relative to his father is directly opposed to his position
relative to his mother - for whom he is "the most important person in the world"12'3 -
and which is necessarily sundered. The child wanders through the environs of his
father's estate "alone and unprotected"129 albeit under constant surveillance, until he
returns home, repositioned in the paternal register, "ashamed and humbled, afraid to
look me in the face."130 The father has sanctioned the educator's method because he
131refused to have "a rebel in my house."
The Homeric scene arises in the context of rule based communications. However, it
contains an (unrealised) capacity for the subject to respond to a prescriptive sentence
(rule), and thereby to distinguish intersubjective relations from the stimulus-response
model of natural causation. Subject and object are no longer bound by cause-effect
132model of interaction. In one episode Emile and his Tutor watch a conjuror perform
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a trick at a fair. ~ The conjuror makes a wax duck act more or less like a real one,
attracting it towards a piece of bread held in his hand, by means of a hidden magnet.
Emile and the Tutor set out to discover the scientific principle behind the trick. They
do so and Emile is invited to demonstrate his discovery before the audience at the
conjuror's next performance. Unable to bring the duck under the same degree of
control as the conjuror despite being in possession of the 'principle' behind the
illusion, Emile experiences intense shame when his magic fails before the
onlookers.134
The meaning of objects remains unquestioned as long as action with respect to those
objects proceeds as normal. However, tension between action and expectation results
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in the analysis of actions and the objects they derive their content from. Emile is
unable to resolve conflict by simply reorganising objects within the same schema -
the 'principle of magnetism'. New meanings are therefore sought. The subject
emerges in this temporal interstice between the passing away of the old universals,
and new universals yet to come. However, the situation reinscribes Emile into a
conventional role. The conjuror accuses the Tutor of wrongly letting Emile have his
13^
way and reminding him that "your experience should be his guide". The Tutor,
equally ashamed, concurs and promises that the episode will not be repeated.
This question is designed to 'imperceptibly' deliver Emile into the Tutor's hands by
providing the education with new indispensable grounds, which the painful memories
of shame and confusion permit without resistance. The scene is presented to resolve
the problem of temporal disjunction in the child's development - of pride rather than
maturity leading intellect. However, it does so by fixing the child in the gaze of the
expectant onlookers who then register their disapproval and derision. There is no
evidence here of a freedom of response in which good reasons must be given as the
justification for following a rule.136 The child merely internalises the crowd's
evaluation and adopts it as the limit of his development Nonetheless, a partner of
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discourse is implied since the text admits of the relation between Tutor and pupil
that "the time is coming when our relation must be changed, when the severity of the
master must give way to the friendship of the comrade.In other words, the subject
cannot understand himself without understanding social relations, and will be unable
to reevaluate identity without reinterpreting social relations.
The fact that the new pedagogy meets with the child's unstinting approval suggests
strongly that the conjuror's and the Tutor's pronouncements are responses, or
articulations which anticipate a response from Emile. Approval is one such response,
but not the only possibility. He may critique historical society and posit self-respect
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from the point of view of a better or ideal society. Emile and the Tutor are invited
to be guests of the conjuror and are let "in on the secret" of his trick, "but do not
tell".140 In fact, the only secret being kept is the one Emile is not in on - the new
equivocation introduced into (but subsequently reinforced in) the rule-bound principle
of education. Commitment to a course of action is still rational only in the sense of
being bound by 'nature' from the scientist-observer's point of view, not by good
reasons raised in intersubjective contexts. The only alternative to role fixation in
Emile is skepticism - that is to say, an undermining of objectivity and hence
subjective collapse.
The child is exposed to nature in order to develop a non-negotiable boundary of
subjective identity. Impregnability ofmonadic selfhood is prized above the flexible
rearticulations of available norms in novel situations. Exposed to nature the child
becomes familiar with threats and develops a "coat of mail".141 The child is being
educated to take no situation as normal, to develop no expectations, nor cognitive
habits with respect to causal patterns. Since the only rule is necessity, necessity
dictates the absence of a covering rule.142 The child could be said to be developing no
role identity. In fact, the unbreachable boundary suggests a developmental itinerary in
which the role is fixed and unmaleable. Indeed, as the child's freedom is defined as
being regulated by the force of things rather than by the commands of others,143 an
absolute boundary around the role is constructed.
Emile provokes no response when he breaks objects because it is explained that he is
not the cause or agent of the breakage which occurred 'by itself'.144 However, the
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relation between things and bodies is not natural and direct but mediated.146 The body
and the body-thing interface are part of the subject's social identity. Thus, the refusal
to assign blame or identify cause raises an absolute boundary between Emile and
others, by failing to acknowledge their position in a discursive system. Things,
therefore, do not 'prevent without forbidding'146 as Rousseau requires since they do
not belong to a time prior to prohibition, or symbolic interdiction. The absolute
separation of self from things represents a rigid negation of the other and rigidly
determines identity without the possibility of negotiation.147
A HIGHER ORDER
Rousseau seeks to construct a guiding theory and to avoid the pitfalls of hermeneutic
understanding. He dismisses the authority of the scriptures on the basis that it is the
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product not of the text per se, but commentators, interpreters and mediators.
Furthermore, the original language has been translated, and no native speakers of the
original remain.149 On the basis of the importance of these first and second order
mediations he endorses the abandonment of the text in favour of nature rather than
attempt to reconstruct the original or true meaning. Because biblical exegesis is
unable to found morality Rousseau dismisses the authority of what passes for
Christianity. Unable to found conviction either within the institution or outside it he is
forced to maintain an attitude of 'reverent doubt'.150 Choosing not to submit, the
subject renegotiates the authority of long-standing norms and thereby emerges as
subject. The conservative hypothesis of the Creed reasserts itself, however, when, in
the face of no certain knowledge, the law of the nation and the father of the family
form the basis of public order.
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The 'Creed of the Savoyard Vicar' releases the potential for higher order reflexivity,
at the same time as it contains it.151.Considering the effects of Cartesian doubt the
152Vicar says "we scarcely know whether man is one or many." The only solution to
the multiplication of doubt is to 'follow the inner light'.151 Reflection unifies the
subject since "I alone ... produce it". The 'many' now recenters on the 'one' which
becomes a first principle. However, multiplicity returns when the Vicar admits the
incomprehensibility of the union of mind and body.154 The only solution to this
dilemma is to posit the wholeness of the will - making it whole to the extent that it is
independent of the senses.1:0 The search for an irreducible unity has marginalised the
possibility of an intersubjective solution to the fracturing of identity. Knowledge of
the difference between right and wrong is posited in conscience. However, whilst the
child is invited to examine himself in the light of all that is revealed through the
sermon, this is restricted by the Tutor's reminder that at this stage in his development
it is better for him to think as the Tutor does.156
As truth fails to appear in the symbolic order and its textual practices and interpretive
institutions, authority is merely re-embedded. Hermeneutic reconfigurations of past
understandings would posit a different solution, but Rousseau's stringent requirement
for certainty prevents it. Instead, strong individualism (in the form of 'conscience' - a
centered, 'inner light') emerges to take the place of community. Nation and family are
idealised communities able to provide the individual with recognition and consent.
When his education is complete, Emile assumes his place 'in' society by occupying a
1 57
farm physically separate from but politically connected to the city. In fact, life on
the farm is invested with the ideal trappings of republican life and represents a lost
and imaginatively reconstructed Roman order. Virgilian georgic is the genre
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controlling Aemilian social formations, implying a condemnation of Roman
decadence, a relocation of centers of sociability midway between barbarism and full
civility, and a value structure of labor, usus, and arte, rather than the pastoral values
of spontaneity and otium158 Indeed, authentic identity only appears to rest on the
abstraction of the subject from the community and his reliance on exclusively truth-
sensitive cognition producing significations independent of others. Emile, indeed,
bases his identity on a redetermination of existing practices of the self - and not at all
on scientific criteria.
Given that the telos of the education, and the criteria for assessing, is autonomy -
Emile's independence from the Tutor - his having "decided to be what you have
made me of my own free will"159 appears (but only appears) decidedly inauthentic.
The Social Contract recognises the extent to which social role and selfhood are
mutually sustaining: "If there were no different interests one would scarcely sense the
common interest."160 However, rather than a struggle for the mutual recognition of
self-understanding the interactive situation is the context for maintaining a
transcendent identity. The struggle for recognition may contain its own potential for
resolution in the intersubjective recognition of claims to selfhood. However,
interdependence in Emile is skewed towards a basis in strong individualism only to
the extent that it reveals a countervailing tendency to reassign the basis of social
autonomy to the legal order. The self-sufficiency of agrarian life is idealised because
"there is only one man who gets his own way - he who can get it single-handed."161
However, the absolute boundary that this idealises as the basis of autonomous identity
is only the necessary counterpart to absolute dependence. The education is in fact a
georgic labour for the Tutor who fashions Emile as his product: "You are my
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property, my child, my work."162 The legitimacy of one's claims and self-
interpretations is not a source of agreement. Instead, Emile's identity is an
internalisation of the Tutor's identity to the extent that he equates "love of the Author
of his being" with his natural "love of self'.16-1
The imperceptibility of the force which shapes him blocks Emile's capacity to
renegotiate the boundary between his identity and other's. Emile internalises authority
absolutely during the transformation of that authority from 'mastery' to 'friendship'
which gives control the immediacy of self-motivation: "self-love put(s) him into your
hands".164 The Tutor is the "middle term"165 linking Emile to society. Eiowever,
mediation is a dangerous concept in Emile because it represents a source of alienation.
Therefore, the Tutor is not another (alienating) will but 'another self'. This other self,
however, does not enter into relations with Emile but represents the rigid identity of
both parties linked in terms of absolute dependence: "I would have tutor and scholar
so inseparable that they should regard their fate as one".166
For Emile higher level subjectivity is a self-integration based on an ontology of
selfhood - integration into a naturally, metaphysically determined, teleologically
structured higher stage. Because Rousseau fails to historicise and socially
contextualise the conditions for the strategic distortion of human interaction,
interaction remains negative at an ontological (rather than historical) level. The
pathology of communication is inherent rather than developmental and is therefore
irreversible. Once constructed "the first link in ... (the) social order" is no longer
amenable to validity testing and rational reconstruction.167 Because interaction does
not have a communicative intent it cannot distinguish between reaching an
understanding and success - that is, exerting an influence on another.168 So, argues
Rousseau, "the child's first tears are prayers, beware lest they become commands".169
This state of vigilance determines that techniques of surveillance are central to
subjective development.
Rousseau explains why in the context of a speculative reconstructive theory of
history. In a good - albeit primitive - societies, character is immediately available for
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inspection: "The good man is an Athlete who delights in fighting naked." Character
is wedded to action with the same immanence as action to the body, and motivation is
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completely externalised. Assessments of others can be made "at first glance".
Similarly, Emile is both educable to the extent that he is perceptible, and to be
172rendered more perceptible by his education. Rousseau advises guarding against the
'indistinctiveness' of city children.173 Modern societies, he says, throw a "deceitful
veil of politeness"174 over genuine relations, and so are to be made subject to the
paradigmatic sites of inspection, role construction and limit internalisation found in
Geneva. In Geneva balls are arranged for the marriageable youths "where the eyes of
the public are constantly open and upon them, forcing them to be reserved, modest,
and to watch themselves most carefully."175
Parry points out that the transparency of republican festivals is reinforced by
surveillance: "A lord commissioner presides over the ceremonies. The elderly and
particularly married women are observers and censors. A queen of the ball is elected
as an example to the community of modest conduct. Through these censors the
community acts as a partial spectator of individual behaviour."176 The passage is
resonant with Rousseau's discussion of Emile's integrity based on the importance of
public honour to Sophy: "What will people think?" Emile there internalised the
prohibition as 'virtue' exercised in self-control.177 Surveillance is an internalised
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spectator which congeals the self around the role representing the permissible limits
of expression. In Geneva governance through the censors constructs a correspondence
between self and society which appears self-posited because the look is an evaluative
device segregating recognition from oblivion. It is only through the internalisation of
these normative limits that a sense of particularity concretises the individual who
should "decide to be what the community has made him."178
The form of identity promoted here is not autonomous because no higher order
reflexivity ('decision') binds the individual to their role. For Rousseau, legitimate
action in society is a product of the combination of the "utmost generality in content
with utmost individuality in source".17'' However, as a 'source' the individual merely
doubles his role, and reproduces his persona in his person. In Geneva, the
individualist indifference to standards cannot be solved except by an equally extreme
reaction - the individual capitulation to standards.
BOUNDARY AND LIMIT
Aboulafia argues that the sense of self is a bounded quasi-totality in the sense that it
has a redefinable boundary. This boundary is redefined by the subject's response to
1 SO
normative situations, but only to the extent that this response is recognised. This
significant stage of consciousness is foreclosed in Emile at a number of levels. The
father, for example, counters the child's capacity to negate a negation with an
181absolute negation against which no subjective position can be taken. Unrecognised,
the subject's power of negation ('No') remains alien to the subject, and prevents self-
I
creation. The Tutor on the one hand introduces 'use' value as a transcendental
standard for the child to test 'reality'. 'What is the use of that?' is the means the child
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is given for legitimately soliciting responses from others.183 More importantly,
authority is the means put into the Tutor's hands to call an end to 'useless'
questioning. The Tutor's 'no' is a universal negation without possibility of returning
the negation, not an offer in relation to which the child is invited to respond in order
for the subject to emerge.
For Rousseau, the worst possible education is one that 'hesitates' between the will of
the educator and the will of the child.184 The battle ofwills occurs in a gap that
artificially separates and assumes the irreconcilable conflict of 'being-for-ourselves'
18^and 'being-for-others'. In the place of this potential hesitancy Rousseau advises the
constant prohibitive command: 'No'. However, the 'no' is thereby a signifier of the
presence of the gap in the command between its issuance and its being followed.
There is no automaticity to the action that responds to the command. Emile is a split
subject, caught between the binding norm and the motivation (affective claims) to
follow it.186 The buried 'double negative'187 that structures the 'no' admits the
possibility of discourse, and thereby of a possible negotiation of the boundary
between subjects and objects of command, between sources of authority and their
targets. Ultimately, the conversion of utterance into intersubjective discourse opens
the possibility for the subject to occupy the role of the other. However, for Rousseau,
the respective wills of the child and the Tutor represent an essential discrepancy
which cannot be reconstructed.
The sense of self results from a resolution of the conflict of wills - an integration of
impulse (the self) and prohibition (the No). This is initiated by Emile identifying with
... 133the Tutor to decrease the tension in containing both the desire and the prohibition.
Autonomy is only fully realised, however, when the limit between internal and
185
external internalised as a property of consciousness is negotiated in the subject's
intersubjective relations with society. Ultimately, silence - the refusal to communicate
- becomes a source of assurance, of truth, and of power and authority. Making the
189
'no' a wall of brass registers the refusal to be accountable and to justify it, to open
the hermeneutic dialogue. The impersonality of the 'no' makes the utterance situation
independent rather than embedded in interactive contexts. Rousseau makes it a wall of
brass to extrude ambiguous and subjective tremblings from it - to dry it clean of
uncertainty and open-endedness. The father who does not respond to his children
when they speak to him ("What a father!"190) thereby establishes himself as father -
he need not answer, he need only express his wishes, desires and orders.
The Tutor, as mediator, obscures the paradox of form - the dependence of the
observer on the observed.191 By means of a communicative prohibition the Tutor in
fact privileges certain semantic performances (his negation) over others (negation
allowed to all dialogic participants on the basis of their role as partners of discourse),
monopolising the authority to control observations, and defuse paradoxes by linking
orders of observation. Hesitation in education occurs because of a dual conception of
the sign. On the one hand the sign is arbitrary, with no natural relation to the referent.
On the other hand the sign represents the unity of difference between the signifier and
the signified. Even Sophy is (and must be) 'adorned',192 and the fable of the Fox and
the Crow, rather than a relic of feudal mythology, is the condition of Enlightenment.
Although the sign is without a referent, it establishes a relationship between the
signifier and the signified (or first order and second order observations) that is the
relationship of reference. The Tutor's 'no' is equally ambiguous. As a command it is
not outside society - not a wall of brass - but within it and therefore the subject of a
186
response. That response calls forth the question and answer session between Tutor
and child positing pedagogical instructions within a space of reasons. The dynamics
of identity, in other words, can only be captured by second order observations: the
observer observes how observers deal with objects that are only references to
observations stabilised by other observations. There is no immediacy or transcendent
subject of observation, only a communicative context of knowledge.
There cannot, therefore, in the absolute terms established in Emile, be any freedom,
critique or will. Ferrara recognises that, for Rousseau, autonomy only appears in its
negative form, as freedom from the effects of social pressure represented by the
influence of others.193 Ferrara's requirement is based on Mead's concept of the self.
Flabermas' conception of a discursively and communicatively, or intersubjectively,
constituted self posits autonomy of a different order, and exposes Emile to a critique
which Mead's descriptive concept cannot articulate. For Flabermas, the subject comes
to be in the place of the other where the other's utterance has opened the possibility of
a response.194 As long as the Tutor's command is considered absolute it cannot be
refused. The 'No', however, is situated in contexts of interaction which necessarily
establishes a conversational relationship since it anticipates the response of a
conversation partner.195 As an offer ofmeaning the 'No' ultimately depends on the
response it draws forth. This response, importantly, is not predetermined. It is open
whether the command will be confirmed or resisted, whether the subject will occupy
the role or transcend it through a qualitatively different response. It is not, then, as
Ferrara says, that the Tutor plays the role of an integrative ego function.196 Rather, it
is only in the breaching of objective autonomy and the openness of the subject to
discourse that conditions of reflective autonomy are established.
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